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Italian pilots were good, particularly their fighter pilots. Laddie Lucas, in his book about the fight for Malta, is very generous in his description of his opponents. There was a great tradition of aviation in Italy, and their air force participated in several great long-distance ventures between the wars. The fighter equipment was not up to date in fall 1940 as their main fighter models, the Fiat CR.42 and G.50, were underpowered and under-gunned but very maneuverable. The Fiat BR.20M bomber, however, was on par with anything the RAF had. It flew faster than the Hampden, Wellington and Beaufort with a better bomb-load combination (except for the Welllington), and it had a more powerful defensive armament, fielding three 12.7mm (.50 calibre) Breda machine guns. It served well with Franco’s forces during the Spanish Civil War and for the Japanese during the Second Sino-Japanese War. If anything, it had a weakness in that its engines consumed so much oil that its range became restricted. Most of the BR.20s that failed to cover the distance from Italy to Belgium in one hop had to land for refilling of oil. For operational sorties over England this was not a problem due to the shorter distances involved there.
To believe that the Italian bombers could have gone straight into battle is not realistic. Given a few days, however, under an immediate urge to support their allies, it would have been possible, particularly if their missions were to be flown in the easily-navigated area between the Thames Estuary and the Belgian coast, which they actually did. The Fiats could carry a large variety of bomb-loads, ranging from 20 to 800 kilogram bombs, weapons powerful enough to sink or damage larger warships. It could also carry a bomb dispenser system with four bombs containing a total of 720 bomblets, 1 to 2 kilogram anti-personnel or incendiary bombs.
But they were shot down in droves, were they not? Not really. If you compare the Italian losses with similar daylight British losses over the Continent, they were rather less than more. In the first night-bombing mission on October 24, 1940, none of the 16 participating Fiats were lost to enemy action. The British reported little practical damage, not so strange since the bombings were done from 5,000 meters altitude. On October 29, 1940, the first daylight raid was flown with 15 Fiats participating. The bomber unit overflew Ramsgate at a relatively low altitude in a tight wingtip-to-wingtip formation which flabbergasted the anti-air gun crews. The Italian bombers were described as standing out as peacocks due to their lively camouflage. The British guns were able to do damage to five of the Italians; one of them force-landed in Belgium, the others made it back to their base after 75 bombs had been dropped on Ramsgate. On the night of November 5/6, 1940, 13 Fiats flew a night sortie over Harwich and Ipswich without losses. Without any triumphs to report, the best the English newspapers could report on was the awakened citizens who complained that the Italian aircrafts sounded like “rattling tin cans.” In other words, they were not much good.
There were quite a few missions flown with more losses generated by mechanical failures than enemy action. On November 11, 1940, came the mission that probably contributed the most to the bad reputation of the CAI. Ten BR.20M’s took off around midday, each of them loaded with three 250 kilogram bombs. They flew the route Bruges-Ostend-Harwich and approached Harwich at 14:40 at 3,700 meters. Bad weather resulted in most of the escort force not showing up. Of the 42 CR.42s, 46 G.50s and some Luftwaffe Bf 109s, only the CR.42’s were in the vicinity. The Italian formation was jumped by parts of four Hurricane and Spitfire squadrons, which had been scrambled by the radar controllers. One squadron already was in the area flying a routine patrol. The Fiat fighters soon had their hands full defending themselves, leaving the bombers to their destiny. After the battle the RAF fighter pilots made claims of nine BR.20Ms shot down and one damaged, which was the whole strength of the formation. In reality, three were shot down. The Italians claimed nine British fighter shot down while only two in reality were damaged. With claims such as these there was bound to be some false impressions. Much has also been made of the fact that the Italian bomber crews flew with steel helmets and had their rifles on the ready in the aircraft with bayonet mounted. When you think about it, this is a rather sensible precaution in a war. I’d like to see a RAF bomber force over the Continent or a Kriegsmarine base, being met by a similar fighter force, getting away as lightly as the Italians did on this occasion.
The CAI returned to Italy during the first half of 1941.
General characteristics Fiat BR.20M
• Crew: 5
• Length: 16.68 m (54 ft 8 in)
• Wingspan: 21.56 m (70 ft 8.75 in)
• Height: 4.75 m (15 ft 7 in)
• Wing area: 74.0 m² (796.5 ft²)
• Empty weight: 6,500 kg (14,330 lb)
• Max takeoff weight: 10,100 kg (22,270 lb)
• Power-plant: 2× Fiat A.80 RC.41 18-cylinder radial engine, 746 kW (1,000 hp) each
Performance
• Maximum speed: 440 km/h (273 mph)
• Cruise speed: 340 km/h (211 mph)
• Range: 2750 km (1,709 mi)
• Service ceiling: 8,000 m (26,250 ft)
Armament
• Guns: 3× 12.7 mm (.5 in) Breda-SAFAT machine guns
• Bombs: 1,600 kg (3,530 lb) of bombs
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Well, it seems tp me that the Italian air forces should have been a branch of the Reggiamarine. Consider that from west to east they had bases in: Sardinia, Sicily. Pantelleria, Greece and Crete (after 1941) and the Dodecanese. With these assets, there was no real need for aircraft carriers provided that the air was part of the navy with appropriate training, communication, and etc.
Mind you, the record of the RAF is no better so the RN had to have the support of the FAA. Nonetheless, the coopertion between the Italian air force and navy appears to have been woeful.
TKerr
The Fiat was strictly a level bomber, and had limited ability to hit ship targets from medium to high altitude. Against merchants ships traveling in convoy at moderate speeds, the Italian Air Force did achieve some success in hitting ships. Against rapidly moving and maneuvering naval vessels, such as the destroyers that the Royal Navy would have been using against any attempted German landing, the Fiat would have been pretty much useless. If used to attack the RN destroyers while they were in the midst of the invasion flotilla, the Fiats would have posed far more danger to the Germans than to the Royal Navy. There were also a reasonable number of cases of Italian aircraft attacking Italian navy vessels. Naval vessels being attacked by friendly aircraft were a continual problem during World War 2. No air force really had much success with medium to high altitude horizontal bombing against ship targets during the war.
Hi, Dale – not much new here! If anything, I should think the Axis bomber forces would primarily try to stop any RN units before they entered the Channel (except their dive bombing forces). As for mixing up friend and foe I don’t think I have seen more complaints than from RN personnel – even quite late in the war. That said, I have also seen comments from the same sources in the Med that, as level bombers go, the Italians weren’t that bad. Of course, it would always be a balance between altitude and hitting probability. In 1940 I should think none of the warring factions were as badly prepared for anti-ship operations as the RAF Bomber Command.
Is that so?
Which sources? What were the successes then of Italian level bombers against moving ships, merchant or otherwise, in 1940/41?
Whether Bomber Command was prepared for hitting ships is a red herring. They had Coastal Command and the Fleet Air Arm for that job. Both of them could hit ships, as they demonstrated, and some the reasons for the failure of Coastal Command to be more successful (lack of intel) would not have mattered in a fight against an invasion fleet, while others would have. Bomber command however did very well in its aerial mining campaign already early on.
If you want to discuss this in earnest I suggest you establish a thread in the Forum.
Fred
Here is perfectly fine, since you chose to bring it up here. So I take it then that there were probably no successes by Italian high-level bombers against the Royal Navy in 1940/41.
The Hampden had a higher bomb load:
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/hampden_spec.html
The Beaufort was a torpedo bomber, so it is hardly surprising it had a lower bomb load (i.e. none). You maybe thinking of the Blenheim, which was light bomber, and therefore in an entirely different class. You are also ignoring the Whitley, which was a contemporary medium bomber that could haul almost twice the payload of the Br.20.
The Br.20 was a good enough machine. No more, no less.
Interesting article…but I dont think British recording of the Italian efforts are as bad as you say. They are merely a record that the italians were there, basically ineffectual and that the mission was a propoganda effort by Mussolini – most of which isnt far from the mark. It was a bit of a pointless exercise – those fighters and bombers would have been invaluable in Africa.
Hi, peterg!
We might have read different stories…:-)…..As for ineffectual they really should be compared with their opponents, the RAF, as implied by me in the article. The Bomber Command was not very effective at the time and had heavy losses when they tried to be. The Italian bombers surely could have achieved more than they did at the time and in the context of an invasion this force might have been of more use to the Germans than it was, as a crucial element would have been the Royal Navy’s eventual incursions into the Channel from the East. More than 100 extra well-placed Axis bombers in such a context could certainly have made a difference.
Fred
Only if they actually hit something. How many naval vessels were actually hit by level bombers in 1940? Did the Regia Aeronautica practice these kind of attacks with their level bombers at the time?