Battle of Cheren

[Tom from Cornwall]

The third battalion of the 10º regg. granatieri was the btg. alp. «Uork Amba». It was the only battaglione alpini in the theater. The officer in the picture appears to be a major (although the shading and reflection make the rank hard to discern, could be a captain).

Hi Jeff,

Many thanks for the swift response. As an aside, are there any good English language sources for the Italian army in the East African campaign? I've got access to the relevant Italian official histories and am going to work through translating them as best I can but am looking for any sources which might help with the following questions:

1) Italian defensive tactics at Keren - from British sources, it appears there was an emphasis on immediate counter-attack by relative small Italian reserves against any position which fell to a British/Indian assault. That would require delegation and initiative at a relatively low level, not something that many English sources credit to Italian formations during WW2! Was this a well-trained force actually employing official doctrine or an isolated case driven by local terrain and personalities?

2) How "prepared" were the positions at Keren? There is some evidence that Fort Dologorodoc had been constructed before the battle (concrete-lined trench line ringing the crest of the hill) but not much evidence to suggest other positions were other than hastily assumed but taking advantage of the natural worth of the terrain to the defence. Are there any archival sources for pre-war Italian construction in Eritrea - fortifications, the railway or roads, etc? Pre-war photographs of the same?

3) Were the Italian colonial formations similar to those of the British Indian army? Infantry mainly African with British officers? More technical arms such as artillery and signals?

4) There are some suggestions in the British historiography that Platt's plan for Keren was too unimaginative - is that reflected in the Italian interpretation of the campaign as well?

Apologies for the deluge of questions! It's such an interesting campaign...

Regards

Tom

 

[jwsleser]

Tom

Glad I was able to assist. RE: your questions.

1. Yes, there was a very strong emphasis on immediate counter attack. This was in Italian military doctrine, but was enabled by the nature of colonial service. The colonial units were accustomed to operating independently before the war and were given wide latitude in initiative. This provided a school of training and experience that officers in metropolitan units didn't have access to. The same process of experience can be seen in the British colonial units. As most of the fighting at Cheren were small unit actions, this mode of operating fit well with the leadership's training. The usual problems that limited colonial officers, the lack of experience in orchestrating large unit operations, wasn't an issue in the A.O.I. The senior leadership was well versed in large scale operations and the subordinate units were skilled in small unit tactics. Note this is only IMHO.

2. There wasn't much preparation prior to the battle. Part of the issue was the nature of the terrain. Rocky, hard ground made it very difficult to build elaborate defensives. Lack of material was another issue. Labor was the third. The multiple avenues of approach to attack the A.O.I. made focusing the limited resources a serious challenge. The lack of indirect fire systems (mortars were specifically in short supply) hampered the defense more than the simplistic nature of the field works.

3. Yes. The technical services were mainly European, but there were a large number of Africans in even those units. Colonial artillery and machine gun units were colonial, Africa NCOs and men, Italian officers. The highest unit level for the colonial units were brigades, so much of the technical/support services were manned by Africans. The divisional structure created at the outbreak of war was more administrative and provided little tactical control or support.

4. That is difficult for me to answer as I haven't really analyzed the British options. Cheren was a tough nut to crack and the Italian leadership did a very good job in anticipating British actions. The Italians had forces already positioned to cover any wide British flanking movements such which was attempted to the north of Cheren. Logistics also limited what the British could do. While the British had better equipment, they didn't really outnumber the Italians by much, and the terrain enhanced the Italian weapons more than if the battle had been fought less severe terrain.

The Italian officials don't offer much analysis, but tend to be a straight recounting of events. You might try reading Riccio and Afiero's new book Birth and Fall of an Empire that covers the A.O.I. I have not read this book, but previous works by them tend to follow the official histories fairly closely. They have previously offered some comment, but don't provide much support for their conclusions (lacking footnotes and in-depth discussion of why they formed those conclusions). Sobski's East Africa 1940-1941 can offer some tidbits of new information, but I found it a difficult read and hard to follow (and I know a lot about the campaign).

I hope others here will clime in with their thoughts on this matter.

Pista! Jeff

 

[Tom from Cornwall]

Thanks Jeff,

Very useful information. I clearly need to go off and do some reading and research.

Regards

Tom