Italian Army of 1940: Facilitator or Victim of Mussolini’s Failed War Strategy?

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Meeting Betwen Mussolini, Hitler, Ciano and Von Ribbentrop Picture Courtesy of WW2Total.com.

His difficulty in understanding the German advance in France was perhaps another demonstration that by 1940 the Duce had lost the better of his political insight. Too many years spent as an absolute dictator with no one in a position to contradicted or challenge him had made Mussolini a slave to his own glorified myth, and prisoner of his own schemes. His capacity to understand and rate other men, nations, and the events that were now gripping the world was severely reduced.  So, in Mussolini’s eyes, the shocking developments  in France was justified with the conclusion that there was in fact a secret accord between France and Germany; elements in the French government and or military had secretly made an agreement to ‘step aside’ for the German military, thus ushering a new Nazi regime to gain control of the country.

Without discarding this option entirely, there were some past events that that lend themselves to give some bit of credence to this theory.  Years before the actual German invasion, Hitler started to prepare in France the groundwork for Nazism to take hold.  He, for the most part on the sly, took control of some small but influential newspapers in which after acquiring them, he began to spread the Nazis ideology through the power of the ‘press’.  Some of these principles took a great hold onto many right-wing leaning intellectuals, perhaps even more so than in Italy. This could be explained by the fact that too many in Italy, Nazism looked like a bad copy of Fascism, while in France it was considered a revolutionary way to react to an ineffective democracy.

But the real “coup de theatre” was the Russian – German non-aggression pact signed in 1939.  At that point the French left wing intellectuals were now totally disoriented, being that socialism seemed to be the glue which joined Russia and Germany.  Now these men began to see a possible German invasion of France under a different light, in which Hitler, as a sort of liberator, would be the man who annihilated the ‘failed’ capitalist democracy to impose a new socialist order in France.

Thus there was a moment in time in which the extremes of both the French left and right wings, for different reasons, looked positively at the German invasion.  There is not enough documentation to say in what proportion those feelings affected the French resistance to the invasion, if at all, but the rapidity with which the French were defeated in conjunction with expedient nature in which the collaborationist government was formed, suggested to some, including to some degree Mussolini, that a sector of the French establishment (and even a part of the Army) was perhaps not so rigidly opposed to the German invasion and conquest.

The speed at which France fell to Hitler’s army was not even considered before hand by the Duce. Alone into his office, with an intelligence service useful only to persecute some old antifascist who had escaped to Paris, the Duce expected day after day  that“ a new Marne” would appear to entangle and punish Hitler’s army in a bloody drawn out affair; this was never to materialize on the battlefields of 1940 France.

The following facts are known: 10 June 1940 Italy entered the war alongside Germany, and within days her troops were engaged against the enemy.  The Italian advance into France launched at the teeth of the French Alps defensive network, was a hastily and poorly planned engagement that seemed to indicate that little to no advance planning had been involved.  Given almost no artillery support, the Italian soldiers impaled themselves continually onto the French fortifications, thus minimal ground was gained in exchange for a costly price in Italian blood.

A lingering theory persists that this act was done perhaps not so much to gain for the Italians the treasures and rewards from the imminent fall of France, but to secure for its own future use the protection that this mountainous region of the Alps would provide Italy in the eventuality Hitler next turned his army south, and sent his troops to war against Italy.

What is perhaps most disconcerting about the Italian entry into war is the fact that the momentous decision to destine the country to the inevitable horrors and hardships that were to come was not even fully committed to until just a handful of days before hand. Now Italy was thrust into the beginning of the greatest fight ever to befall mankind, and did so without even truly knowing who her friends were, and of perhaps greater importance, who were her true enemies.

With irrefutable certainty, one can state that Italy was not prepared for this war; neither from the moral point of view, nor from the practical one.   Mussolini and his government had established a new policy for the country to follow into war:  the policy of uncertainty.

Special Thanks to TJ for the overall editing of the text and for his valuable additions. His contributions makes him a co-author in all respects.

References
Galeazzo Ciano; Diary 1937 – 1943
Giuseppe Bottai;  Diary 1935 – 1944
Giuseppe Bottai;  Vent’Anni e un Giorno
Dino Grandi;  Il Mio Paese. Ricordi Autobiografici.
Renzo De Felice;  Mussolini il Duce  vol. 1 and 2
Enzo Biagi;  La Seconda Guerra Mondiale – Parlano I Protagonisti

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I’m very interested to all concerning the WW2, but especially I like to study the military and political aspects of the Italian participation to the WW2. Also, I like to investigate lesser known facts and figures of the conflict.

Lorenzo

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