I came across a British analysis of the range of an Italian infantry battalion, including heavy machineguns and 47mm guns. They concluded the range was 1,000 yards (Why the source used yards is not explained.). Italian artillery only added another 500 yards max due to terrain interfering with sight lines.
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Board Wargame creation
- Thread starter David Wormell
- Start date
David Wormell
Member
Thanks for that.
Yards because it's a British analysis. we only started using the metric scale in the early 1970's and it wasn't fully adopted until 1992. Road signs are still in Imperial measurements.
Yards because it's a British analysis. we only started using the metric scale in the early 1970's and it wasn't fully adopted until 1992. Road signs are still in Imperial measurements.
So Interesting!
In combat at Battalion level what damage levels do you have?
Until now, I never calculated damage at the battalion level, as not very useful unless you do a Malta invasion game. Otherwise, attacks were made along a regimental front. If you use 1,000 yard hexes and a range of 1,000 yards for a battalion with a 1,000 yard front, a British attacking unit that comes with range of one Italian battalion also comes with range of the Italian battalions on each side of it, the British unit being within one hex range of all three battalions. Three battalions is a regiment. Thus, damage is done at the regimental, not the battalion, level.
The same thing occurs with tanks. When tanks attack infantry, they always get fired on by an entire regiment of anti-tank guns because even if the tanks are just on one hex, a line of three battalions in front of it can fire on that hex. This is important because a division never gets to fire all its weapons because, unless this is WW1, the enemy does not attack across the entire divisional front, but only a regimental front to try and punch through.
So if British tanks attack an Italian division with 6 battalions and 8-47mm guns, it actually attacks only one regiment of 3 battalions with 4-47mm guns, not 6 and 8.
I'll use the British attack on Bardia as the example. The Italian posts were 800 yards apart. To attack one post (3-4 machineguns) was to be fired on two other adjacent hexes (using 800 yard hexes). Once those three posts were taken, you had to take the next three too. Total: 6 posts with18-24 machineguns. After that, you can attack the remaining posts from behind with no casualties while Matilda tanks overrun the artillery in the rear.
It cost the British 456 men, about 56 by unnecessarily frontally attacking post 11. They did not repeat this mistake in taking Tobruk, where the casualties to do the same thing were 400. Subtracting post 11 out, it cost 400 men each to take 6 posts at both Bardia and Tobruk. This figure includes losses to artillery, with each post inflicts damage averaging 67 men. Subtracting out artillery casualties leaves 53 men per post, or almost exactly the casualties inflicted by post 11 at Bardia.
It doesn't matter that there were 40,000 Italian troops inside Bardia versus 23,000 in Tobruk. Take six posts to let the tanks and infantry through and its over. In both cases, Italian firepower is the same; 6 posts. Any Italian left after that is killed, wounded, or a prisoner. They can't shoot to the rear and their anti-tank guns bounce off the Matildas which then run them over. The British soldiers simply round them up.
This is why working with bigger scales (a regiment versus a single battalion, 6 posts versus divisions) produces more accuracy. I averaged casualties over 12 posts. By doing so, my game produced a loss of 400 British at Tobruk and Bardia plus 53 men at post 11, for a total of 853 casualties game versus 856 actual, an error of less than 1/2 of 1%.
To get a crude estimate an individual battalion's damage, the six posts averaged "about" 21 heavy (Breda 37) machineguns total (I do not count LMG's or rifles) to produce 53 casualties per post. This averages to 15 casualties per HMG. Depending upon source, an infantry battalion had 8 HMG or enough for 120 casualties. But this is just one way of how to calculate it and it involves concrete, barbed wire, and engineered fields of fire for extra casualties (Although the Australian had the defense map.). Other situations may be less and I do use other situations. I did a quick calculation by dividing my regimental damage by 3 to get a battalion damage and my games produce 133 but include 4-75mm guns.
What do you get?
Here is my source:Thanks for that.
Yards because it's a British analysis. we only started using the metric scale in the early 1970's and it wasn't fully adopted until 1992. Road signs are still in Imperial measurements.
Australia in the War of 1939-1945
Series One
Army
Volume I
To Benghazi
By
Gavin Long
Chapter 8David Wormell
Member
Not at the point when I am able to Alpha test the provisional combat scheme I'm afraid.Until now, I never calculated damage at the battalion level, as not very useful unless you do a Malta invasion game. Otherwise, attacks were made along a regimental front. If you use 1,000 yard hexes and a range of 1,000 yards for a battalion with a 1,000 yard front, a British attacking unit that comes with range of one Italian battalion also comes with range of the Italian battalions on each side of it, the British unit being within one hex range of all three battalions. Three battalions is a regiment. Thus, damage is done at the regimental, not the battalion, level.
The same thing occurs with tanks. When tanks attack infantry, they always get fired on by an entire regiment of anti-tank guns because even if the tanks are just on one hex, a line of three battalions in front of it can fire on that hex. This is important because a division never gets to fire all its weapons because, unless this is WW1, the enemy does not attack across the entire divisional front, but only a regimental front to try and punch through.
So if British tanks attack an Italian division with 6 battalions and 8-47mm guns, it actually attacks only one regiment of 3 battalions with 4-47mm guns, not 6 and 8.
I'll use the British attack on Bardia as the example. The Italian posts were 800 yards apart. To attack one post (3-4 machineguns) was to be fired on two other adjacent hexes (using 800 yard hexes). Once those three posts were taken, you had to take the next three too. Total: 6 posts with18-24 machineguns. After that, you can attack the remaining posts from behind with no casualties while Matilda tanks overrun the artillery in the rear.
It cost the British 456 men, about 56 by unnecessarily frontally attacking post 11. They did not repeat this mistake in taking Tobruk, where the casualties to do the same thing were 400. Subtracting post 11 out, it cost 400 men each to take 6 posts at both Bardia and Tobruk. This figure includes losses to artillery, with each post inflicts damage averaging 67 men. Subtracting out artillery casualties leaves 53 men per post, or almost exactly the casualties inflicted by post 11 at Bardia.
It doesn't matter that there were 40,000 Italian troops inside Bardia versus 23,000 in Tobruk. Take six posts to let the tanks and infantry through and its over. In both cases, Italian firepower is the same; 6 posts. Any Italian left after that is killed, wounded, or a prisoner. They can't shoot to the rear and their anti-tank guns bounce off the Matildas which then run them over. The British soldiers simply round them up.
This is why working with bigger scales (a regiment versus a single battalion, 6 posts versus divisions) produces more accuracy. I averaged casualties over 12 posts. By doing so, my game produced a loss of 400 British at Tobruk and Bardia plus 53 men at post 11, for a total of 853 casualties game versus 856 actual, an error of less than 1/2 of 1%.
To get a crude estimate an individual battalion's damage, the six posts averaged "about" 21 heavy (Breda 37) machineguns total (I do not count LMG's or rifles) to produce 53 casualties per post. This averages to 15 casualties per HMG. Depending upon source, an infantry battalion had 8 HMG or enough for 120 casualties. But this is just one way of how to calculate it and it involves concrete, barbed wire, and engineered fields of fire for extra casualties (Although the Australian had the defense map.). Other situations may be less and I do use other situations. I did a quick calculation by dividing my regimental damage by 3 to get a battalion damage and my games produce 133 but include 4-75mm guns.
What do you get?
I should add that while my games indicate an Italian battalion can inflict 133 casualties, that's using the Breda 37 HMG. The Breda 37 is only used on defense. You can't pack one across the battlefield to attack. That's what the Breda 30 LMG was for and it was a failure (jamming). So when an Italian infantry battalion attacked, it did so with an MC rifle, only half as good as a British Enfield, the worthless Breda 30, and a good 45mm mortar. British casualties drop to 20 or even less.
To correct for this deficiency, the Italians had the 65/17 Model 13 cannon on wheels. Although not a battalion weapon, it could be pushed forward (or mounted on a truck, particularly on a captured Morris CSB in North Africa) to accompany an attack, staying about 500 yards behind the infantry battalion. In spite of being 1913 vintage with wooden spoked wheels, it was a fairly good addition. Yet not so good for the British to make use of captured 65's themselves.
This tells you just how bad Italian infantry were equipped to attack. When the enemy won't collect your own captured weapons (as they did with the Breda 37) it means they're worse than theirs.
For Italian infantry to defeat British/Australian infantry, they had to threaten a flanking maneuver. The British/Australians would always pull back against any such threat. First, they didn't want to get surrounded because that led to the second possibility. Surrender. They didn't want to suffer the humiliation of being the first Common Wealth troops to surrender to the Italians. Although the first consideration was common sense, the second was pure British propaganda, which portrayed the Italians as military clods who eagerly surrendered. Some 45 Common Wealth troops taking 800 Italian prisoners was considered the norm. Therefore, for 45 Common Wealth troops to surrender to 800 Italians was not. No British officer wanted to be the first to do so. Yet to retreat was also hardly honorable and so, absent a flanking maneuver, they wouldn't. They'd simply slaughter the attacking Italians in a frontal assault until they ran out of ammunition AND WHICH THEY DID. The British only carried four days of ammunition which, in a three day game turn was 75% used up. This was additional incentive for the British to retreat on DAY FOUR when it was their turn.
In North Africa, except for the Italian offensive of September 1940, the British were very careful not to let themselves be outflanked by the Italians (Although Rommel did it all the time.). The only reason it happened then was due to Italian troops attacking Halfaya Pass, which threatened to cut off the British in Sollom. So their troops withdrew to Buq Buq to destroy the water wells. They could have made a stand there but didn't. Why not?
It's because there are no British troops at Sofafi-Rabia to cover their southern flank. So they pulled back to Azziiziya. This proved hardly a brilliant decision. With Italians now in control of Buq Buq, they could (and did) outflank the British to the south of Azziziya with walking infantry (2nd Libyan).
Using three day turns with the Italian turns being September 13, 14, and 15, the British turn began September 16. They have two problems. First, they have used up 3 of their 4 days of ammunition. Second, the 2nd Libyan (followed by 1st Blackshirt) is bypassing them on a dirt road to their south with a battalion of L3 tanks. Time to retreat. Ammunition resupply awaits just a few miles behind them at Sidi Barrani. Yet they don't stop here. They're in full reverse. Why?
It's because the L3 tanks and truck mounted 1st Blackshirt can reach Maktilla and surround them if they stop. So they kept on going. In fact, they kept on going so far I defy you to find where they retreated to. The 11th Hussars were assigned to keep the road open through Maktilla and dealt 1st Blackshirt some serious casualties which returned the favor with 47mm fire. Except for the Matilda, all British armored cars and tanks were "cardboard" to the 47mm gun. The 11th called it quits.
So why am I relating this story?
First, the British always withdrew with just the SLIGHTEST possibility of being outflanked. Yet that does not explain why they didn't make a stand at Buq Buq with two days of ammunution left. Why did they pull back to Azziziya?
It's because the British troops that should have been at Safafi-Rabia, to cover their southern flank, weren't there.
But neither were the Italians. The British retreated without a threat to their southern flank. The mere POSSIBILITY was enough to make the decision. Thus, the mere THREAT of being OUTFLANKED even with no Italians there, will put the British in reverse.
This allows you to play not only the Italians, but also the British, in a one person game with 100% accuracy. The British will always attack with a flanking maneuver (to the south in North Africa) and always retreat when faced with the same. Anyone can play British blindfolded.
I'm guessing by your hex size and using battalions, you're invading Malta. Tough game. Yet the British cannot form a defensive line of six hexes (6 battalions) anywhere across Malta except at Ghadira. No such British battalions man Ghadira except the King's Own 1st battalion (K.O.M.R) which had as its heaviest weapon the Bren light machinegun. The next defense is road 118 which is 4 hexes wide. There are not four regular army British battalions within reach of it. At 16 hexes long, they can't even cover the Victorian Line and won't for long (We already know for how many days - three.).
But it's worse than this. The Bren light machineguns of the 1st King's Own? They didn't have them. They weren't delivered until September 1, 1940. Every single pillbox the British built to defend the island had been designed for a machinegun but which weren't actually delivered. The 1st Kings Own were armed with bolt action rifles and pistols only. They're worse off than the Italians. Only one out of three is even on duty.
It's not the pillboxes and the 1st KOMR that's the problem. It's landing first and then landing supplies second, because the British Navy will bombard you within 48 hours, refuel at Valletta, and bombard you again. Expect a significant supply loss.
Survive it and the British will retreat to Valletta, hole up, and make it their Tobruk.
There are no easy wins against the British.
But you can always make them back up.
To correct for this deficiency, the Italians had the 65/17 Model 13 cannon on wheels. Although not a battalion weapon, it could be pushed forward (or mounted on a truck, particularly on a captured Morris CSB in North Africa) to accompany an attack, staying about 500 yards behind the infantry battalion. In spite of being 1913 vintage with wooden spoked wheels, it was a fairly good addition. Yet not so good for the British to make use of captured 65's themselves.
This tells you just how bad Italian infantry were equipped to attack. When the enemy won't collect your own captured weapons (as they did with the Breda 37) it means they're worse than theirs.
For Italian infantry to defeat British/Australian infantry, they had to threaten a flanking maneuver. The British/Australians would always pull back against any such threat. First, they didn't want to get surrounded because that led to the second possibility. Surrender. They didn't want to suffer the humiliation of being the first Common Wealth troops to surrender to the Italians. Although the first consideration was common sense, the second was pure British propaganda, which portrayed the Italians as military clods who eagerly surrendered. Some 45 Common Wealth troops taking 800 Italian prisoners was considered the norm. Therefore, for 45 Common Wealth troops to surrender to 800 Italians was not. No British officer wanted to be the first to do so. Yet to retreat was also hardly honorable and so, absent a flanking maneuver, they wouldn't. They'd simply slaughter the attacking Italians in a frontal assault until they ran out of ammunition AND WHICH THEY DID. The British only carried four days of ammunition which, in a three day game turn was 75% used up. This was additional incentive for the British to retreat on DAY FOUR when it was their turn.
In North Africa, except for the Italian offensive of September 1940, the British were very careful not to let themselves be outflanked by the Italians (Although Rommel did it all the time.). The only reason it happened then was due to Italian troops attacking Halfaya Pass, which threatened to cut off the British in Sollom. So their troops withdrew to Buq Buq to destroy the water wells. They could have made a stand there but didn't. Why not?
It's because there are no British troops at Sofafi-Rabia to cover their southern flank. So they pulled back to Azziiziya. This proved hardly a brilliant decision. With Italians now in control of Buq Buq, they could (and did) outflank the British to the south of Azziziya with walking infantry (2nd Libyan).
Using three day turns with the Italian turns being September 13, 14, and 15, the British turn began September 16. They have two problems. First, they have used up 3 of their 4 days of ammunition. Second, the 2nd Libyan (followed by 1st Blackshirt) is bypassing them on a dirt road to their south with a battalion of L3 tanks. Time to retreat. Ammunition resupply awaits just a few miles behind them at Sidi Barrani. Yet they don't stop here. They're in full reverse. Why?
It's because the L3 tanks and truck mounted 1st Blackshirt can reach Maktilla and surround them if they stop. So they kept on going. In fact, they kept on going so far I defy you to find where they retreated to. The 11th Hussars were assigned to keep the road open through Maktilla and dealt 1st Blackshirt some serious casualties which returned the favor with 47mm fire. Except for the Matilda, all British armored cars and tanks were "cardboard" to the 47mm gun. The 11th called it quits.
So why am I relating this story?
First, the British always withdrew with just the SLIGHTEST possibility of being outflanked. Yet that does not explain why they didn't make a stand at Buq Buq with two days of ammunution left. Why did they pull back to Azziziya?
It's because the British troops that should have been at Safafi-Rabia, to cover their southern flank, weren't there.
But neither were the Italians. The British retreated without a threat to their southern flank. The mere POSSIBILITY was enough to make the decision. Thus, the mere THREAT of being OUTFLANKED even with no Italians there, will put the British in reverse.
This allows you to play not only the Italians, but also the British, in a one person game with 100% accuracy. The British will always attack with a flanking maneuver (to the south in North Africa) and always retreat when faced with the same. Anyone can play British blindfolded.
I'm guessing by your hex size and using battalions, you're invading Malta. Tough game. Yet the British cannot form a defensive line of six hexes (6 battalions) anywhere across Malta except at Ghadira. No such British battalions man Ghadira except the King's Own 1st battalion (K.O.M.R) which had as its heaviest weapon the Bren light machinegun. The next defense is road 118 which is 4 hexes wide. There are not four regular army British battalions within reach of it. At 16 hexes long, they can't even cover the Victorian Line and won't for long (We already know for how many days - three.).
But it's worse than this. The Bren light machineguns of the 1st King's Own? They didn't have them. They weren't delivered until September 1, 1940. Every single pillbox the British built to defend the island had been designed for a machinegun but which weren't actually delivered. The 1st Kings Own were armed with bolt action rifles and pistols only. They're worse off than the Italians. Only one out of three is even on duty.
It's not the pillboxes and the 1st KOMR that's the problem. It's landing first and then landing supplies second, because the British Navy will bombard you within 48 hours, refuel at Valletta, and bombard you again. Expect a significant supply loss.
Survive it and the British will retreat to Valletta, hole up, and make it their Tobruk.
There are no easy wins against the British.
But you can always make them back up.
hammurabi70
New Member
An interesting analysis. So what difference would there be between an Italian attack and a German attack?
I limited myself to North Africa and did not include Crete or Malta (Where the Germans lacked trucks.). North Africa is all about trucks. In 1940, when the Italians didn't have them and 1941 when they did, is a major difference. No trucks means walking. Walking meant you simply walked towards a British Prisoner of war (POW) camp waiting for you.An interesting analysis. So what difference would there be between an Italian attack and a German attack?
In 1940, the Italians believed in, but hadn't trained for, "The War of Rapid Decision" in which trucked troops bypassed British strongpoints. It sounds like German blitzkrieg but it wasn't. In blitzkrieg, if the Germans were attacking say, target "A", the Luftwaffe cut off reinforcement to target "A" (The Ju-87's bombed the bridges and rear artillery while the He111's bombed the enemy supply warehouses and their railroad stations plus Bf110's and Do-17's took out the enemy's airfields. By comparison, about all the Italians could bomb was a city/port or airfield (usually once and then never come back.). Instead, the Italians attacked British vehicle road columns with what they called "Assault aircraft" (Cr.32's and Ba.65's armed with 12.7mm MG's.). By shooting up engine radiators, they could delay a British motor column for a short time.
The main German attack on "Target A" would come from tanks (like PZ IV's) with a short barreled 75mm gun to take out enemy concrete pillboxes for machineguns. Walking behind the tanks and using them as cover, were infantry to clean out these "hardpoints". Behind them were the schutzen panzers (armored half tracked vehicles armed with a heavy machinegun for trench "cleaning". They carried just a few soldiers who dismounted while the halftrack was still moving to prevent it from being zeroed in from enemy artillery fire. By this means, they brought a few troops up very close to the trench being cleared and these soldiers took out the trench command bunkers. Thus, the enemy artillery, pillboxes, trenches, and command posts were all targeted at the same time while the Luftwaffe denied rear road movement. Sound good? It was even better. Once the Germans breached the line, they sent "recon" battalions though on ahead. This force was misnamed as it followed LAST behind the main attack. They were mostly Mk I and II tanks, with a couple of 88's, and some artillery pieces and motorized infantry. Basically, a small, light panzer division, they raced on ahead to capture a main road intersection in the enemy's rear. When the enemy's retreating columns reached that intersection, they got stopped, jammed up, and surrendered. Hundreds of thousands of Russian troops were captured this way. A good example of this was carried out by a small, light British mobile force at Beda Fomm to capture the Italians fleeing Benghazi.
So how did the Italians attack in their "War of Rapid Decision"? They attacked on foot in narrow columns in order to attack the narrowest possible defensive front. They were also quite effective with artillery, which they brought up very close to the British for direct fire. Some it was truck mounted. Once stopped, Bersaglieri were called in to outflank the enemy machine guns followed by trucked troops (who previously moved no faster than the walking infantry in front of them.). Thus, an Italian attack began at the speed of mud behind infantry marching in parade formation until the trucked infantry passed them (taking 2 hours to do). In theory, a Celere division followed (but not always in practice), acting somewhat like a German recon battalion although not defensively designed. At the very rear of the attack were the Italian tanks and which often never became a part of a battle due to insufficient armor (L3's and M11/39's). The later M13/40 was a very effective tank, not by being a better tank, but by it's range. A battalion of M13/40's, if it spotted a moving dust cloud (British vehicles) would use their range and speed to come in from behind that dust cloud, the British being unable to see out of it, They would then attack from behind (Sometimes as the British were refueling.). Oddly enough, the M13/40 was a British tank killer but this did not happen until 1941. The Italians were also taught tank recovery by the Germans so sometimes the British had to destroy the tank three times.
In 1941, Rommel would motorize two Italian infantry battalions of an infantry division for an attack (The rest stayed home in Tripoli.). These moved at incredible speed (Italian trucks were very good.). Otherwise, they still used the same 1940 equipment and still lacked recon battalions. Rommel used them either for diversionary attacks (With their trucks they could arrive fast and get away fast.). The British took these diversionary attacks very seriously. Rommel would also use them to surround British strongpoints which his German troops bypassed. However, they weren't very good at taking those strongpoints as 75mm artillery was too light and their 149/13's worthless.
In terms of invading Malta as compared to the Germans invading Crete, the Italians had already used air landing troops, parachutists, and parachute supplies since 1938, the latter two with pretty good accuracy and could airdrop L3 tanks. In 1940, they lacked the obvious (three HMG and an 81mm mortar) to hold a position and had only carbine rifles, but this was corrected and the Folgore Parachute division was very well trained (I expect as good as German.). Had some of this thinking been applied in 1940, its likely they could have been put to good use. The Italian mountain divisions were easily converted to Air Landing divisions. The parachutists, combined with assault aircraft, would make British trucks in the south find it difficult to move north or defend the Victorian Line.
Supplying Malta in 1940 is a bitch (You have 48 hours to unload before the British Navy arrives to bombard what supplies you just landed. The Germans did not have this problem.). Supplies can be parachuted but not enough. I also had to borrow nine German gliders and their pilots from Hitler to take out three troublesome coastal guns. The northern landing beaches were both mined and provided underwater obstacles. The Germans faced no such problem on Crete. There are number of delaying line pillboxes the British erected that would require 75mm field guns to take out which, while they can be landed, are not easily moved. Again, the Germans never had this problem on Crete. And while the Italians could air land on Malta's airfields, after their British fighters took off, the British drove a bus across the runway to block it for Italian Sm.81's to use. When their fighters returned, the bus was removed and then returned to blocking the runway. So an Italian attack on Malta would not be the same as the German attack on Crete.
