Could the R.A. Perform CAS?

[jbroshot]

Belatedly, I dug out my copy of Strike from the Sky The History of Battlefield Air Attack, 1911-1945, by Richard P. Hallion (1989).

Italian CAS is discussed all too briefly, and only in regards to "The Abyssinian War" and the Spanish Civil War. Here is an excerpt at the start of the discssion, found at page 82.

 

[jbroshot]

Two of the sources he lists for the chapter on "The Abyssinian War" are

Report of military observer with Italian armies in East Africa, report nos. 1-10​

and Pedro del Valle's Roman Eagles Over Ethiopia (1940) (I own the 2003 Battery Pres reprint)

I also own all five volumes of Shores' and Massimello's A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940-1945 but so far haven't had the time or inclination to look for examples of RA close air support in the first three volumes.

 

[jwsleser]

Humm, I might need to find copies of Shores and Massimello. As the R.A. hasn't been the focus of my research, my library is a little thin on that service.

Ricco and Afiero offer these comments in the their Luck was Lacking, but Valor was Not. [My bold]

p.67

The Italians were not unaware of the need for the air arm to be prepared and capable of providing sir support, including close air support, to the ground forces. The foremost proponent of developing a ground attack capability was General Amedeo Mecozzi, who began to propound his theories and train pilots for that role in 1929 when he was still a major. It is averred that pilots trained by Mecozzi were able to fly at very low level (what today would be termed ’nap-of-the earth’) and were able to drop inert bombs on a target as small as a handkerchief. As forward-looking as Mecozzi’s concept and training standards may have been, when the war broke out, his vision could not be fully or properly implemented because although the Regia Aeronautica had supported Mecozzi’s theory and provided enough funding and resources to create two ground attack wings, the 5º and 50º that were assigned to the V Assault (Ground Attack) Brigade in 1936, the Breda Ba.65 which equipped those units was, for the Italians at the time, an innovative and complicated aircraft, the first mono‐plane in Italian service with retractable landing gear, a variable pitch propeller and flaps, it was not well liked by pilots who were accustomed to the simplicity and maneuverability of biplanes. There was a high incidence of accidents when the Ba.65 was first introduced because pilots wanted to engage in the same type of aerobatics they were used to with the CR.32 and other agile biplanes, as a result, more than a few pilots lost their lives.

and pp.72–74

As these operations were progressing, both sides made haste to improve the numbers and quality of aircraft assigned to the theater: on 29 January1941 the Italians deployed the FIAT G.50 monoplane fighter, which easily outmatched the British Gloster Gladiator biplanes, but was in turn not the equal of the Hurricane which the RAF had sent to theater. Bomber inventories improved with the addition of the FIAT BR.20 on the Italian side and the Martin Baltimore on the British side. A major change in the air equation was the arrival of the Luftwaffe in Libya in February, initially with 66 Junkers Ju-87 Stukas and 22 Messerschmitt Bf-110 Zerstörer fighter-bombers, soon joined by the very capable Messerschmitt Bf109 fighter and by Heinkel He-111 bombers. The German Ju-87s were also joined by a number of Ju-87s in Italian service, nicknamed the ‘Picchiatello’ (equivalent to the American ‘Woody Woodpecker’). Three squadriglie, the 209ª, 237ª and 239ª, were equipped with the Picchiatello. As the campaigning in the desert resumed, in addition to conducting their own independent air operations, the Italians and Germans engaged in numerous joint efforts, especially with regards to joint operations with Ju-87s of both nationalities; many of these Stuka attacks were carried out against the defenses at Tobruk.

The Italians sought to improve their air capabilities in North Africa by introducing the FIAT G.50 and Macchi MC.200 monoplanes to cope with the Hurricane and early Spitfires but were not particularly successful against those British aircraft. In particular, the G.50 was underpowered and, lacking sand filters, was not suited for desert operations. As a result, both the G.50 and MC.200 were modified as fighter-bombers, somewhat following in the footsteps of the CR.42 which, when considered to beat the end of its useful operational life, was given anew role by adapting it to the fighter-bomber role in 1941. All three types of aircraft represented an immediate response to the need for the Regia Aeronautica to develop and provide tactical air support and were used intensely for close air support. The fact that these aircraft had originally been fighters enabled them, once they had dropped their bombs, to strafe enemy personnel and vehicles as well.

Pista! Jeff

 

[jwsleser]

CAS, like all military missions, has it roots in purpose and decision. Here is a period discussion of close support to troops. CAS as a term wasn't used during WW2 (as far as my limited research has gone).


US FM 100-15 1942 field manual. if anyone has access to other armies period manuals, lets take a look.


######

EMPLOYMENT OF AVIATION IN CLOSE SUPPORT OF GROUND TROOPS


• 233. All classes of aviation may be used to support ground forces. Light bombardment aviation is particularly trained and equipped to operate in close support of ground forces. It accomplishes this by the employment of bombs, chemicals, and machine guns, by horizontal bombing attacks usually at intermediate and low altitude, or by dive bombing attacks.
• 234. Close support comprises all types of operations by aviation which have the prjmary mission of intervening against hostile ground forces in contact with the supported friendly ground forces or capable of interfering with their mission. This support may consist of aviation attacks against targets or objectives on the immediate front or flanks of the supported ground forces; attacks against troops, installations or other objectives more distant from the supported units' for the purpose of assisting in the execution of their missions; execution of reconnaissance or observation for the supported ground forces; or pursuit protection in the immediate area of ground operations of the supported troops and installations.
[...]
• 236. The employment of aviation support of ground forces is affected by the following fundamental considerations:
a. The primary mission of combat aviation is the establishment of air superiority by the destruction and neutralization of effective hostile air resistance. Local air superiority must be maintained to insure effective air support without excessive losses from hostile aviation.
b. Since aircraft are more vulnerable and less easily replaced than artillery, economy in their use against well defended positions must be exercised. This does not mean economy in number applied to the objective, but economy of force by application to the right target at the right time. Support from aircraft can outdistance greatly the support which can be given by artillery; therefore, it should normally be employed on targets which cannot be engaged effectively or overcome promptly by the use of artillery alone.
• 237. Combined operations of air and ground forces must be closely coordinated by the commander of the supported ground force. The success of operations defends on this coordination and on standardized procedure in which both ground and air units have been trained together thoroughly.
• 238. Combat aviation in support of ground troops may be employed in one or more of the following operations:
a. Reconnaissance bombardment.-Bombardment aviation may conduct combined reconnaissance bombing missions by developing and attacking targets that impede the advance of the supported unit.
b. Attack on defensive organization. Air attacks are executed against field fortifications and defensive organization in the path of supported ground forces, particularly mechanized and armored forces when it is not practicable to employ other means of attack upon the desired objective in the time available, or when the added fire power and moral effect of air attacks are essential to insure the timely success of the operation of the ground forces.
c. Attacks on enemy reserves and reinforcements. Hostile ground forces moving toward the operations area of the sup ported force normally will be a remunerative target for bombardment aviation and are subjected to air attack for the purpose of blocking or delaying their movement and for effect ing their destruction or demoralization. 'Formed bodies of troops and their transportation are highly vulnerable to attacks by bombing and automatic weapon fire.
d. Attacks on hostile mechanized forces. Supporting combat aviation attacks and destroys approaching mechanized forces and antitank units before they gain contact and engage the supported force. The supply, and maintenance elements of hostile mechanized and armored formations are essential to their continued operation, and opportunity shall be sought constantly to accomplish early destruction of these hostile supply elements. Support aviation should be continuously on the alert to detect preparation for and to block any coun teroffensive operations against the supported ground force. Their organic reconnaissance should be used for this purpose.
e. Support of friendly armored or motorized forces. After the initial attack has been launched, supporting aviation continues to operate in close coordination with armored and motorized forces by attacks on hostUe resistance impeding their progress, including hostile counterattacks against the friendly supported force.
f. Support of parachute troops and air infantry in the air and on the ground.-In the support of air infantry operations, friendly pursuit operates to gain and maintain effective air control over the objective for the period of the operation and provides security to aid-borne troops while in air transit and during landings. Supporting bombardment aviation conducts initial attacks when necessary to neutralize the enemy ground defenses at or near the objective, in order to enable parachute and/ or air infantry to effect a landing, and maintains sustained support until the objective·of the sup ported unit has been gained. Air attacks are directed against ground targets at or near the objective that opposes the operations of the supported air infantry on the ground and against any enemy reserves or reinforcements that threaten the supported force.

 

[jwsleser]

There are (were) two issues which derailed this discussion. The first was the word 'close'. Close used in the sense of CAS wasn't meaning some small distance like 500 meters, nor was close only considering the location of ground troops. If you read the manual above, close is used as a broad term meaning in support of troops.


The second is the belief that TV CAS or CAS such as practiced in Vietnam and later wars was the only form of CAS. This is incorrect. It was rare for a danger close (~500m) air support missions to occur during WW2. Fighting on the Pacific Islands likely saw some as the small size of the islands, the complete freedom of air operations (there wasn't any flak to any effective level), and time to train/practice such missions made such missions possible. The type of actions that were often CAS during WW2 all saw significant separation between the friend forces and the target of the air action. I have already cited the use of CAS at Sedan. Stukas weren't dropping bombs 200m in front of friendly troops.


What makes CAS a CAS mission is that 1. the purpose is to support troops and 2. the fact that the aircraft will be operating in airspace controlled by the ground force commander. This latter point is what is often overlooked in discussing air support. Aircraft just can't fly in and bomb any targets they wish. The ground force commander (usually at division or corps) owns the battle space over his area of influence (see para. 237 in the manual above). The area of influence is the terrain upon which the ground unit can effect events with his organic systems. These systems are indirect fire systems, reconnaissance and intelligence systems, security zones and outpost lines, patrol areas, etc. There can be ground forces forward of the FLOT (Forward Line of Troops) that the aircraft have no information about. Aircraft can't do anything inside that area without coordination with the ground force commander. Today the area of influence can be around 20 kms forward of the FLOT and is usually indicated by the location of the FSCL (Fire Support Coordination Line). Any activity between the FLOT and the FSCL is control by the ground force, beyond by corps or other control measures. In WW2, this area extended somewhere between 8-16 kms depending on the ground unit’s weapons.


A consideration that is part of the previous paragraph that most people don’t think about is indirect fire. When aircraft are flying in a ground unit’s battle space, the artillery must cease fire. One issue is obscuration of the target area. The other is that low-lying aircraft can be hit by friendly fire. There are two theories about this issue: big sky, little bullet, or small sky, big bullet. Do you feel lucky?


There are numerous factors that effect the accuracy on aircraft against ground targets: navigation, obscuration of the target, weather, enemy action (fighters, flak, etc.), etc. If a strafing aircraft isn't flying parallel to the FLOT, the rounds could travel in front of or behind the target (depending on the actual angle of approach). Same with a bomb drop. High speed approach requires pilots to quickly identify the target location and drop their ordinance all in a brief period of time. Hence accuracy is always suspect.


Because of these considerations, there is always a large danger area surrounding the target that friend troops wanted to stay out of. A visible demarcation line wasn’t always available and a bomb didn’t respect that line if the troops and the target were too close.


Distance and time were the primary means to control CAS missions. The aircraft didn’t know the location of the friendly forces. Friendly forces did know their own location and the location of the target. Therefore it was often the ground commander who had to ensure his troops were stopped a safe distance from the target.


The sorties were scheduled by time. The ground commander (hopefully) knew the time of the mission. If the attack was going well and moving quicker than planned, the commander must stop his forces and wait for the air to attack. Or he must contact the air and tell them to abort the mission. The reverse could also happen. Wargames provided an example of this issue.


One must know the C2 structure of the battlefield to understand CAS. ‘In the vicinity of ground troops’ is not some small, defined distance but identifies who has the authority to decide upon the use of systems within a given area.

Pista! Jeff

 

[jbroshot]

General Amedeo Mecozzi, who began to propound his theories and train pilots for that role in 1929 when he was still a major. It is averred that pilots trained by Mecozzi were able to fly at very low level (what today would be termed ’nap-of-the earth’) and were able to drop inert bombs on a target as small as a handkerchief. As forward-looking as Mecozzi’s concept and training standards may have been, when the war broke out, his vision could not be fully or properly implemented because although the Regia Aeronautica had supported Mecozzi’s theory and provided enough funding and resources to create two ground attack wings, the 5º and 50º that were assigned to the V Assault (Ground Attack) Brigade in 1936,

One of the sources that Hallion cites in his bibliography is,

Meccozzi, Amedeo. "Origini e svilupo dell' aviazoione d'assalto." Revista Aeronautica 11, no. 2 [February 1935]

 

[Wargames]

Thank you for your latest comments.



The 80º rgt. f. occupied the town of Nikitowka which is located on the east bank of the river. The river was not between the two forces. An example of CAS without a visible demarcation line.



Prove me wrong Wargames by citing sources.

Here is the map of the Nikitovka, Russia. Just follow the road from Nikitovka EAST just 4,044 feet to the bridge the Russians used to cross the Reka Yazeva River.

Nikitovka · Kaliningrad Oblast, Russia, 238744

Kaliningrad Oblast, Russia, 238744

www.google.com

 

[jwsleser]

Thank you for your reply.

Unfortunately that Nikitovka is in the Kaliningrad Oblast near the Baltic Sea. Zoom out and you will see where it is located.

The area we are discussing is in Ukraine. Try:

Horlivka · Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine

Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine

www.google.com

Nikitovka is just north of Gorlovka, which is the modern day Horlivka on the Google map (see Fronte Russo, disegno n.14). It appears Nikitovka has been absorbed by Horlivka as the town is no longer searchable on the map. The Svyato-Pokrovsʹka Parafiya Horlivsʹkoyi church looks to be located where the northern part of the town once stood. Saizevo (now Zaitseve on Google maps) is just north of it as shown on the Italian map.

I have made similar mistakes using Google maps when dealing with Russia. It happens. I once spent an afternoon comparing the Italian maps with Google to ensure I knew what I was looking at.

Pista! Jeff

 

[jwsleser]

I checked the manuals in my library to see if they could add anything. In Impiego delle divisoni paracadutisti ed aviotrasportabili (1942) V. Cooperation dell'aviazione (para. 58) it states (my translation, words in [ ] were added to aid comprehension):

V. AVIATION COOPERATION


58. – Aviation, as already mentioned in the general characteristics of use, intervenes in favor of the Grand Units of paratroopers and air transportable [troops]:

a) in the "organization" phase, for
– continuously and systematically check, through visual and above all photographic reconnaissance, the territory to be occupied with the air boarding, as well as the results achieved by the aerial actions;
– perfect training for boarding and disembarking the units;

b) in the "execution" phase, for
– carry out intense and persistent preliminary actions on all the enemy's preparations, tending to reduce their defensive capacity as much as possible and to act on the morale of the defenders;
– carried out reconnaissance and offensive actions on communications, both land and sea, in order to prevent, or at least hinder, the influx of reinforcements from afar;
– probe the enemy's air and anti-aircraft reaction, through isolated actions and sorties;
– transport the units;
– to contribute to launch safety, neutralizing the anti-aircraft defense with bombings and machine guns, immediately before, during the launch and in the immediately following period, when the units are organizing [on the ground] (the more localized and intense the aviation actions, the greater the probabilities of successfully overcoming the critical moment of the organization of the units);
– support the operations on the ground with bombing, bomb letting and strafing actions;
– carry out diversionary missions to facilitate the surprise;
– supply the landed units with food, ammunition, various materials;
– to recover paratroopers units used in particular episodic actions.

As I was on post, I stopped by CARL to see what was available. I knew they have some Italian manuals, but most were addestramenti or istruzioni. I did find Addestramento dei guastatori di fanteria (1941) which had a brief bit about aircraft (para. 52). Again my translation.

AVIATION COOPERATION
52. The aviation completes the artillery preparation towards the final phase with actions, aimed essentially at the destruction of the works, carried out by flying over the fortified system in the direction of the front and in two or more stages up to the moment immediately preceding the attack. The last overflight, with the launching of smaller caliber bombs, will be carried out at a safe distance from the sappers or advanced infantry units that will be pre-established in the attack plan.

As one can read, use of CAS was part of the doctrine during the war.

Pista! Jeff

 

[Wargames]

Thank you for your reply.

Unfortunately that Nikitovka is in the Kaliningrad Oblast near the Baltic Sea. Zoom out and you will see where it is located.

The area we are discussing is in Ukraine. Try:

Horlivka · Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine

Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine

www.google.com

Nikitovka is just north of Gorlovka, which is the modern day Horlivka on the Google map (see Fronte Russo, disegno n.14). It appears Nikitovka has been absorbed by Horlivka as the town is no longer searchable on the map. The Svyato-Pokrovsʹka Parafiya Horlivsʹkoyi church looks to be located where the northern part of the town once stood. Saizevo (now Zaitseve on Google maps) is just north of it as shown on the Italian map.

I have made similar mistakes using Google maps when dealing with Russia. It happens. I once spent an afternoon comparing the Italian maps with Google to ensure I knew what I was looking at.

Pista! Jeff

Thank you for the correction. In that event, you may be right and CAS was used.

You wrote:

"Why does the passage suggest that the Italian soldiers were further back? Were the Italian soldiers further away than the Germans at Sedan? You don't know where the Italians soldiers were located on the battlefield because you haven't studied that battle."

The passage of time is indicative of the distance for the Italians to reach the front. You don't seem to know where the Italians were either or you have posted it (Certainly far enough back for Mussolini to watch.). And, I haven't studied the battle, just as I don't think you have either or you'd know the fighters were Mc200's, the recon bombers were R0.37's, and 12 Ju-87's were included (Aerial Operations in the Greek Campaign October 1940 - April 1941, Giulio Gobbi, June, 2005). I found the source you cited and it's obvious why you couldn't answer my questions. You don't know. It seems the pot has called the kettle black. You did this again when I asked you produce evidence Ariete was involved in a battle with 7th Armored using CAS. You wrote:

"Same problem Wargames. Once again, you have no detail knowledge of this battle. You don’t know."

I'm going to guess you don't know either, or you'd correct me. It's your example, not mine.

Let us not forget when I pointed out that you had no ground troops at all in your "British armored vehicles in the El Cuasc area" CAS, you accused me of a "strawman" argument. I can name others but why bother? It gets us nowhere.

However, I actually do agree CAS was used on March 9, 1941 in the Pass attack. The follow-up infantry attack is too close to claim otherwise and it could be done as all the targets were identifiable from the air by their own landmarks (You listed them.). So Mc.200's and Ju-87's could be used without "friendly fire" consequence which is likely why the Br.20's weren't used as they might have produced them.

As I said before, we are wasting our time arguing CAS when we don't use the same definition and this certainly reads like you don't have a definition when you wrote this:

"CAS as a term wasn't used during WW2 (as far as my limited research has gone)."

And this has been my discovery as well in the last 24 hours. It's not defined in terms of WW2. You named the US FM 100-15 1942 field manual to define it. That was based on Coningham's British CAS and found not to work and was tossed. Ultimately, its WW2 use varied between armies because you can bet Germany's CAS manual reads differently. But in this case we know the army, Italy. We know the location (Malta). We know the year (summer 1942).

If you can give a date where both the Italian Army and Italian Ju-87's attacked Tobruk on the same day, as you have several to choose from, this would give us an idea of Italian Ju-87 capabilities in CAS. I've read by 1941 the Italians received 46 B-1s, 50 B-2s, 59 R-2s (unsourced) and another (Wiki WarThunder) additional Ju 87 B-2 and R-5 for a total of 159 aircraft in 1942. While I don't have much faith in the Ba.65, it seems 150 Ju-87's (or whatever the actual number was) ought to be capable of doing something (Mc200's were very good at escorting it.). Correction: The Mc200 was considered better at escorting the Ju-87 than the Bf-110 but not the Bf-109. Ju-87 pilots actually complained about the Mc.200 as an escort (Bergström, Christer – Andrey Dikov – Vlad Antipov Black Cross Red Star – Air War over the Eastern Front Volume 3 – Everything for Stalingrad. Hamilton MA, Eagle Editions, 2006. Pg 57.). But Bf-109s did not have much success escorting Ju-87's over the Battle of Britain either. The Ju-87's problem was the Spitfire with its high diving speed. It could follow a Ju-87 down on its tail. If the escorting fighter could not match the Spitfire's dive, the Ju-87 could be shot down. This would require a fighter slow enough to stay with the Ju-87 in level flight, yet then have a high diving speed. The Mc.200 came pretty close to this on paper but evidently not in practice, Italian Ju-87's being quickly relegated to night bombing of Malta. MC.202's and Re2001's were tried as escorts over Malta. The result is unknown to me, but the Germans never requested either plane to escort their Ju-87's. I have a note the Germans reduced their Ju-87's to night attacks only over Malta in June 1941 (But found a daylight attack on March 26, 1942) and all Ju-87's were withdrawn from bombing Malta on July 25, 1942.

 

[jwsleser]

You don't seem to know where the Italians were either or you have posted it (Certainly far enough back for Mussolini to watch.). And, I haven't studied the battle, just as I don't think you have either

What a silly little insult Wargames. Of course I have studied the battle or I wouldn't have use it as an example. After all, I am not like you

There are more Wargames.

or you'd know the fighters were Mc200's, the recon bombers were R0.37's, and 12 Ju-87's were included (Aerial Operations in the Greek Campaign October 1940 - April 1941, Giulio Gobbi, June, 2005).

So what? You found a very short Stormo magazine article that doesn't say a thing about actual the March offensive or anything about support to the R.E.. https://www.stormomagazine.com/Articles/HistoryArticles_Greece.htm

Go back to La Regia Aeronautica and actually read the lists of aircraft available/used.

As for the remainder of your post, yes I have studied the battles and I do have the details. After all, I did know where in Russia the C.S.I.R. operated, something that appeared to have eluded you. I have used the Russian histories available in CARL for the other side of the hill.

At least you actually tried to do some research so my method is working. "Give a person a fish....."

However, I actually do agree CAS was used on March 9, 1941 in the Pass attack. The follow-up infantry attack is too close to claim otherwise and it could be done as all the targets were identifiable from the air by their own landmarks (You listed them.). So Mc.200's and Ju-87's could be used without "friendly fire" consequence which is likely why the Br.20's weren't used as they might have produced them.

Keep on rationalizing about something you are wrong about but are unwilling to admit.

Pista! Jeff

 

[Wargames]

Jwsleser:

I wish you luck.

 

[jwsleser]

Wargames

Thank you you for the discussion.

Pista! Jeff

 

[Wargames]

Wargames

Thank you you for the discussion.

Pista! Jeff

Thank you, but I'm not done, I'm waiting for you to finish.

 

[jwsleser]

Finish What?

 

[Wargames]

Jwsleser:

I wish you luck.

The air attacks at Sedan preceded the German assault across the river. The air attacks at Sedan happened over 2 kms from the nearest German troops. The air attacks shifted to even further back behind the French lines before the German assault across the river began at 1600 hrs. You don’t even know the details of the battle that you are touting as an example of CAS.

Pista! Jeff

The crossing of the Meuse took place at 1530 hours. The last bomb was dropped at 1500 hours and which corresponds to the scheduled crossing time. The thirty minute delay in crossing was due to the boat operators not having arrived. When they failed to arrive, the Germans crossed without them. My times come from the letters of German Staff Sergeant Walter Rubarth who led the crossing (Forgotten Soldiers by Brian Moynahan) and "The Blitzkrieg Legend” by German Col. Dr. Karl-Heinz Frieser.

The 1600 hours time you used was for a 20 minute raid planned by II Fliegerkorps. The idea of a single massed strike was abandoned, and instead the German air units were to attack in small formations but constantly, through the day (Col. Frieser, Karl-Heinz. The Blitzkrieg Legend. Naval Institute Press, 2005. p. 154.)

You cite "The air attacks at Sedan happened over 2 kms from the nearest German troops". 2 km is 2, 287 yards. I identified CAS range as:

Close proximity to Italian friendly ground troops would be on the order of 4-5,000 yards, with Italian troops attacking about 1,000 yards from the enemy front lines and CAS likely directed to the enemy rear.

2,287 yards is well within my description.

 

[Wargames]

Finish What?

I thought you were going to provide evidence of Italian CAS in order to dispute a wargame designer and show Italians could provided CAS over Malta in 1942. I have reread your posts three times and you never did,

In wargame design you have to show cause and effect. There should be a cause (aircraft) and it should be measurable (Number of aircraft and weapons carried.). There should an effect on the target and it too should be measurable (The effect can be a loss of men, equipment, supplies, command, etc.).

So at Sedan, the measurable cause was 200 Stukas and 310 Dornier 17's and the measurable effect was 56 French casualties and the loss of the communication wire laid on the ground ( Frieser, Karl-Heinz. The Blitzkrieg Legend. Naval Institute Press, 2005 page 161). This meant the French 75's were incapable of indirect fire support.

You have never provided measurable cause and measurable effect even once. Let's go through your claimed arguments:

Attacks CR.42 B.A. the 376th Sqd. (Cap. I. Lalatta) were brought against British armored vehicles in the El Cuasc area, east of Gambut and Sidi Rezegh area, working for several consecutive days with takeoffs from the airfields of Ain el Gazala frequently subjected to the enemy fighter attacks . To reinforce the few Italian attackers came the 236th assault Sqd. (Cap. A. Cerutti) with CR.42 B.A. (Wing bombs) who had left the Ju.87 survivors of the 209th Sqd. to pass on the biplane Fiat equipped as a assault.

Your cause includes the Cr.42 which could, indeed, strafe British armored vehicles (but only of very thin armor). However, you didn't measure the cause (number of Cr.42's) or the measured effect on the British vehicles. Without a measured effect, it could be zero. Again, you provide no friendly ground units being supported (your own definition of CAS). This demonstrates nothing.

Swooping attacks against armored columns were effectively carried out by the 239th Sqd. in defense of the Bir el Gobi sector entrusted to the “Ariete” and a Battalion of GG.FF., that their baptism of fire had behaved as rejecting veterans with value and high spirit of sacrifice the attack of the tanks of the 7th Armored Div.

Same problem as before. No measurable cause. No measurable effect. If you can't measure it, you can't show effective CAS, The Italians could be throwing paper airplanes at the British and you could call it an example of Italian CAS.

Even the air component of the tactical support had some news with the application of the CR.42 bomber type Nardi and 150th Group CT first to experience this innovation by making successful attacks against the Greek positions and batteries in Albania (Val Desnizza).

Again, no measurable cause (number of planes) and no measurable effect (damage inflicted). You can claim "successful" because the word is included in your source but exactly how successful is missing. Were the Greeks a nihilated or did they just miss lunch? Again, you don't provide a friendly ground unit being supported and your source calls it "tactical support" and not CAS.

Brought to the observatory of Mount Komarit mouth of Val Desnizza, Mussolini attended to report on the operation explained by General Gambara, whose plan was deemed simple and straightforward, and the next day - 9 March - the “Val Desnizza" offensive began after an artillery preparation made from about 300 guns that fired no fewer than 100,000 rounds on enemy positions. At 07:00 the infantry leapt to the attack preceded by intense aerial bombardment on Trebescines and adjacent areas, while fighters and reconnaissance bombed and machine-gunned Togliari, Kuk, Mezgorani, Gerova, Ciafa, Sofit, Caizza, Psari and the Picchiatori hit precise objectives considered very important by terrestrial commands at Suka, Spadarit, Mezgorani, Toscisci, hill 1308 of Trebescines. A total of one hundred planes took turns in the attacks from early morning to sunset, to provide concrete support to the troops and the effective support of the Air Force in the IX Army sector.

Your listed cause includes 300 guns, 100,000 shells, and 100 aircraft You include supported troops. Your listed effect is "hit precise positions" but with no measured effect. How many guns were knocked out? Greek casualties? If you don't know the effect, you cannot say Italian CAS was effective as it may have accomplished nothing (After all, the Italians lost the battle.).

I notice you have the book, "Mussolini's Defeat at Hill 731". If Italian CAS was actually successful, you should be able to find it here. Simply provide a measured cause (number and type of airplanes) and a measured effect on the Greeks (losses). You cited this offensive as evidence of successful Italian CAS.

On November 12, the 371st Sqd. CT (Capt. Enrico Meille) was assigned to the command CSIR and intended to ease Russian pressure on Nikitowka positions held by the 80th Inf. Regiment reinforced by a group of 75/27 of the 8th artillery Regiment, several days surrounded by units of the Russian 174th Div. For several days the low-flying Macchi C.200 machine- gunned enemy positions by implementing even throwing bombs 50 kg. after processing in the fighter aircraft with Angeloni wing mounts which falls essential to broaden the range of applications because of the absence of assault types very useful on the eastern front. The missions were extended throughout the course of the short day to the point that on several occasions it was necessary to illuminate the Stalino track with the vehicles headlights to facilitate landings.

So once again you have unknown number of aircraft inflicting unknown losses on the Russian enemy. No cause. No effect. Doubtless, there was a cause and some sort of effect as I found a similar claim where on January 17, 1943, 25 Italian fighters aided surrounded German troops in the Millcrovo area (The Macchi C.202, Profile Publications, #28, Page 7), their contribution being recognized by the German high command. While a measurable effect is missing, in our two examples the defenders recognized it. Unfortunately, it is still not measured. Therefore, you cannot say what effect 25 Italian fighters would have strafing British troops on Malta. Further, in both situations, the fighters were supporting a defense (The Russians were attacking). In Malta 1942, it would be the Italians attacking and the British defending (often in concrete pillboxes) and the effect totally different, including possibly zero.

Once again, you demonstrate your lack of knowledge to intelligently discuss this topic. The R.A. had been badly beaten in the fighting since December 1940 and had suffered significant losses. It had to abandon all of its forward bases and relocate further west. Operational ready rates was poor and the 5ª Squadra Aerea was in disarray. The RAF had gained local air superiority and the R.A. was having problems just trying to defend its own airbases. Someone who has actually studied the operations of the Italian military during that time period would know that without needing to crack open a book.

On December 20, 20 Italian bombers bombed a British column from Sollom bound for Bardia, destroying 6 vehicles and killing six solders. I just gave you cause (20 bombers) and effect (6 vehicles, 6 soldiers killed), at a time you say it couldn't happen. I also earlier gave the cause and effect of a Ba.65 attack on the 11th Hussars on September 11, 1940. Yet you can't find any Italian CAS in the September offensive when they had Ba.65's and Cr.32 bis available. If the Italians had the aircraft for CAS and the training for it in the assault on Sidi Barrani, it seems neither one of us can find it.

Prove me wrong Wargames by citing sources.

I am. I'm using your sources.

One area where the Italian armoured units had a potential edge over their British opponents was in terms of close air support. The Regia Aeronautica (Royal Air Force) had put some effort into developing ground attack aircraft, which had been used extensively in both Ethiopia and Spain. The Breda Ba.65 fighter-bomber, armed with two 12.7mm heavy machine-guns, two 7.7mm machine-guns and a pair of 250kg bombs, was capable of conducting strafing and dive-bombing attacks.The newer Breda Ba.88 was also available, although it proved a serious disappointment in combat. While pre-war air-ground training was uncommon, the Regia Aeronautica was willing to provide close air support to the army when requested. (p.71 my bold)

"The newer Breda Ba.88 was also available." It was used on airfields as a decoy for British aircraft to attack. If you have a Ba.88 CAS attack mission during WW2, please post it. The Ba.65 did not have a bombsight, it could not divebomb as claimed, it had no sand filters, and with an engine life expectancy of 80 hours. Your source mentions "pre-war air-ground training was uncommon". When did it become common? Neither your source above nor yourself have yet to show effective CAS during WW2. Spain and Ethiopia don't count.

I have already addressed the reasons why it wasn't seen as often during the war due to the lack of a permissive environment and the lack of aircraft (especially in A.S.).

Which is the very reason I stated "historically, it never happened".

You stated :

The R.A. did attack/bomb Tobruk numerous times during the siege.

I have been patiently waiting for you to cite an Italian ground and air attack on Tobruk on the same day. You have 241 days to choose from. So far, you haven't done so. It would go a long way towards making your case.

Of course I have studied the battle or I wouldn't have use it as an example. After all, I am not like you

Good. Then you'll have no problem posting cause and effect in your examples.

 

[jwsleser]

I thought you were going to provide evidence of Italian CAS in order to dispute a wargame designer and show Italians could provided CAS over Malta in 1942. I have reread your posts three times and you never did,

Okay, that is your opinion. I know I did provide evidence of CAS since you agreed....

However, I actually do agree CAS was used on March 9, 1941 in the Pass attack. The follow-up infantry attack is too close to claim otherwise and it could be done as all the targets were identifiable from the air by their own landmarks (You listed them.). So Mc.200's and Ju-87's could be used without "friendly fire" consequence which is likely why the Br.20's weren't used as they might have produced them.

Then we have this...

If you can't measure it, you can't show effective CAS, The Italians could be throwing paper airplanes at the British and you could call it an example of Italian CAS.

The question I asked was not 'how effective was Italian CAS', the question actually asked was "Could the R.A. perform CAS?" (read the title of the thread). You reply was...

Since the Italians historically never used CAS (emphasis is my original post),

Once there is agreement that the Italians did execute CAS missions, then one can move on to discuss its effectiveness. Until then, no point.

I am not designing a wargame. The game designer used Burtt's book as his source. Burtt provided no arguments or sources to support his statement. We already have several examples of Italian CAS and likely more can be found. Burtt did not state that Italian CAS was ineffective, he stated it didn't happen. Two different positions to take about CAS.

If you wish to quantify the effectiveness of Italian CAS, go ahead and do your own research. Bottomline is that I don't wish to be your research assistant. I have other research I wish to do.

I find no pleasure in discussing these issues with you. You are too fixed in your opinions without having done the necessary research. When I read uninformed statements such as this...

I have been patiently waiting for you to cite an Italian ground and air attack on Tobruk on the same day.

... there is no requirement for for the friendly force to be attacking (yes Wargames, CAS is also used in the defense). In fact CAS be used when neither side is attacking/defending. You lack a fundamental understating of how military operations are planned/executed and you have not indicated any desire to learn.

Please begin another thread about the effectiveness/ineffectiveness of Italian CAS and post your argument and research. If you still don't believe the Italians historically executed CAS, there is no reason to discuss whether it was effective.

Pista! Jeff

 

[Dili]

CAS was done in Greece by observation aircraft and from some reading they also bombed relatively frontline troops with bombers. Also one of criticism made by the head of Regia Aeronautica against the 5 Squadra(Libya) was that they were employing the bombers against British troops instead of function they were build for. Now attacking troops and AFV do not mean necessarily close air support but it seems these attacks were frantic due to ever changing tactical situation, so some might have been.

In 1933 Aviation for Regio Esercito (Observation aircraft) manual . L'Intervento offensivo diretto nel combatimento is considered a Compiti Eventuali. Considered a rare case when bombers and attack aircraft are not available.

 

[Dili]

That said it would be interesting to get information on air to land and land air contact. I saw sometime ago the symbols that infantry put on land to inform aircraft. I will have to check my radio information.