CC.NN. XXIII Marzo Motorization

[jwsleser]

Posted 20 March 2011 - 02:23 AM by Dili

This division was motorised around late 1940. When it was more precisely and the trucks came from Italy or from other units in Africa?

Another question. Why this unit and not another Division?

Posted 20 March 2011 - 05:06 PM by diciassette2000

Anyone of the Camicie Nere divisions was "Motorized". They only went to "Autotrasportabile" status with the commitment of some Regio Esercito units or detached units from 5.a Armata. The "autotrasportabile" italian word was
an .......strange word to say ....that the trucks for single divisions were put on the field only if the HQ says "yes" and only in certain kind of situations....never permanently allocated to them....So also the XXIII CCNN division was like others so.....(the trucks were allocated from Army Truck Park)
All the best
Maurizio

Posted 20 March 2011 - 05:41 PM by Dili

Let's say that Balbo wanted to motorize Divisions with trucks available. How many of autotrasportabile could be Motorized- TOE remaining autotrasportabile - that you think will be possible: maybe 2? 3?

 

[jwsleser]

For those that wish to ponder this, here is some data.

TO&E for a divisione motorizzata requires 1,749 vehicles of various types ( L'esercito italiano tra la 1 e 2 guerra mondiale p. 311). This is for a three regiment division (two rgt. fanteria and one rgt. Bersaglieri). To make things simple, use only 2/3 vehicles needed for a two-regiment structure (note that motorized infantry regiments only have two battalions, not three as the other regiments. These numbers also include motorcycles that aren't needed). That means ~ 1,166 vehicles needed to motorize a binary division. The chart below (Montanari vol I p. 552) are the trucks assigned to the 10 Armata in October 1940. Just use the totals, not the efficient/non efficient (operational and in-op).

 

[Dili]

Thanks Jeff.

http://www.regioesercito.it/articolivari/espcor.htm

Al 4 luglio, in fatto di automezzi, la sola 10a Armata disponeva di:
- 780 autocarri pesanti (+ 406 inefficienti);
- 555 autocarri leggeri (+ 295 inefficienti);
- 224 «Dovunque»; alt
- 120 autobotti (+ 53 inefficienti);
- 40 autoambulanze.

(...)

L'accentramento - deciso da Graziani il 16 ottobre - degli automezzi dei reparti, per costituire un autoraggruppamento di armata, servì unicamente a limitare la mobilità delle unità dipendenti quando furono attaccate.
Così ricorderà il capitano Giuseppe D'Avossa, allora comandante del 1° Gruppo della Divisione di fanteria Cirene:

Il 20 novembre 1940 fu commesso un grave errore, che portò alla paralisi totale di tutto lo schieramento italiano in A.S.
Il comando dell'intendenza di armata, allo scopo di attuare la manovra logistica nel deserto, ritirò tutti gli automezzi delle unità, [...] Accentrò così a sé circa 5.000 automezzi, con il risultato che mentre prima di tale determinazione i rifornimenti di viveri, acqua, vestiario, carburanti e munizioni affluivano abbondanti in prima linea, in quanto ogni unità provvedeva, a scaglione, a rifornirsi con i propri mezzi presso le basi logistiche, dopo non arrivò più nulla [...]; tutte le unità schierate defraudate degli automezzi divennero, dall'oggi al domani, unità statiche, insabbiate nel deserto, e quindi impotenti ad opporsi alla dinamica offesa del nemico. Come pure, fatta eccezione per i pezzi da fanteria che erano dotati di proiettili perforanti, ai cannoni dell'artiglieria invece non ne arrivò mai uno, nonostante che, come si apprese in seguito, nei pressi di Sidi Azeis fosse stato costituito, in assoluta segretezza, un grande deposito con migliaia di perforanti [...]
Che dire poi dei nostri soldati di la linea, i quali negli ultimi tempi mancavano di tutto, quando i magazzini di armata erano colmi di viveri, equipaggiamenti e vestiario, lasciati intatti nelle mani degli inglesi, durante la loro offensiva? (37)



(...)
Era stato inoltre inviato in Libia (e vi era già ai primi di gennaio) il 10° Reggimento bersaglieri (3 battaglioni con 66 ufficiali, 67 sottufficiali, 1660 truppa con 141 autocarri 626 più 9 pesanti); gli autocarri erano stati maggiorati del 15% rispetto all'organico (43). Tale Reggimento, destinato dallo S.M.R.E. alla costituenda Brigata, fu invece trattenuto dal Comando di armata per la sua riserva.

 

[sultanbev]

Google translate shows this as:

On July 4, in the case of vehicles, the only 10th Army had:
- 780 heavy trucks (+ 406 inefficient);
- 555 light trucks (+ 295 inefficient);
- 224 «Anywhere»; halt
- 120 tankers (+ 53 inefficient);
- 40 ambulances.

(...)

The centralization - decided by Graziani on October 16 - of the vehicles of the departments, to constitute a self-assembly of army, served only to limit the mobility of the dependent units when they were attacked.
This is how captain Giuseppe D'Avossa, then commander of the 1st Group of the Cirene Infantry Division, will remember:

On 20 November 1940 a serious error was committed, which led to the total paralysis of the whole Italian camp in A.S.
In order to carry out the logistical maneuver in the desert, the command of the army's intendenza withdrew all the vehicles of the units, [...] He thus concentrated around 5,000 vehicles, with the result that while before this determination the supplies of food, water, clothing, fuels and ammunition flowed abundantly in the front line, as each unit provided, by scale, to stock up with their own means at the logistics bases, after nothing came [...]; all the deployed units defrauded of the vehicles became, from today to tomorrow, static units, silted up in the desert, and therefore powerless to oppose the dynamic offense of the enemy. As well, with the exception of the infantry pieces that were equipped with piercing bullets, the artillery cannons never got one, although, as we later learned, near Sidi Azeis had been constituted, in absolute secrecy , a large deposit with thousands of perforators [...]
What then of our soldiers of the line, which in recent times lacked everything, when the army stores were full of food, equipment and clothing, left intact in the hands of the British, during their offensive? (37)



(...)
The 10th Bersaglieri Regiment had also been sent to Libya (and there was already in early January) (3 battalions with 66 officers, 67 non-commissioned officers, 1660 troops with 141 trucks 626 and 9 heavy); the trucks had been increased by 15% compared to the staff (43). This Regiment, intended by S.M.R.E. to the Constitution Brigata, it was instead held by the Army Command for its reserve.

 

[sultanbev]

The astonishing point there to me is:
"As well, with the exception of the infantry pieces that were equipped with piercing bullets, the artillery cannons never got one, although, as we later learned, near Sidi Azeis had been constituted, in absolute secrecy , a large deposit with thousands of perforators [...]"
so all the artillery pieces which often ended up being used as de facto anti-tank guns, had no AP rounds to use in the field, even though the stores in the rear had tons of them. Ouch.

 

[Dili]

Yes.
And i would not say that is the only astonishing thing.