“Disguised” Italian Merchant Raiders

jwsleser

Member
Staff member
#1
Posted 17 October 2012 - 12:09 PM bye Peleliu81

I am currently reading a book on the Battle of the Atlantic (Battle of the Atlantic, Marc Milner), and the author makes mention of the good results obtained by disguised German Raider vessels. (German ship would be disguised as common merchant vessel and once an Allied ship got to within range of its weapons, it would open up with surprise attack). The author mentions that the British had started cataloging and documenting ships that could eventually be used by the Japanese as merchant Raiders as early as 1934, Germany in 1938, and by the Italians in February of 1939.
Can anyone provide information, or source references, of the Italians using “disguised” merchant Raiders during the war? I am not familiar with any instances. If they did not employ such vessels, if anyone knows for certain, I would appreciate that knowledge as well.

TJ

Posted 17 October 2012 - 12:29 PM by fredleander

All information I have found is that Italian armed merchants were not used as "raiders" in the way of the Kriegsmarine's Hilfskreuzer, but mainly as escorts or armed transports.

Fred

http://www.navypedia.org/ships/italy/it_cm_amc2.htm

Posted 17 October 2012 - 06:28 PM by Frederick

I originally added this response to David's account,
so then erased it. Sorry for the confusion.


I of course know about the German Atlantis (as you can imagine I have video) however this is the first I've heard of Italian raiders. I was able to find this limited info about the Ramb I:

http://www.nzhistory.../sinking-ramb-1

Seems they came to an untimely end around the Horn of Africa in February 1941. Search "Italian ship Ramb I" in wikipedia and there is a bit more background
info.
 

jwsleser

Member
Staff member
#2
Posted 18 October 2012 - 12:41 PM by Frederick

TJ, here is some more info from a different source - interesting stuff!

History of the Italian plans to transform motorships into military units for war in the oceans from 1940 to 1943

After Italy’s foray into WW II (June 10th, 1940), Supermarina began a series of studies with the purpose of transforming a certain number of motor vessels of medium displacement, but with large range, into units modified to intercept and destroy British maritime traffic in the oceans.

These studies, which were considered part of a single project, did not produce any practical result since during the favorable first year of war, Italy failed, as we know, to seize the British bases of Suez and Gibraltar, which precluded the existence of Axis surface ships from the Mediterranean into the oceans.
However, since Italy had a certain number of hulls fit for this use and already placed outside the Mare Nostrum (the Italian and German merchant ships docked in neutral or friendly ports, such as the Japanese ones, were quite a few), the supreme command of the Italian Navy, even though with a great delay, decided in the summer of 1940 to begin a study. This study attempted to emulate the orders given by the Kriegsmarine relative to the creation and utilization of the so-called “auxiliary cruisers.” It should be noted that since 1939 Germany had created the first “raiders”, introducing them, since early 1940, into the oceanic trade routes.

On the 6th of September, 1940, the Project Office of the “Stato Maggiore” of the Navy generated a first list of three modern cargo ships, all belonging to the “Monginevro” class, (at the time, near completion at the “Cantieri Riuniti dell’Adriatico” shipyard) and all fit for radical transformations. The three ships belonged to the Società di Navigazione Alta Italia and were in an advanced phase of completion (the first one was 99% complete, the second one 96% and the third one 92%). These ships had all the required characteristics for long missions (obviously after a few alterations), and, due to their structural characteristics, could easily receive the installation of the necessary guns, torpedo launchers, antiaircraft guns, and the equipment and the extra storage indispensable to a raider of the oceans.

The units of the Moginevro class were 124 meters long, 18 meters wide and had a drought of 7.40 meters loaded. The total displacement was around 5,500 tons with a capacity of 8,600 tons. The three ships could reach a maximum speed of 16.5 knots (and maintain 15), and had a range, at a speed of 15 knots, of 12,000 miles.

The engineers of the Regia Marina in charge of compiling a report on the characteristics of the hull under construction reported: “the deck is wide, quite unobstructed and it is quite suited for the installation of guns and mines… the silhouette of the “Monginevro” make us believe they will be seaworthy. The deck is wide and well-equipped, the quarters and stowage comfortable and in large quantity…” So, after a first analysis, Supermarina took positive, though incomplete, estimates and made assumptions (since the ships were not ready, they could not be actually tested) on the potentiality of these ships, moving on to an actual implementation plan to make them ready for combat.

It was thought to arm the ships in a manner similar to the one implemented by the German navy for the raiders. The naval engineers of Supermarina introduced the idea of installing six 152/40 guns (one near the bow, one near the stern, and four to the sides), two antiaircraft and anti-ship 37mm guns (on the boat deck, past the funnel), two 20mm AA guns (on the boat deck, or on top of the deck, near the compass), two 450 mm torpedo launchers (one on each side, installed in the hull about 5.5 m below the water line), and a smoke screen apparatus.
The selection of the 152 mm guns (weapons with a maximum range of 16,000 meters) was dictated by the need for a weapon of assured destructive capabilities against the hulls of merchantmen, and also for the need to respond to the guns of British light cruisers equipped with similar weapons. The 120 mm guns with which were equipped some Italian destroyers, at the time, and some auxiliary vessels (including the auxiliary ship Eritrea which operated in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean), were not selected, at least initially, because they were thought insufficient in facing large enemy cargo ships often equipped with 114mm, 120mm and even 152mm guns, or the British light cruiser of the Leander class often utilized to patrol oceanic routes.

To allow the Monginevro to locate their prey over the horizon with greater speed and ease, it was thought to install a hydroplane with folding wings, but this idea was later abandoned due to technical problems (boarding a plane would have required the creation of a gasoline bunker and other accessories which were expensive and voluminous). Regarding the offensive weaponry aboard, it was decided to equip the ships with 200 rounds and 5 star-shells for each 152 mm barrel, 300 shells for each 37mm guns and 6,000 cartridges for each 20 machine gun. In addition, over 600 explosive charges were to be placed inside the hull and the quick-work (the upper part of the ship extending from the hull) to provide for self-destruction in case of capture or severe damage.

The engineers of the Regia Marina in charge of the conversion of the “Monginevro” did not forget to plan for the installation of about 100 to 150 mines, of the Elia type, stowed in the stern hold. These mines would be lifted by cranes and transferred on specially constructed rails. The radio and signaling equipment would have consisted of the already existing radio equipment (a D/F fix, a 0.5 Kw transmitter, and a short and medium wave receiver). In addition, it was planned to install two additional receivers and a small radio.

Above the fore-bridge there was enough space for a model 60 or a model 90 discovery searchlight, possibly retractable, a signaling light projector, and an echo-sounding gear. The Monginevro’s fuel consumption was excellent (with a normal load of 770 t. they could cover over 12,000 miles at fast speed), but was not good enough for the Italian Navy engineers who wanted to increase the already excellent range by almost four fold, striving for a maximum range of 40,000 miles, or the equivalent of 5 months without calls. The plan called for the installation of an additional bunker for an additional 1,730 t. of oil fuel (for marine diesel engines).

The new bunker would have been installed on the hold’s dunnage, and in the forward and aft peak. Also, the Monginevros would have received large storage areas for flour and foodstuff, a refrigerated area, two ovens for the baking of bread, plus a large infirmary with a large selection of medicines. Also, to guarantee the good health of the personnel, one of the forward holds would have hosted a stable for a dozen milk cows and a large cage for about 50 chickens. Finally, the equipment for the new Italian “pirates” would have included a repair shop and spare parts depot.

The crews of the Monginevros would have included 12 officers, 10 petty officers, 14 sailors and mechanics, 42 sailors to man the guns, plus, if needed, 18 additional officers and sailors as crew for captured ships. Technical difficulties, politics, and financial issues did not allow Supermarina to go beyond a simple but highly detailed study for the transformation of the Monginevro, the Monviso and the Monreale. As it is known, the Italian Navy, since the very beginning of the war, had to concentrate all efforts on resolving multiple high-priority emergencies, since it had to face the toughness of the British Navy and Air Force.

During 1942, also considering the United States’ entry into the war, the project for the conversion of the Monginevros into raiders was definitively abandoned, leaving to the surviving German “Handels-Stor-Kreuzer” (cruisers for the disturbance of maritime traffic) the task of spreading panic along the oceanic routes.

Posted 18 October 2012 - 04:56 PM by Peleliu81

Thanks, good stuff. A chicken pen????


What was the source on this info?

Thanks again.

TJ

Posted 22 October 2012 - 09:22 PM by Frederick

I couldn't last long without an occasional roast either.


Plenty of good material on the site
http://www.regiamari...126&lid=1&cid=1
 
#3
These studies, which were considered part of a single project, did not produce any practical result since during the favorable first year of war, Italy failed, as we know, to seize the British bases of Suez and Gibraltar, which precluded the existence of Axis surface ships from the Mediterranean into the oceans.
I don't quite understand this. The Italians did not "fail" to seize Suez and Gibraltar in that they never attempted to in the first place. "Failed" is an odd word to use in this context. It would be like saying that the Germans "failed" to seize Vladivostok. Both Suez and Gibraltar were beyond their reach in the "favorable first year of the war" and all subsequent years. Gibraltar needed Spanish intervention, or at least, its acquiescence.

Secondly, the last part of the sentence is a puzzle: which precluded the existence of Axis surface ships from the Mediterranean into the oceans; Italian subs were quite active in the Mediterranean ( I know they are not surface ships), but I am almost certain that some Italian naval ships were active outside the Med. German ones definitely. The real war for the Italians was in the Med anyway, so why would they want to waste valuable resources sending their warships "into the oceans" ?
 
Last edited:

jwsleser

Member
Staff member
#4
I believe you are taking the comment out of context.

The first key word is studies. The R.M. had developed plans for more than just what historically happened. These plans were not realized for the reasons you mentioned. You can quibble about the use of the word 'failed', but one can 'fail to take action'. Nothing in the sentence requires an understanding that the 'Italians tried and failed'.

The term 'surface ships' clearly excludes submarines. IIRC, two merchant raiders did operate in the Indian Ocean for a short period of time.

Pista! Jeff
 
#5
Hi Jeff,

Long time so write! Ok, the problem was the word "failed". It implies that the Italians tried but "failed" . It is true they never tried to take Gibraltar as Franco, was against the idea, and his support was necessary. There were other reasons too, of course. Suez? Yes there were plans to do this and do that. That's what generals do, I suppose: making contingency plans. The German high command had a plan ready made to invade Palestine and sweep through Syria and link up with the forces in the Caucasus. They "failed" to institute that little plan!

I presume these medium-sized motor vessels would have been converted in Italy and transported overland to a French port on the Atlantic in German occupied France, thus by-passing Gibraltar altogether.
 
#7
Morning all,
Interesting thread. You may be interested to know that RAMB III which was an armed auxilery cruiser is still in existence. After the armistice it passed into German hands and finally Yugoslavian and became the presidential yacht Galeb. I attach a photo. I have numerous books on the Regia Marina and I don’t recall any mention of a disguised raider!
Regards,
Bob
 

Attachments

Annales

New Member
#8
I presume the it was used by Tito then as his private or state yacht. How ironic that Tito of all people should have chosen this particular ship.
 
#9
Jeff, I just uploaded this article the other day.
Regia Marina in the Far East: 1940-1945
Interesting article!

As for the use of the word "failed" I suppose Mussolini's intention with the September 1940 offensive was really to reach the Suez Canal. That Graziani thought otherwise doesn't negate the verdict of "failure". Just my opinion.

That said, considering the fact that Italy had commitments in Ethiopia, with a large number of troops and resources stranded there, it is a mystery that Mussolini decided to use his resources in Albania before he had secured the communications with his eastern outpost, capturing the Suez Canal before wasting his resources in other places. That was a great mistake, if not a "failure".

Fred
 
Top