Opie’s Taranto report arrived in Washington in January of 1941, and the delay seems to have lessened its impact. Back in November, CNO Harold Stark had been hot for more information, – the Taranto attack was the page one story in the November 14 New York Times – pestering his aides for more details. By January, though, the US Navy had convinced itself that torpedoes would only run in deep (75 feet) water, and sent this message out to the Fleet. Opie’s report, and those of other observers, that the Royal Navy felt that its torpedoes could successfully run in water as shallow as 24 feet seems to have been missed. Although he asked to be sent to Hawaii to share the “lessons learned,” Opie returned in April to a desk job in Washington. His lecture to the Navy’s General Board covered other aspects of the attack, and no one seems to have asked him about the depth of water issue. Interestingly, one of his lessons learned was that ships might be safer from aerial attack if they were at sea, rather than in a harbor. No one followed up on this idea, either. In September, Opie took over as CO of USS Roe, a destroyer on Atlantic duty. On December 7, Roe was docked at Hvalfjordur, Iceland’s major port.
The raid on Taranto demonstrated the power of carrier-based planes. Striking from ‘over the horizon,’ such aircraft could surprise land based targets and ships thought to be safe in their harbors. As aircraft became faster and better armed, this threat would only increase. The Royal Navy made this point with one carrier and twenty planes. The Japanese Navy would dramatically emphasize it when they attacked with 6 carriers flying off 350 planes. The Japanese sent an attache from Berlin to Taranto in the wake of the attack to consult with the Italians and observe the damage. Later, in May of 1941, a full-fledged naval mission to Italy would visit Taranto and engage in lengthy talks with the Italian Navy about the attack. The Japanese adopted the Italian method of preventing air-launched torpedoes from diving too far: that of attaching wooden fins to the torpedo to break its dive. They worked out the details in extensive testing conducted through the summer and fall of 1941, but it seems likely that the idea came from the mission to Italy. Taranto did little to influence Admiral Yamamoto, who had already convinced himself that attacking Pearl Harbor was feasible, except perhaps to reinforce this belief.
More details of this event can be found in my book, The Raid, The Observer, The Aftermath, which can be purchased by visiting this link.
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With regard to the second wave, the aircraft damaged on deck, L5F, was struck down into the hangar, repaired, and then launched some 30 minutes after the rest of that wave. One other aircraft in that wave, which had a long range tank fitted beneath the fuselage, L5Q, lost the tank, and so returned to Illustrious.
You can find details in “Swordfish” by David Wragg, Weidenfield & Nicolson, London, 2003. ISBN 0-297-84667-1
Or, as stated above, in my book.
What if the Italians adopted the German-style Z-Plan for the Navy?
Littorio-Class Battleship…6 ships
Spica-Class Torpedo Boat…100 ships
Explosive Motor Boat…100 ships
Guiseppe Garibalde-Class Cruiser…20 ships
Marconi-Class Submarine…250 ships
Pearl Harbor was a false flag, Taranto was for real.
Great article. Nice analysis on why the Swordfish bomber was the perfect choice for this raid.