On the 21st, the British attempted a flanking maneuver at the Italian line with a group of armored cars, but this advance was driven off by Italian tanks. Later that same day, the Italians launched about 30 tanks at the British lines, but heavy artillery fire and a group of Crusader tanks broke up the attack, and Italians pulled back to their own lines.
Italian tanks proved their worth at Bir El Gubi. Picture courtesy of diglander.libero.it
The day of the 22nd was relatively quiet, and the Ariete Division received orders late that afternoon that the bulk of their tanks would pull out the next day to coordinate on another attack with the Germans.  This plan called for Ariete to advance on the British troops near Sidi Rezegh and attempt to crush them between elements of 21 Panzer.  The first Battle of Bir el Gubi was over.
The battle of Bir el Gubi had been an impressive victory for the Italians. They had not only stood up under the weight of a large British armored offensive, but inflicted heavy damage to the attacker while retaining the ground they defended. With their forces unexpectedly tied up with the Italians, only one full strength Armored unit was able to reach Sidi Rezegh, and were consequently crushed by Rommel’s Afrika Korps. The battle there might have turned out differently had the British been able to hit the Afrika Korps with the intended strength they had planned for.
The battles fought during Crusader over the next month would rage back and forth. The British would eventually break the siege at Tobruk when the Axis army was forced to pull back to the more defensible area of Gazala as supplies started to run out for them. The Axis would take back some of this lost land in fierce fighting before the whole of the battle came to a standstill in January.
The Ariete on the move. Picture courtesy of libero.it
The siege of Tobruk had been lifted, but the British had failed to destroy the Axis forces as Crusader had called for. The Axis troops under Rommel would make them pay for that failure in 1942, as they would drive deep into the heart of the Allies through Egypt, setting up the final showdown at El Alamein.
The British lost close to 50 tanks and suffered nearly 100 casualties during the fighting at Bir el Gubi.  The Italians lost about 35 of their tanks, and suffered close to 200 casualties during the successful defense staged in those hot sands of Libya. The turnaround of Italian military in North Africa had begun.
Back on November 23rd, as the Ariete division was moving out of Bir el Gubi to link up with the Germans, they did so with a renewed sense of pride and confidence. As the troops pulled away in their tanks and support vehicles, Bir el Gubi disappeared behind them into the hazy desert horizon, and emerged into Italian military history.
TJ Nicoletti
References:
Iron Hulls Iron Hearts: Mussolini’s Elite Armoured Divisions in North Africa
Wikipedia Articles                                                                                                                                                                                                        Decisive Campaigns of the Second World War: John Gooch                                                                                                              Pendulum of War: The Three battles of El Alamein: Niall Barr
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Very interesting….I am looking for firsthand accounts of this particular engagement, both from Ariete and Brit. 22nd Armored Brigade. If you know of any in published form – memoirs, diaries, etc. – please post at my site. With thanks –
SDC
Thank you for the additional information.
There are many imprecisions on this article. (I wanna give you my apologize for my bad english)
In the morning of 19th june, le Ariete armoured division was waiting for the british attack, but on that morning General Mannerini, vice commander of the CAM[1], was visiting the position of the 8th bersaglieri regiment at Bir el Gobi. When the english advance on the position started, the main bulk of italian infantry defencese was refitting her position, because in Mannerini’s wiew, the sistemation of italian defences was too large.
At 11:00 the XXII Armoured brigade started his attack, but general Scott-Cockburn, that was in command of the brigade, didn’t line up his artillery and decide to charge the position of the 8th bersaglieri, retaining that his three tank regiment can easily defeat the italians. This idea was created by the earlier engagement by some M-13 and Crusaders sent by both forces in recognition, as you also reported.
At noon the attack was staging, but british tanks charged the italian position using a line formation, like a cavalry charge, and without support of artillery, thinking that they could easly overrun the defenders. This allowed the italians to easily target them with artillery.
When the 4th Country of London Yeomanry (4th C.L.Y.), one of the three tank battalions of the XXII brigade, impact on the right side of the bersaglieri defensive positions, it was repulsed by the artillery fire. But in the center the 3rd C.L.Y. and the 2nd Glouchestershire tank battalions were able to break-in the defensive position of the 8th bersaglieri.
At 3:00 p.m. the central part of italians defences were overrun by english, and Scott-Cockburn retain that victory was near, but just few moments after that he had realized that, the 131th italian tank regiment, composed by VII-VIII and IX tank battalion, started a counter-attack against the british spearhead into bersaglieri positions.
The VII and the VIII tank battalion attacked directly the 3rd C.L.Y, and in the mean time the IX tank battalion starts an outflanking maneuvre against the 2nd Glouchstershire, trying to close in a pincer the two british tank battalions penetrated into italian defences.
But unfortunately for the italians, the british tanks had a superior speed and when they started a withdraw, the M-13 were unable to follow them or to close the pincer before the british can’t escape.
[1] CAM: Corpo d’armata di manovra, an army corp composed by the Ariete armoured division, the Trieste motorized division and a recce group. It was created to be an operational mobile reserve at disposition of the italian commander of the Supreme North African Command, the General Bastico, and was under the control of General Gambara that at that time was equal to Rommel in the hierarchy of Axis forces in Lybia.
My sources:
Montanari – Le operazioni in Africa Settentrionale Vol. II Tobruk – USSME, Rome 1993 (2nd Volume of the italian army relation on the northafrican campaign)
Playfair Ian Stanley Old, con Stitt G.M.S., Molony C.J.C., Toomer S.E.: – The Mediterranean and the Middle East Vol. II: The Germans come to the help of their ally- H.M.S.O., London 1956
- Diario Storico del Comando Supremo: Vol. V (settembre – dicembre 1941) – USSME, Roma 1995 (Official reports of the Italian General Staff)
- Verbali delle riunioni tenute dal Capo di Stato Maggiore Generale – Vol. II (1 gennaio – 31
dicembre 1941) – USSME, Roma 1983 (Verbals of the meetings of the Italian Chief of italian General Staff)