Could the R.A. Perform CAS?

[jwsleser]

I just received my copy of Invasion: Malta game (more on the game later in the Wargaming section) and was thumbing through the rule. In it, it states that the Italians couldn't do CAS, so had to depend on the Germans. As John Burtt was a consultant for the game, I looked in his Operation C3: Hitler's Plan to Invade Malta 1942. On p.118 Burtt states "The one thing the Regia Aeronautica would not do on Malta was to provide close air support for the troops on the ground. Italian fliers never trained to support troops in this manner; they would leave that task to the Germans, who were trained in such tactics." No footnote to support this statement with cites.

This doesn't strike me as correct. I know the R.A. had a doctrine for CAS and trained CAS missions in the school. They develop aircraft specifically for that role (not that the those aircraft were considered good at it). I know that the R.A. did support troops during battles in 1940 and have always assumed that they continued to do so in the later years. Air superiority greatly affects the ability to conduct CAS missions, and the Axis air forces didn't always enjoy that edge.

The idea that the Germans would handle all CAS for the invasion is simply far-fetched to my ears for many reasons. However, as I am now home,l will be looking at the plans to see if this is discussed. Such a support concept would need to be in the plan.

Anyhow, I am reaching out to our R.A. fans to see if anyone can add to this story.

Pista! Jeff

 

[Darren Marshall]

The problem with the CAS for the Italians mostly concerned the lack of suitable and efficient aircraft for the purpose. The Breda Ba 65 was obsolete and was practically withdrawn from active service in 1941. The Breda Ba 88 was a total failure. After proving obsolete as an intercept fighter, the CR-42 was used extensively as a ground attack aircraft. The Germans supplied Ju-87 "Stukas" but they were few in number.

So it is not correct to say that the RA did not have a doctrine for the CAS because it did, but it had serious problems putting it into practice due to the lack of aircraft suitable for the purpose.

 

[jbroshot]

A paragraph found in the section "Italy's mechanized facade" in Chapter 1: Pre-war doctrinal and technological influences in my recently acquired copy of Robert Forczyk's Desert Armour Tank Warfare in North Africa Beda Fomm to Operation Crusader,1940-41

Basically says the same thing as the previous poster. Pre-war the RA "put some effort" in developing ground attack aircraft, and used them in Ethiopia and Spain. The Ba 65 is mentioned as is the Ba 88 which is labeled a "disappointment." The author states that pre-war air-ground training was uncommon but the RA was willing to provide close air support to the army when requested

(Tried but failed to copy relevant paragraph from said copy which is an electronic, pdf, copy

 

[jwsleser]

Darren

Thank you for the comment. Yes, the Italians didn't develop a successful ground attack aircraft, but many aircraft were used by all air forces that were not designed for that role. Often aircraft that were considered no longer suitable for their original designed role were then used for CAS. The Allies enjoyed a surplus of aircraft, so were able to use frontline aircraft for CAS in the last years of the war.

I have ordered a copy of Fiat Cr.42 Aces of WW2 as the blurb states the author discusses the Cr.42 in that role. I do know that the R.A. provided effective CAS during the fighting along the wire in 1940. The R.A. was instrumental in stopping the cross border attacks by the end of July 1940.

Jim

Thanks. I have Forczyk's book. The paragraph is on p.71. It really doesn't offer much. Of course I am looking at 1942 after several years of fighting and assume that CAS was being performed. I could be wrong, but I don't believe that is the case.

The main challenge is finding sources that specifically addresses CAS missions by R.A. I am just beginning to to do some serious research into the R.A. during the war.

Pista! Jeff

 

[Darren Marshall]

Darren

Thank you for the comment. Yes, the Italians didn't develop a successful ground attack aircraft, but many aircraft were used by all air forces that were not designed for that role. Often aircraft that were considered no longer suitable for their original designed role were then used for CAS. The Allies enjoyed a surplus of aircraft, so were able to use frontline aircraft for CAS in the last years of the war.

I have ordered a copy of Fiat Cr.42 Aces of WW2 as the blurb states the author discusses the Cr.42 in that role. I do know that the R.A. provided effective CAS during the fighting along the wire in 1940. The R.A. was instrumental in stopping the cross border attacks by the end of July 1940.

Jim

Thanks. I have Forczyk's book. The paragraph is on p.71. It really doesn't offer much. Of course I am looking at 1942 after several years of fighting and assume that CAS was being performed. I could be wrong, but I don't believe that is the case.

The main challenge is finding sources that specifically addresses CAS missions by R.A. I am just beginning to to do some serious research into the R.A. during the war.

Pista! Jeff

Yes exactly, as I said they mostly used fighters as ground attack aircraft. CR-42 and G-50 above all. But obviously since they were not developed for that purpose, they did not have optimal performance.

 

[jwsleser]

Darren

Ahh, the G.50 as well. I saw that the three stormi identified as ground attack for C3 were Cr.42, G.50, and Ju.87.

Can you recommend any books/sources that discuss this? Trying to gain a fuller understanding of the issue and historical examples.

Pista! Jeff

 

[Wargames]

I just received my copy of Invasion: Malta game (more on the game later in the Wargaming section) and was thumbing through the rule. In it, it states that the Italians couldn't do CAS, so had to depend on the Germans. As John Burtt was a consultant for the game, I looked in his Operation C3: Hitler's Plan to Invade Malta 1942. On p.118 Burtt states "The one thing the Regia Aeronautica would not do on Malta was to provide close air support for the troops on the ground. Italian fliers never trained to support troops in this manner;

CAS required Italian ground troops to use colored flares as they operated without radios. They had to fire one color over their own troops and another color over the enemy troops, so that the CAS pilot could identify which side to attack. Historically, this never happened. In my own Invasion Malta 1940 game (not 1942) I could only use Italian CAS against British troops on the Victorian Line. This was possible because Italian pilots could see the Victorian Line from the air and machinegun those British on the south side of it while the Italians army attacked from the north (It was aircraft that outdated the Victorian Line.). Yet I still had to use colored flares to signal to the CAS pilot when a section of line was taken or else he might strafe the Italian troops that took it. This created the risk of the British firing a duplicate colored flare over themselves to prevent strafing. The British could also conceal their positions on the Victoria Line from CAS using camouflage. I used Ba.65 aircraft and the Cr.32 bis, 18 at a time Both had more of a "scare" effect on British troops on the Victorian Line than producing actual British casualties (The Italian soldiers advanced while the British took cover against being strafed.). There was a tendency in 1940 for the British to overstate Italian capabilities (Much more so in reverse). The British responded more to the perceived threat versus the actual threat. In my game, the British did man it and, in spite of being outdated, it worked pretty well for them simply because it was very conveniently positioned and Italian CAS only partly effective.

I used the same aircraft to fly down the British roads running north (I attacked from the north) and for one day had success hunting British trucks (After which they moved at night.). That pretty much ended CAS and the Ba.65 (except to strafe Sunderlands).

 

[jwsleser]

Wargames

What is the source of your information (colored flares)? Italian units had aerial recognition panels for use as well. Certainly radios would have made things a bit easier, but few armies had air-ground radios in their units until late in the war. CAS certainly happened before then. Absence of radios is not an indicator of an inability to execute CAS missions.

Pista! Jeff

 

[Wargames]

Wargames

What is the source of your information (colored flares)? Italian units had aerial recognition panels for use as well. Certainly radios would have made things a bit easier, but few armies had air-ground radios in their units until late in the war. CAS certainly happened before then. Absence of radios is not an indicator of an inability to execute CAS missions.

Pista! Jeff

Since the Italians historically never used CAS (emphasis is my original post), my source was Germany in France, 1940 on how to do it. They used colored flares to differentiate the two sides for German pilots, using the Hs123 aircraft as the attack aircraft. Otherwise, German aircraft needed a geographical division between their army and the enemy's to prevent accidental friendly fire attacks. For example, the Ju87 dive bomber was used on French artillery at Sedan because the River Meuse separated the two sides. On June 20, 1942 Rommel used Ju87's to bomb Tobruk's artillery and Ju-88's to bomb the harbor in CAS, the first known time I'm aware of that a geographical barrier wasn't used. I do not know how they did it.

So in my Invasion Malta 1940 wargame, I needed a geographical divide visible from the air over Malta with the Italians on one side and the British on the other. The only geographical line I found was the Victoria Line. I then added flares as Italy had them The most aircraft I could use at a time was 18 due to the lack of radios.

 

[jwsleser]

Since the Italians historically never used CAS (emphasis is my original post),

Sorry, that is quite incorrect. What source are you using to make that claim?

What definition of CAS are you using?

Close air support (CAS) involves employing ordnance within close proximity of ground troops. It is a mission flown in direct support of troops. CAS missions can be planned days in advance or they can be immediate. The R.A. certainly did perform this type of mission. While geographic barriers and radios can make employment of CAS safer, they are not a requirement to execute CAS missions.

Pista! Jeff

 

[Wargames]

Sorry, that is quite incorrect. What source are you using to make that claim?

History.

"Close air support (CAS) involves employing ordnance within close proximity of ground troops. It is a mission flown in direct support of troops. CAS missions can be planned days in advance or they can be immediate. The R.A. certainly did perform this type of mission."

Close proximity to Italian friendly ground troops would be on the order of 4-5,000 yards, with Italian troops attacking about 1,000 yards from the enemy front lines and CAS likely directed to the enemy rear. No Italian bomber could do this with accuracy, and none ever did. I will cite the Italians surrounding Tobruk as evidence and British surrounding Bardia.

You are left with the Ba.65 or Cr.32 bis in 1940, the 101° Gruppo Assalto and 15° Stormo Assalto of Cr.42 in 1941 (which replaced the Cr.32 bis), and the 50° Stormo Assalto of G.50 bis in 1942. These aircraft were used to strafe airfields and truck convoys. I'm interested in learning what battle these planes attacked in support of, the distance between the lines, and how they identified friend from foe?

 

[jwsleser]

To start with....

Since the Italians historically never used CAS (emphasis is my original post),

As I stated, quite incorrect.

Arena, La Regia Aeronautica 1939–1943, vol. 2. Taken from the English translation as it was quicker. My bold.

p.139, A.S. 1941.

Attacks CR.42 B.A. the 376th Sqd. (Cap. I. Lalatta) were brought against British armored vehicles in the El Cuasc area, east of Gambut and Sidi Rezegh area, working for several consecutive days with takeoffs from the airfields of Ain el Gazala frequently subjected to the enemy fighter attacks . To reinforce the few Italian attackers came the 236th assault Sqd. (Cap. A. Cerutti) with CR.42 B.A. (Wing bombs) who had left the Ju.87 survivors of the 209th Sqd. to pass on the biplane Fiat equipped as a assault.

p.141 A.S. 1941.

Swooping attacks against armored columns were effectively carried out by the 239th Sqd. in defense of the Bir el Gobi sector entrusted to the “Ariete” and a Battalion of GG.FF., that their baptism of fire had behaved as rejecting veterans with value and high spirit of sacrifice the attack of the tanks of the 7th Armored Div.

pp.260–261. Greece 1941 (my bold)

Even the air component of the tactical support had some news with the application of the CR.42 bomber type Nardi and 150th Group CT first to experience this innovation by making successful attacks against the Greek positions and batteries in Albania (Val Desnizza).

[…]

Brought to the observatory of Mount Komarit mouth of Val Desnizza, Mussolini attended to report on the operation explained by General Gambara, whose plan was deemed simple and straightforward, and the next day - 9 March - the “Val Desnizza" offensive began after an artillery preparation made from about 300 guns that fired no fewer than 100,000 rounds on enemy positions. At 07:00 the infantry leapt to the attack preceded by intense aerial bombardment on Trebescines and adjacent areas, while fighters and reconnaissance bombed and machine-gunned Togliari, Kuk, Mezgorani, Gerova, Ciafa, Sofit, Caizza, Psari and the Picchiatori hit precise objectives considered very important by terrestrial commands at Suka, Spadarit, Mezgorani, Toscisci, hill 1308 of Trebescines. A total of one hundred planes took turns in the attacks from early morning to sunset, to provide concrete support to the troops and the effective support of the Air Force in the IX Army sector.

pp.496 Russia 1941

On November 12, the 371st Sqd. CT (Capt. Enrico Meille) was assigned to the command CSIR and intended to ease Russian pressure on Nikitowka positions held by the 80th Inf. Regiment reinforced by a group of 75/27 of the 8th artillery Regiment, several days surrounded by units of the Russian 174th Div. For several days the low-flying Macchi C.200 machine- gunned enemy positions by implementing even throwing bombs 50 kg. after processing in the fighter aircraft with Angeloni wing mounts which falls essential to broaden the range of applications because of the absence of assault types very useful on the eastern front. The missions were extended throughout the course of the short day to the point that on several occasions it was necessary to illuminate the Stalino track with the vehicles headlights to facilitate landings.

Three different fronts, all in 1941. All CAS missions. Discussion to follow.

Pista! Jeff

 

[jwsleser]

Wagames

You have a very incomplete understanding of CAS. CAS is not limited to attacks made 5 minutes before the ground units attack, not are they always danger close. The key phrase is "It is a mission flown in direct support of troops.” I should have changed the word order to place this first. My error.

Close proximity to Italian friendly ground troops would be on the order of 4-5,000 yards,

CAS could anywhere to from danger close to being kilometers away. The bombing of Monte Casino with heavy and medium bombers before the ground assault was CAS.

with Italian troops attacking about 1,000 yards from the enemy front lines and CAS likely directed to the enemy rear. No Italian bomber could do this with accuracy, and none ever did.

This again is quite incorrect. See Greece example.

No Allied bomber could do this as well*, but aircraft flying CAS were not limited to bombers. The Cr.32, Cr.42, and G.50 successfully bombed ships at sea, so bombing/strafing within 5 kms of friendly was quite possible and was done. The Cr.32s and Cr.42 supported Italian units along the wire against British attacks in 1940.

Of course, there are the examples I posted above.

[* note that when Allied medium bombers were used in a CAS role, the Allies had air superiority so were able to operate a low altitudes, in large numbers, and had the benefit of spotter aircraft. Even then, their bombing accuracy wasn’t great (see trying to drop bridges or any other pin-point target), with strafing usually more effective than bombing. How many times did Allied CAS hit their own troops? Don’t apply perfection to the Italians yet ignore the realities of CAS as practiced by other nations.]

No Italian bombers ever really tried to do this because the airspace was never permissive enough to do it. Even the famed Stuka was pulled when the Allied air threat was too great. Committing SM.79s to CAS when there was need for interdiction and an overall shortage of aircraft didn’t make operational sense. (see brief discussion of types of air planning below).

The problem with the Italian aircraft designed specifically for CAS wasn’t one of accuracy, but one of reliability and lacking the speed/maneuverability to survive in hostile airspace. You read many accounts of Allied CAS missions because they had the numbers of aircraft to gain at least local air superiority and provided a significant number of CAS aircraft that made a greater impact on the unfolding operation. Destroying an Allied truck fuel convoy had far less impact than destroying an Axis truck fuel convoy. Which will be written about more?

CAS directly supports troops in some manner. Interdiction shapes the battlefield by denying access and maneuver: hitting logistical, C2, and movement corridors. Strategic targets the enemy’s ability to wage war: factories, resource centers. Air superiority targets the enemy’s ability to challenge and gain a level of air superiority over the battlespace by targeting airfields and strives for air-to-air combat.

Attacking enemy artillery 10 kms behind enemy lines during an offensive is CAS. Attacking an enemy column that is moving towards the attacking force and can reach it that same day is CAS (the time element is flexible, the point is the enemy force is directly reacting to the friendly attack. This is different from an army moving reserves forward in preparation for some type of future commitment. Attacking those forces with air is interdiction). Any time a friendly unit calls and asks for a target to be attacked during an operation it is CAS. The German air attack on the French units at Sedan was planned the day before and it was CAS. CAS can be committed based on time (bomb the fort at 0800), allocation (six aircraft will be over your zone of attack/sector of defense. Direct them to targets by whichever means), roaming (six aircraft will be over your zone. They will attack any targets they see forward of your units).

Again the point is that the air is being used in direct support of a ground request. That request could be weeks, days, hours, or minutes before the time needed, but it is still CAS.

The effectiveness of CAS is more causal to the permissiveness of the area of operation than the type of aircraft used. If the CAS sorties can’t survive the mission, the quality of aircraft doesn’t matter. A aircraft that is highly effective can only be effective once if it is lost during the sortie.

The Axis never possessed air superiority with a large number of aircraft in A.S. for any length of time. As the German armor forces were the main striking force in A.S., they received the majority of the CAS as the Italian units were rarely placed in that role. Given this, the Italian air units were used for air superiority and interdiction. However note my comments about the wire in 1940 and the three examples above. Studying A.S. for Italian CAS will be a limited data set, but it did happen.

I plan to study the use of the R.A. in Russia and Greece, as the Italian forces in those theaters executed many offensive operations and had their own air components. As I point out at the beginning of this thread, the R.A. had a doctrine, they trained their pilots, and designed/built aircraft for CAS. Giving the Compagnie Auto-Avio-Sahariane units in A.S. were well known for their combined air/ground operations before and during WW2, the statement that they couldn’t do CAS/they didn’t do CAS is wrong. I have shown that this type of mission was executed by the Italian military.

You are left with the Ba.65 or Cr.32 bis in 1940, the 101° Gruppo Assalto and 15° Stormo Assalto of Cr.42 in 1941 (which replaced the Cr.32 bis), and the 50° Stormo Assalto of G.50 bis in 1942. These aircraft were used to strafe airfields and truck convoys. I'm interested in learning what battle these planes attacked in support of, the distance between the lines, and how they identified friend from foe?

Then do the research. You stated the Italians didn't use CAS and I have disproved it. Start digging into the records and ferret out the details.

Study Russia and Greece as those theaters provided an environment for the R.A. to execute CAS. Even France 1940 provides some examples of Italian CAS.

Pista! Jeff

 

[jwsleser]

After I wrote this, I checked a book or two. Even the lowly Italian infantry regiment was issued an RA.1 radio. The RA.1 was a ground–air radio (see La radio in grigio-verde p.72). Why would an infantry unit need to talk to aircraft?

 

[Wargames]

After I wrote this, I checked a book or two. Even the lowly Italian infantry regiment was issued an RA.1 radio. The RA.1 was a ground–air radio (see La radio in grigio-verde p.72). Why would an infantry unit need to talk to aircraft?

It doesn't. The aircraft talk to each other. Hand and wing signals became too complex for more than 18 ground assault aircraft to stay organized.

 

[jwsleser]

It doesn't. The aircraft talk to each other. Hand and wing signals became too complex for more than 18 ground assault aircraft to stay organized.

I have absolutely no idea what you are attempting to say. The radio was for air-ground coordination.

The sky above a target is too crowded for more than 18 aircraft at one time. What is your point?

Please comment on the historical examples of CAS.

 

[Wargames]

Wagames

You have a very incomplete understanding of CAS. CAS is not limited to attacks made 5 minutes before the ground units attack, not are they always danger close. The key phrase is "It is a mission flown in direct support of troops.” I should have changed the word order to place this first. My error.



CAS could anywhere to from danger close to being kilometers away. The bombing of Monte Casino with heavy and medium bombers before the ground assault was CAS.

Your definition is still incorrect. It is a mission flown in direct support of attacking or defending troops close by, It is not conducted in support of distant bystanders away from the battle. If the troops are pulled back to avoid being bombed by friendly aircraft, then they are not "close by" and it is a tactical bombing attack and not CAS. CAS and ground troops engage the same target at or near the same time. It is known as "combined arms".

Two of your three examples don't work and I question the third.

"Attacks CR.42 B.A. the 376th Sqd. (Cap. I. Lalatta) were brought against British armored vehicles in the El Cuasc area, east of Gambut and Sidi Rezegh area, working for several consecutive days with takeoffs from the airfields of Ain el Gazala frequently subjected to the enemy fighter attacks . To reinforce the few Italian attackers came the 236th assault Sqd. (Cap. A. Cerutti) with CR.42 B.A. (Wing bombs) who had left the Ju.87 survivors of the 209th Sqd. to pass on the biplane Fiat equipped as a assault."

This is not close air support. There are no Italian troops being supported. I can argue on September 11, 1940 Ba.65 aircraft knocked out 10 tanks of the 11th Hussars, No Italian troops were present, same as in your example. So not CAS either.

"Swooping attacks against armored columns were effectively carried out by the 239th Sqd. in defense of the Bir el Gobi sector entrusted to the “Ariete” and a Battalion of GG.FF., that their baptism of fire had behaved as rejecting veterans with value and high spirit of sacrifice the attack of the tanks of the 7th Armored Div."

Same problem. There's no mention of the "Ariete" and a battalion of GG.FF engaged in the battle. No close troops engaged, no close air support. It's an air attack on an armored column and which was conducted by both sides.

"At 07:00 the infantry leapt to the attack preceded by intense aerial bombardment on Trebescines and adjacent areas, while fighters and reconnaissance bombed and machine-gunned Togliari, Kuk, Mezgorani, Gerova, Ciafa, Sofit, Caizza, Psari and the Picchiatori hit precise objectives considered very important by terrestrial commands at Suka, Spadarit, Mezgorani, Toscisci, hill 1308 of Trebescines. A total of one hundred planes took turns in the attacks from early morning to sunset, to provide concrete support to the troops and the effective support of the Air Force in the IX Army sector."

The word "preceded" muddies your argument. It suggest the Italian Army watched from a safe distance. What troops attacked Togliari? Kuk? Mezgorani? Gerova? Ciafa? Sofit? Caizza? Psari and the Picchiatori? None?

Your Russian example uses Nikitowka, Russia which has the Reka Yazeva River defending it. The Italians were on the west side. If the Russians are on the east, then Italian pilots can attack anything east of the river (visible from the air) and not risk "friendly fire", the same as the German Ju87's attacked Sedan across the Meuse River. A dividing landmark would be necessary such as I suggested with the Victoria Line on Malta.

If Italy could fly CAS, it would have attacked the British Army outside Bardia in January 1941 and attacked Tobruk using CAS when they had it surrounded for 241 days. The designers of the Malta game are not using the same definition of CAS you are. It's probably why you're questioning them.

 

[Wargames]

Although I cringe to use Wikipedia as a source, I cut and pasted some points from this article on CAS on which I did agree regarding Germany:

Close air support - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

“These preparations did not prove fruitful in the invasion of Poland, where the Luftwaffe focused on interdiction and dedicated few assets to close air support. But the value of CAS was demonstrated at the crossing of the Meuse River (my note, Sedan) during the invasion of France in 1940. General Heinz Guderian believed the best way to provide cover for the crossing would be a continuous stream of ground attack aircraft (my note: Ju-87’s) on French defenders. Though few guns were hit, the attacks kept the French under cover and prevented them from manning their guns. Aided by the sirens attached to Stukas, the psychological impact was disproportional to the destructive power of close air support (although as often as not, the Stukas were used as tactical bombers instead of close air support, leaving much of the actual work to the older Hs 123 units for the first years of the war).”



These are exactly the same points I made, Ju-87’s attacked Sedan on the west side of the Meuse when the Germans were on the east side. The geographical division of the river prevented “friendly fire” incidents. But absent a geographical division, the Ju-87’s went back to tactical bombing versus close support and the Hs 123 used for close support, guided by colored smoke. I also noted a psychological effect on British defenders in my Malta 1940 game defending the Victorian Line disproportional to actual casualties. Yet you probably won’t be using this line.





“…on the eve of the Meuse offensive, Guderian's superior cancelled his CAS plans and called for high-altitude strikes from medium bombers, which would have required halting the offensive until the air strikes were complete. Fortunately for the Germans, his order was issued too late to be implemented…”



The above tells us that using tactical bombers, such as you described in Greece/Albania, would have required halting the offensive until the air strikes were complete, making it not a joint operation but an independent one.

It might be best, instead of arguing of over a definition of CAS that neither of us will agree on, that you describe how, where, and what aircraft the Italians could have been used in CAS over Malta.

 

[jwsleser]

Thank you for your latest comments.

Your Russian example uses Nikitowka, Russia which has the Reka Yazeva River defending it. The Italians were on the west side.

The 80º rgt. f. occupied the town of Nikitowka which is located on the east bank of the river. The river was not between the two forces. An example of CAS without a visible demarcation line.

The word "preceded" muddies your argument. It suggest the Italian Army watched from a safe distance. What troops attacked Togliari? Kuk? Mezgorani? Gerova? Ciafa? Sofit? Caizza? Psari and the Picchiatori? None?

Any soldier will tell you that CAS should always precede the attack, otherwise friendly soldiers get killed.

The air attacks at Sedan preceded the German assault across the river. The air attacks at Sedan happened over 2 kms from the nearest German troops. The air attacks shifted to even further back behind the French lines before the German assault across the river began at 1600 hrs. You don’t even know the details of the battle that you are touting as an example of CAS.

Why does the passage suggest that the Italian soldiers were further back? Were the Italian soldiers further away than the Germans at Sedan? You don't know where the Italians soldiers were located on the battlefield because you haven't studied that battle.

This is not close air support. There are no Italian troops being supported. I can argue on September 11, 1940 Ba.65 aircraft knocked out 10 tanks of the 11th Hussars, No Italian troops were present, same as in your example. So not CAS either.

Two issues here. First, you have no clue to the locations and missions of the friendly/enemy units at this time. You have no idea of the timing and missions of the R.A. You have little knowledge of this topic.

Secondly since I didn’t cite the actions against the 11th Hussars as an example, why are you presenting a strawman argument.?

Same problem. There's no mention of the "Ariete" and a battalion of GG.FF engaged in the battle. No close troops engaged, no close air support. It's an air attack on an armored column and which was conducted by both sides.

Same problem Wargames. Once again, you have no detail knowledge of this battle. You don’t know.

If Italy could fly CAS, it would have attacked the British Army outside Bardia in January 1941 and attacked Tobruk using CAS when they had it surrounded for 241 days.

Once again, you demonstrate your lack of knowledge to intelligently discuss this topic. The R.A. had been badly beaten in the fighting since December 1940 and had suffered significant losses. It had to abandon all of its forward bases and relocate further west. Operational ready rates was poor and the 5ª Squadra Aerea was in disarray. The RAF had gained local air superiority and the R.A. was having problems just trying to defend its own airbases. Someone who has actually studied the operations of the Italian military during that time period would know that without needing to crack open a book.

RE: Tobruk. Again an uninformed statement. The R.A. did attack/bomb Tobruk numerous times during the siege. The operations against Tobruk saw the first use of Italian Ju.87’s and the Cr.42b/a’s. Since they did attack Tobruk during the siege, the Italians were using CAS as per your statement.

These are exactly the same points I made, Ju-87’s attacked Sedan on the west side of the Meuse when the Germans were on the east side. The geographical division of the river prevented “friendly fire” incidents. But absent a geographical division, the Ju-87’s went back to tactical bombing versus close support and the Hs 123 used for close support, guided by colored smoke.

The over 2kms in distance between the targets and the Germans and shifting the air attacks deeper into the French rear before the Germans launched their attack across the river had more to do with the lack of friendly fire casualties than the river. These actions are pretty much textbook CAS planning. As I have previously stated, having the river didn’t hurt but it is never a requirement for CAS.

I also noted a psychological effect on British defenders in my Malta 1940 game defending the Victorian Line disproportional to actual casualties. Yet you probably won’t be using this line.

Why should I use that line? Since I have stated that the Italians used CAS and I can research its effect, why should I use something that is made-up?

After rereading this discussion, I am wondering what research have you actually done? You haven't studied the operations/battles of the Italian military to any great degree beyond popular history and Wiki. Your analysis of the examples has errors and you didn't add any new information to support your comments. All you did was wave your arms and say 'not true' but offered nothing to demonstrate the correctness of your statements.

The only fact you have is the statement by John Burtt from his book. A statement that lacks any cites or discussion of why it is true. A statement that I have not read in any other source addressing the Italian military (in English or Italian). You cite Sedan, a battle you haven’t studied and that has nothing to do with the R.A. use of CAS. I have posted cites and all you have offered is Wiki. What research have you actually done that supports your position that the R.A. couldn't execute CAS? What other source did you find besides Burtt that makes that same claim?

Prove me wrong Wargames by citing sources.

It might be best, instead of arguing of over a definition of CAS that neither of us will agree on, that you describe how, where, and what aircraft the Italians could have been used in CAS over Malta.

How can we discuss the Italian use of CAS if you don’t understand what makes an air sortie a CAS mission? How can we discuss CAS if you have no idea what methods were available and how armies actually performed the mission? Why would I wish to pretend that the Italians couldn't do CAS just to discuss how the Italians could do CAS?

Pista! Jeff

 

[jwsleser]

I should have posted this earlier in the discussion but I didn't consider that it was needed at the time.

This is the paragraph that Jim Broshot cited from Robert Forczyk's Desert Armour Tank Warfare in North Africa Beda Fomm to Operation Crusader,1940-41 published in 2023.

One area where the Italian armoured units had a potential edge over their British opponents was in terms of close air support. The Regia Aeronautica (Royal Air Force) had put some effort into developing ground attack aircraft, which had been used extensively in both Ethiopia and Spain. The Breda Ba.65 fighter-bomber, armed with two 12.7mm heavy machine-guns, two 7.7mm machine-guns and a pair of 250kg bombs, was capable of conducting strafing and dive-bombing attacks.The newer Breda Ba.88 was also available, although it proved a serious disappointment in combat. While pre-war air-ground training was uncommon, the Regia Aeronautica was willing to provide close air support to the army when requested. (p.71 my bold)

Forczyk is noted for his research in archives to find primary sources. Note he makes the same comments I have made, the fact that the R.A. had developed and practiced CAS before the war. I have already addressed the reasons why it wasn't seen as often during the war due to the lack of a permissive environment and the lack of aircraft (especially in A.S.).

Pista! Jeff