Desert Armour

[jwsleser]

I spotted a new book from Osprey titled Desert Armour Tank Warfare in North Africa: Beda Fomm to Operation Crusader, 1940–41 by Robert Forczyk. As the title states, it will cover the early battles in A.S. One can see from the Table of Contents posted on the website that the authors covers doctrine, organization, and then the actual operations. Looking forward to reading the book to see if it adds materially to the history of the early A.S. battles.

Desert Armour

Robert Forczyk covers the development of armoured warfare in North Africa from the earliest Anglo-Italian engagements in 1940 to the British victory over the Ge…

ospreypublishing.com

Book is scheduled for release on 28 February. I have preordered.

Pista! Jeff

 

[Slavomir]

Great find, Jeff.

Another book by R. Forczyk on desert warfare is announced and scheduled for October 2023: Desert Armour. Tank Warfare in North Africa: Gazala to Tunisia, 1942-1942.
Desert Warfare

Best regards

 

[jwsleser]

Thank you for the additional find. I will wait to read the first before deciding whether to preorder the second.

My concern is whether Forczyk accessed Italian primary sources. If he did, then the books could be a nice addition to the library. If not, then another Anglo-centric account. Forczyk lives in the US, so I am wondering how much Italian material he collected for his books.

Pista! Jeff

 

[jwsleser]

I have been told that this book has been released. I had preordered it, but Osprey states my copy won't be dispatched until 28 Feb. Huh?

Forczyk made a blog post HERE talking about the book. It appears he only used the Italian material available at NARA, no research in the Italian archives. It will be interesting to see what he found.

Pista! Jeff

 

[jwsleser]

Osprey notified me that my copy of Forczyk's book has shipped. So maybe in 10-12 days....... No idea why it didn't ship days ago.

I am mainly interested to see what sources he used to address the Italian side of Compass. As I suspect that he mainly used material from NARA, I am keenly interested in seeing which rolls he used. I also suspect that his discussion of Italian doctrine will mainly be from Sweet. However I am wiling to be pleasantly surprised if he discovered other sources.

I have discovered that I made a tactical error. My experience has been that books from UK publishers are not usually available from US dealers like Amazon until a month or so after its release in the UK. Amazon already has the book and if I ordered today, it would arrive by 6 March (Prime) or tomorrow if I used fastest delivery. So any US CS members interested in the book should look to US sources instead of Osprey.

Pista! Jeff

 

[Slavomir]

I am keenly interested in seeing which rolls he used.

Me as well. As you know, I spent quite few days at NARA and would like to see what I have missed.

Regards

 

[jwsleser]

I have Parts I and II of the guides and I didn't find any rolls that likely held early (1940–early 1941) material for A.S. I am certainly curious to see what sources he used for Compass.

Pista! Jeff

 

[jwsleser]

I was pleasantly surprised when I opened by mail box and discovered that my copy of Desert Armour had been delivered. It appears it was shipped from inside the US, so Osprey likely prepositioned copies. These are my initial impressions after spending an hour with the book.

It is a very good looking book. It is the slightly larger 24.5 cm x 19.5 cm that your normal book size (23.4 cm x 15.6 cm). The book is well illustrated with B&W pictures, color Osprey draws of vehicles and another equipment, color maps, and wiring diagrams dispersed throughout the book. Just from the physical quality of the book makes me wish I that should have approached Osprey about publishing my book.

And expected (but hoped for better), the bibliography is rather slight. No primary Italian sources are listed expect for one memoir, not even Iezzi's account of the V btg. carri M that is available on the web. The Italian sources are the usual suspects: Montanari, the earlier officials, various Osprey vehicle books, and Pignato's and Cappellano's Gli autoveicoli. No Italian NARA rolls (only German) or Kew War Diaries are listed (the AWM War Diaries are listed). So no expectation of any thing really new.

No obvious errors jumped up at me as I read a few select sections (bits during Compass and Beda Fomm). He does correctly state that it was the «Sabratha» defending Derna and not the 10º rgt. bers. The discussion of Italian doctrine and tank development is very incomplete and I don't agree with his interpretation of what it all meant. I feel he short changes Italian thinking and decisions about armour in the June 40–Feb 41 timeframe in A.S., but where he ends up is accurate. His wiring diagram of a carri M btg. is for three companies, but he does discuss the two company organization in the text (p.78). No mention of the reserve platoons or organization of the btg. carri L.

The book is footnoted, but not as many as I have preferred. There are many statements that I would certainly wish to have a cite. A few too many statements that are new to me and I sorta feel aren't quite right. I am left guessing whether they are thoughts from other writers or the author's own.

The bits I read are very readable and I feel that this is a solid account of the events it covers. My initial sense is this might be a better book than Luck was Lacking or Iron Hearts for those new to A.S. or looking for something a little more in depth. That judgement will need to wait until I read all the book.

Pista! Jeff

 

[jwsleser]

I have read the entire book. I do recommend it to the members of CS because it offers a different take on the why's behind the events in A.S. IMHO it provides reasons for students of the campaigns to take a closer look at the leadership displayed by all sides. I do have some issues with what the author provides, but it is more in the realm of supporting his argument rather than the argument itself.

My first thought was the book should have been named Desert Armour Commanders as Forczyk really focuses on the commanders and their decisions. Forczyk provides a different assessment of the strength/weaknesses of the armour leadership during the campaign than one normally finds in works on North Africa.

The subtitle should have been 'Why Rommel should have been fired.' I have always felt that Rommel has been vastly overrated since the mid-1980s. The more I delved into the Italian accounts and records, the more I came to realize that Rommel needs a serious biographer to peel back the onion skins. I believe that Forczykl has opened that door and someone will finally do some deep research and write a study of Rommel's command in A.S. This alone made the book fresh for me even as I felt that the author didn't really offer anything new in terms of research.

In terms of research, what Desert Armour really offers is analysis, not some earth-shattering new discoveries from the archives. This is a mixed blessing as while the analysis is refreshing, he skimps on supporting his arguments with details.

The subordinate German leadership get a closer look as well, with Forczyk indicating that they too made many mistakes. In fact, by the end of Crusader (which is the end of this first volume) the reader will wonder why the Germans were seen as these great masters of maneuver warfare in the desert. He also begins to poke holes into the argument that the German equipment was so superior that gave the DAK a nearly unbeatable edge. Even that famed 88mm is challenged with Forczyk stating "... and their real trump card was the low-silhouette, high-velocity 5cm Pak 38 anti-tank gun." (p.283).

The Germans are not alone as the British commanders get raked over the coals. "He [Gott] is easily the most over-rated commander of the desert campaign" (picture caption p.278) and "Simply put, Crusader proved Gott was the wrong man to command an armoured division assigned to conduct a challenging mission." (p.282). Gatehouse, Campbell, Scott-Cockburn, etc. are discussed as well.

Forczyk does include looking at the Italians, but it quickly become clear that his research wasn't very deep. He is generally positive, discussing the various problems that prevented them from from being successful. His discussion of the events leading up to and including Compass are okay, with only his discussion of Beda Fomm causing a few cringes. It is not that his account of 5–7 Feb 1941 was bad, but it clearly reflected the lack of any real in-depth research. In his discussion of Crusader, the issue of Gambara and the actions of the d.moto. «Trieste» are not mentioned. In the end, I felt what he provided was more reflective of being inclusive rather than a serious look at the Italian armored leadership.

My main problem with the book was the lack of supporting material for his arguments. He didn't provide things like Gott's orders/messages during Crusader to support his statements that Gott basically did nothing at times. The same for Rommel. I really wanted him to lay out his arguments using the hard facts available in the historical record. While the maps were nice in showing the actual actions, better would have to use them to outline the options/issues he presented. The maps tended to be more tactically focused when he is discussing operational issues which limited their usefulness. Only the map for the planned British operation for Crusader (p.223) showed an operational level situation in support of the narrative. Compass, the first Axis offensive, and the frontier battles lack any map/diagram of the operational situation/challenges he was addressing.

In all, I do recommend this book for the way it offers a different viewpoint of the battles covered. It will generate discussion on various forums.

Pista! Jeff

 

[Ptolemy59]

Thanks for the write-up. The basic problem is that publishers impose a great deal of constraints that make it difficult to include all the detail that every body wants. I would have liked 20-30 maps, but I was limited to 10. Additional documentation. such as Gott's orders, would quickly go down a rabbit hole that would swerve away from the main topic. The book was never intended to be a biography and I had a tightly-controlled word count imposed upon me. Indeed, I was hoping to do this study in a single volume of about 400 pages, but the publisher decided to split it up into two volumes. The same thing happened with my East Front books.

Another item of note: writers do not own the front cover of their books, the marketing department at the publisher does. I did not even want the title Desert Armour. Nor did I get the cover photos I wanted. It's part of the reality of the publishing industry.

I tried to get as much Italian material as I could (keeping in mind this was written during COVID lockdown, with most archives closed for over a year). I also reached out to you jwsleser, on this forum, and basically received a shrug of the shoulders. So you did have a chance to influence the content of this book, in regard to the Italian Army, but did not. Which is why you are not listed in the book's acknowledgements but Pier Paolo B and Fillippo C. are. Frankly, I see this all the time. As it was, I think I gave the Italian Army in North Africa a fair shake and even more so in the upcoming Volume 2 (due out in October).

 

[jwsleser]

Good day Ptolemy59

I am assuming I am responding to the author, Robert Forczyk. If your are the man, thank you for taking the time to write your response. You are most welcome here on Comando Supremo. If you are some else, please disregard the remainder of this post.

Your response addresses several different issues. I will do so, but first I wil offer a more refined version of my review. This was posted on WW2Talk. I had planned to replace this review here with the one from WW2Talk but now it is too late. http://ww2talk.com/index.php?threads/books-on-north-africa.9330/page-4#post-1007038

I will post a direct response to you comments tomorrow. You have raise several good points that I wish to address.

Pista! Jeff

After writing a book on armor warfare in in Russia and several other WW2 titles, Robert Forcyzk has stepped into the campaign for North Africa. This is the first book of his I have read, so I can't compare Desert Armour to his earlier works.


After reading Desert Armour, I do recommend it as it offers a different take on the why's behind the events in A.S. IMHO it provides reasons for students of the campaigns to take a closer look at the leadership displayed by all sides. I do have some issues with what the author provides, but it is more in the realm of supporting his argument rather than the argument itself.

It is an attractive book. Numerous pictures and color equipment drawing fill the pages, with a good mix of UK, German, and Italian photos. There are several organizational wiring diagrams, but not enough to support the discussion. A German May 1941 panzer division diagram is provided on p.171 that can be used for Crusader, but no corresponding UK or Italian armoured division diagrams are included (the 7th Ar. Div. diagram on p.117 is Dec 40). The color maps are quite nice and very clear, but don’t support Forczyk’s argument as well as they could have (further elaboration below).

My first thought after completing the book was it should have been named Desert Armour Commanders as Forczyk really focuses on the commanders and their decisions. Forczyk provides a different assessment of the strength/weaknesses of the armour leadership during the campaign than one normally finds in works on North Africa.

The subtitle should have been 'Why Rommel should have been fired.' I have always felt that Rommel has been vastly overrated and realized that he needs a serious biographer to peel back the onion skins on his leadership abilities in WW2. I believe that Forczyk has opened that door and someone will finally do some deep research and write a detailed study of Rommel's command in A.S. This alone made the book fresh for me even as I felt that the author didn't really offer anything new in terms of research.

On that note, what Desert Armour really offers is analysis, not some earth-shattering new discoveries from the archives. This is a mixed blessing as while the analysis is refreshing, he skimps on supporting his arguments with details. This is most noticeable when the first part of the book discusses the armour doctrine of the three countries but it isn’t often tied to crafting an in-depth examination of the decisions during the phases of the campaign which follow.

My main difficulty with the book was the lack of supporting material for his arguments. For example he doesn't provide a timeline on Gott's orders/messages during Crusader in support of his statements that Gott basically did nothing at times. While the maps were nice in showing the actual actions, better would have to use them to outline the options/issues he presented. The maps tended to be more tactically focused when he is addressing operational issues which limited the maps’ usefulness to support the discussion. Only one map, the planned British operation for Crusader (p.223) showed an operational level situation in support of the narrative. Compass, the first Axis offensive, and the frontier battles lack any map/diagram of the operational situation/challenges facing the leaders when he was addressing their decisions.

Forczyk’s bibliography is rather thin, especially when looking at his use of Italian sources and the lack of British War Diaries. He does cite a few additional sources in his footnotes that aren’t listed in his bibliography. However the book is light on footnotes, a negative given the nature of his argument and the lack of detail in his narrative.

As the Italian military is the focus of my research, I purchased the book to discover what Forczyk possibly offered. He does address the Italians, but it quickly become clear that his research on their involvement in the campaign wasn't very deep. He mentions the discussions of guerra lampo (fast war) but never addresses the actual doctrine that was adopted, guerra di rapido corso (war of rapid progress). His discussion of the Italian side of the events leading up to and including Compass are basically a straight account of events rather than delving deep into the Italian command problems. In his discussion of Crusader, the decisions of Gambara and Piazzoni aren’t even mentioned (Crüwell’s famous ‘Wo bleibt Gambara?’). In the end, I felt what he provided was more reflective of attempting to be inclusive rather than a serious look at the Italian armored leadership.

In all, I do recommend this book for the way it offers a different viewpoint of the battles covered. it is a solid account of the campaigns with some interesting thoughts thrown in. It will generate discussion on various forums.

Pista! Jeff

 

[jwsleser]

Good day Robert

Let me now address a few points you have raised in your post.

I am pleased that you didn’t disagree with any of my comments. I understand the challenge of writing when given limits on word count, maps, and other conditions. That is something authors must content with.

I do agree with you that, given a word count, providing supporting data like a list of Gott’s communications is likely too much. However it is necessary to say something that provides the reader at least a clue why you reached your conclusions on Gott (I am using Gott as an exemplar).

The bar you set for yourself in this book was “Rather, my intent is to provide a focused analytical account of armoured operations in the theater, from the tactical and operational-level perspective of both Allied and Axis combatants.” (p.10). Using this standard, I have difficulty in understanding whether Gott’s command issues were self-inflicted and causal to the negative outcomes or whether he was trapped by ’s**t happens’? As I stated in my review, I don’t disagree with your conclusions, but I can’t follow the road you used to get there.

Let’s look at your account of the attack on 21–22 Nov., which BTW is a very good narrative. Starting on p.236, you have Gott located in Gaber Saleh experiencing serious communication problems. He was previously at Sidi Rezegh (p.235). Why did he move to Gaber Saleh? Why was it a bad place to be? Next time you discuss Gott, you state “Gott’s performance in battle command during much of the day was incredibly poor; as he failed to direct his scattered brigades and seemed more interested in the movements of the 1st South African division, which was not his responsibility.” (p.240) Was Gott still at Gaber Saleh? Was he still experiencing communication problems? If so, what had he done to try to work around the problem? Had he moved and now had better communications? It is difficult for me to understand why Gott’s failed to direct his brigades if he was still having communications issues unless he did nothing to change it. I don’t know what he tried to do to overcome that problem. Gott is back in communications by 1000 22 Nov (p.240–241), so what had changed? Why was ordering the movement of the two brigades to P.175 the wrong move? What was Gott’s thinking (good or bad) for ordering this move. Did he have a plan where moving to P.175 made sense?

It is this lack of a cause and effect linkage that, for me, creates difficulties in accepting your analysis. I am well read on the A.S. campaign and I don’t necessarily disagree with your conclusions. But I don’t read a strong argument that supports your case.

Desert Amour is a very readable and solid good account of the first armour clashes in the desert. If this was all it was meant to be, it is a very good account.

Pista! Jeff

 

[jwsleser]

I will now address the other issue in your post.

I tried to get as much Italian material as I could (keeping in mind this was written during COVID lockdown, with most archives closed for over a year). I also reached out to you jwsleser, on this forum, and basically received a shrug of the shoulders. So you did have a chance to influence the content of this book, in regard to the Italian Army, but did not. Which is why you are not listed in the book's acknowledgements but Pier Paolo B and Fillippo C. are. Frankly, I see this all the time. As it was, I think I gave the Italian Army in North Africa a fair shake and even more so in the upcoming Volume 2 (due out in October).

Getting Italian sources is a challenge and Covid didn't help. I note that you didn't used the Italian Crusader reports found at NARA in T-821 roll 250. I was able to visit the Italian Army archives in April 2022, but did have work through the Covid issues.

First I would like link our previous discussion. I believe it strongly indicates that I attempted to answer your questions.

Fate of Italian armour leaders 1940-41

I'm trying to ascertain the fate of the medium tank battalion commanders (I, II, III, V, VI) during Operation Compass. Were any killed in action? Were they all captured? Are there any details on Babini's capture/surrender?

comandosupremo.com

Yes, I did drop the ball in not posting that I didn’t know the answer to your last question. I was hoping that others on the forum might step in and offer an answer. After that, I likely squirreled. Mea colpa. A nudge might have helped, but that is now history. If you chose to hold that against me, that is your decision. I believe that if you check my posts on all the various forums I try to be as helpful as possible. As important, I cite my research.

I wish that I had been given an opportunity to assist your work, but that request was never offered. So please don’t hold me accountable for your unwillingness to ask.

Before you think that I am being unfair, here is one thread were I am requesting assistance for my book. Please note the difference in our approaches and that I explain what I am doing and the state of my research.

http://ww2talk.com/index.php?threads/djebel-abiod-21-22-nov-42.98421/

The editor at Helion is currently working on my manuscript, Infantrymen of the Air. It might be published by the end of next month (April) or the beginning of May. I was allowed to pick the cover picture and word count wasn't an issue. They did limited me to 10-12 maps drawn by their in-house cartographer which I considered inadequate, so I used my own cartographer. The book has 54 maps and looking back I should have added a few more. My word count indicates ~420 pages without the index and over 800 footnotes. I want readers to challenge my thoughts and history, so provided then with the source of my conclusions. Now the book is not printed as of yet, so to paraphrase a well known adage, the opera isn't over until the diva sings the aria. I have been told everything is okay, but I will see.

I strongly encourage you to read the book and return to Comando Supremo and offer your review. There is a lot of material on El Alamein and Tunisia that might be useful for your vol 2, but it isn’t armour centric. However, I believe that its publication might be too late for you to leverage.

I hope you continue to come to Comando Supremo and seek assistance. If you don’t, that is your decision. I am willing to help as best I can but I do have other commitments and I must decide on how to use my time based on the information posters provide.

Pista! Jeff

 

[Ptolemy59]

I will now address the other issue in your post.



Getting Italian sources is a challenge and Covid didn't help. I note that you didn't used the Italian Crusader reports found at NARA in T-821 roll 250. I was able to visit the Italian Army archives in April 2022, but did have work through the Covid issues.

First I would like link our previous discussion. I believe it strongly indicates that I attempted to answer your questions.

Fate of Italian armour leaders 1940-41

I'm trying to ascertain the fate of the medium tank battalion commanders (I, II, III, V, VI) during Operation Compass. Were any killed in action? Were they all captured? Are there any details on Babini's capture/surrender?

comandosupremo.com

Yes, I did drop the ball in not posting that I didn’t know the answer to your last question. I was hoping that others on the forum might step in and offer an answer. After that, I likely squirreled. Mea colpa. A nudge might have helped, but that is now history. If you chose to hold that against me, that is your decision. I believe that if you check my posts on all the various forums I try to be as helpful as possible. As important, I cite my research.

I wish that I had been given an opportunity to assist your work, but that request was never offered. So please don’t hold me accountable for your unwillingness to ask.

Before you think that I am being unfair, here is one thread were I am requesting assistance for my book. Please note the difference in our approaches and that I explain what I am doing and the state of my research.

http://ww2talk.com/index.php?threads/djebel-abiod-21-22-nov-42.98421/

The editor at Helion is currently working on my manuscript, Infantrymen of the Air. It might be published by the end of next month (April) or the beginning of May. I was allowed to pick the cover picture and word count wasn't an issue. They did limited me to 10-12 maps drawn by their in-house cartographer which I considered inadequate, so I used my own cartographer. The book has 54 maps and looking back I should have added a few more. My word count indicates ~420 pages without the index and over 800 footnotes. I want readers to challenge my thoughts and history, so provided then with the source of my conclusions. Now the book is not printed as of yet, so to paraphrase a well known adage, the opera isn't over until the diva sings the aria. I have been told everything is okay, but I will see.

I strongly encourage you to read the book and return to Comando Supremo and offer your review. There is a lot of material on El Alamein and Tunisia that might be useful for your vol 2, but it isn’t armour centric. However, I believe that its publication might be too late for you to leverage.

I hope you continue to come to Comando Supremo and seek assistance. If you don’t, that is your decision. I am willing to help as best I can but I do have other commitments and I must decide on how to use my time based on the information posters provide.

Pista! Jeff

Hi Jeff
Of course there are no hard feelings - too much drama on the Internet. If people can help great, if not, no worries. I use NARA all the time - located only 7 miles away - but it was closed to researchers for 2 years, so there was no way to access T-821. COVID was not a fun time to be researching. I finished writing Volume 2 over a year ago, so it's already in final production for publication in October. There is no room for changes at this point.

I look at a lot of on-line WW2 forums, incl. German, Russian, British, Australian, etc. I don't expect to find a lot of valuable info, just useful tips, tidbits and occasional answers to gaps I have. Don't know how many books you have written Jeff, but this is not my first rodeo and telling people in a forum about up-coming books can sometimes be problematic.

Keep in mind that Desert Armour is intended to be an armor-centric look at four armies (Britain, Germany, Italy, USA) in North Africa over four years, so there is no space for a deep dive into individual armies or commanders. Even a major battle like Crusader was only going to get about 25 pages, best case.

For what it's worth, I pointed out that the Italian Army had excellent 4WD trucks in North Africa (unlike DAK), that were well suited for the environment. That Rommel's army was even able to make it into Egypt was due to Italian theater logistics, not German military technology or doctrine. By 1941 standards, the Italian CAM was a decent formation and Italian armor doctrine performed well at Bir el Gubi and throughout much of Crusader and Gazala '42. But once the Grant/Sherman showed up in North Africa, the game was up. Without a better medium tank replacement in the pipeline for '42, the Italian armored units were in decline.

Anyhoo, keep up the good work on your forum

 

[jwsleser]

Good day Robert

Thank you for your reply. I certainly agree that there is too much drama on the net.

For what it's worth, I pointed out that the Italian Army had excellent 4WD trucks in North Africa (unlike DAK), that were well suited for the environment. That Rommel's army was even able to make it into Egypt was due to Italian theater logistics, not German military technology or doctrine. By 1941 standards, the Italian CAM was a decent formation and Italian armor doctrine performed well at Bir el Gubi and throughout much of Crusader and Gazala '42. But once the Grant/Sherman showed up in North Africa, the game was up. Without a better medium tank replacement in the pipeline for '42, the Italian armored units were in decline.

Completely agree. The Italians did wonders in supplying A.S.

Yes, the lack of combat worthy equipment would hinder the Italian armor formations for the entire war. This is of course the issue of an operational capabilities gap where the strategic requirements, operational doctrine, and the tactical means don't align. In terms of leadership, how did the Italian leaders adapt to the realities of the battlefield? One major adjustment was the divisioni tipo A.S. 42 TO&E (followed by the divisioni tipo 43).

I look forward to reading volume 2. My interest in Tunisia has grown, so I looking forward to reading your thoughts on the matter.

Pista! Jeff

 

[jwsleser]

Forczyk's Desert Armour: Tank Warfare in North Africa: Gazala to Tunisia, 1942–43 is now available for preorder on Amazon. Delivery date in the US with Prime is 11 Oct. The book has the same release date in the UK, so US buyers don't need to order from the publisher if they want the book as soon as it is available (and save the shipping). Desert Armour Gazala to Tunis


I have preorder it.

Pista! Jeff

 

[jwsleser]

My copy of Desert Armour, Gazala to Tunisia arrived today. Similar to the first book. Only had time to do a quick thumb through. Several maps are misplaced, but after seeing the errors in my book, I am more forgiving on those types of issues.

 

[David Wormell]

Absolutely! Most errors in books are not the fault of the author

 

[Ptolemy59]

Hi Jeff
I noticed them immediately in the hardcover, which I received 2 weeks ago. I went back and checked my corrections emails and every issue had been listed as fixed, but they were still in the final version. I spoke with Osprey about this, but the problem is not specific to that one publisher. I see two issues, both arising after COVID. First, fewer staff are involved in the editing process and they tend to be very junior, working at home on a part time basis. Most of the old veteran editorial staff has moved on to greener pastures. Frankly I am appalled at how green some of the new staff are - right out of college. Second, greater use of AI tools to speed things up, which is causes issues.

I specifically laid out the maps in order chronologically and they still managed to screw that up. I have the working proofs which show them in the correct places, but the final-to-print version seemed to go awry. It's very frustrating and I've been seeing this kind of thing now in my last four books. Maps are particularly problematic.

 

[jwsleser]

Thank you for the comments. Nice to know information. I don't believe I received any editorial support. I was given the last proof and told to get it back to them in 24 hours. I thought it was pretty good. After reading the final product, I wish they would have told me to sit down, take your time and get it right.

Three of my maps were mis-labelled. I admit that I miss that in my review, but the map list was correct. I felt that someone should have compared the list to the actual labels and said something.