by 184 Nembo » Tue Sep 13, 2005 2:23 pm
Letter to Mussolini from Graziani;
8 FEB.41: North Africa Gen.Roldolfo Graziani Cinc of the Italian armed forces write a letter to Mussolini "Duce these latest events have severely depressed my nerves and strength so that I cannot continue to exercise command in full possession of my faculties. I, therefore ask to be recalled and replaced.
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by JulioMoc » Wed Sep 14, 2005 12:01 pm
Well, what can we say about it?
Marshall Rodolfo Graziani, conqueror of Neghelli, the very man who said to Mussolini "The Duce will have Ethiopia with or without the Ethiopians"; the governor who ruled Ethiopia with oppressive iron hands hanging hundreds...
The worst possible choice to lead the invasion of Egypt. He wasn´t able to order a single counter-attack on the British, always overestimating the numbers of the enemy.
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by Gian » Thu Sep 15, 2005 1:44 am
In his book Tobruk 1940, Folco Quilici mentions that Graziani, in learning about Italian troops being overcome by the enemy (in fact a relatively small Indian force), and Sollum being subsequently occupied by British tanks (that is, the onset of Op. Compass), pretended to be missing and wired the Duce as follows:
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by Jack Greene » Mon Oct 31, 2005 8:07 pm
Come on guys, Graziani had been blown up in 1937 in Addis Ababa by the resistance. He had 100+ pieces of metal stuck in his body. He was not the man of 1935-36. Which for crushing Fascism is a good thing!
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by SUPERMARINA » Tue Nov 01, 2005 4:05 am
Hello Jack,
the real problem, according to my opinion, was not Graziani, a wreck after the 1937 Addis Ababa accident (as the 1944 and 1945 crisis confirmed), but never brilliant before (he was a good colonel, no more), but his staff performance.
Bye
EC
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by JulioMoc » Tue Nov 01, 2005 5:36 am
Please, explain to me this crisis... Was it a Graziani's personal crisis or you're talking about the general RSI crisis?
-------------------
by SUPERMARINA » Wed Nov 02, 2005 10:47 am
The Graziani's nerve crisis mentioned, for example, by Cdr. Borghese during the April 1945 collapse of RSI, or his decision to disband the Rome Carabinieri in Oct. 1943 (improving the local resistance) and later, to send others Carabinieri to Zara with the plan to create there a Division, a plan which had a logic but was so bad organized with so many changes the final result was to send the men in Bohenia as a sort of not declared POWs (and there, again, many of them joined the Czech resistance).
The only sound act of his during the RSI time I can recall was the uproar (again) against Keitel on 20 July 1944 which spared the four division men to be disbanded and used as Luftwaffe Flack auxiliary in Germany, as the OKW wanted to do. I don't know, anyway, if the final result was determined by his verbal violence or by the hurry Keitel and co., had to ship the Italian home to be able to handle their post bomb plot duties.
Bye
EC
------------
by Ennio » Wed Nov 02, 2005 11:47 pm
Well, also his march on Neghelli was prompted by furious telegrams by Mussolini, as Graziani was shuffling his feet and hesitating before doing anything. On the credit side, we can concede that he had a bright idea to give mobility to all his forces by leaning heavily on the US industry, Ford, Caterpillar, and Standard Oil first and foremost. A good Colonel and a good divisional logistician, that was his level.
Who ended up, nevertheless as CinC North Africa, Governor of Lybia, remaining at the same time Chief of Staff of the Army, and getting all three salaries. Misteries of the career system of the Regio Esercito.
-----------------
by FB » Thu Nov 03, 2005 12:56 am
In his book about the Abyssinian campaign, of which he was responsible for the southern front (the secondary one, as the plans foresaw the main move towards Ethiopia coming from the north) Graziani writes extensively about the efforts made in order to motorize as much as possible his troops. And in order to actually use motorized forces, under his command was endured the construction and/or adaptation of a rather complex road system that joined the coastal port cities/towns (in some cases only slightly more than a beach that the steamers could more or less approach and transfer their load onto smaller boats) between themselves and then to the Ethiopian border. A hell of a work, carried on while in the meantime other tasks were being carried on such as the fortification of Mogadishu for instance. Interesting data from his book: a truck was considered out of order and to be replaced by a new one after 25.000 Kms, due to the severe condition in which it was used. Interesting also the system used to bring to the starting point and to middle way stations all the materials needed for the offensive and to feed it afterwords: road trains composed by an American tracked tractor (caterpillar dozer like) and one or two big slides. These could only be used after the roads (dirt roads) were built and a lot of bridges built.
Best regards
P.S.: afaik the cumulative pay system was introduced by that old chap of Badoglio some years before Graziani. It's always good to have a good teacher
----------------
by Gian » Thu Nov 03, 2005 3:17 am
The cronologia.it website mentions that a Piedmontese transport enterprise based in Ethiopia was commandeered (i.e. embedded into the Army) to fasten the advance of the troops. But while pushing towards Macallé some big problems started to surface: as usual, supply lines had become overstretched and the need for fuel, tires, spare parts and fitters (sand continuously paralyzed vehicles) became dire. And, in addition, no reconnaissance work had been performed on the sides of the advancing convoys, rendering them potential "sitting ducks".
Sounds like the campaign was planned like a joyride, at least in its first stage, and better arranged as it developed.
Letter to Mussolini from Graziani;
8 FEB.41: North Africa Gen.Roldolfo Graziani Cinc of the Italian armed forces write a letter to Mussolini "Duce these latest events have severely depressed my nerves and strength so that I cannot continue to exercise command in full possession of my faculties. I, therefore ask to be recalled and replaced.
---------------
by JulioMoc » Wed Sep 14, 2005 12:01 pm
Well, what can we say about it?
Marshall Rodolfo Graziani, conqueror of Neghelli, the very man who said to Mussolini "The Duce will have Ethiopia with or without the Ethiopians"; the governor who ruled Ethiopia with oppressive iron hands hanging hundreds...
The worst possible choice to lead the invasion of Egypt. He wasn´t able to order a single counter-attack on the British, always overestimating the numbers of the enemy.
---------------
by Gian » Thu Sep 15, 2005 1:44 am
In his book Tobruk 1940, Folco Quilici mentions that Graziani, in learning about Italian troops being overcome by the enemy (in fact a relatively small Indian force), and Sollum being subsequently occupied by British tanks (that is, the onset of Op. Compass), pretended to be missing and wired the Duce as follows:
The "move", i.e. the hasty retreat 1000 km away from the frontline, further than stoke Mussolini's wrath, caused the total collapse of Italian forces, the loss of Cyrenaica & Benghazi, the capture of 140,000 men, 19 Generals, two-thirds of their equipment. Had Wavell not run out of supplies, he would easily have reached Tripoli.
----------------
by Jack Greene » Mon Oct 31, 2005 8:07 pm
Come on guys, Graziani had been blown up in 1937 in Addis Ababa by the resistance. He had 100+ pieces of metal stuck in his body. He was not the man of 1935-36. Which for crushing Fascism is a good thing!
--------------
by SUPERMARINA » Tue Nov 01, 2005 4:05 am
Hello Jack,
the real problem, according to my opinion, was not Graziani, a wreck after the 1937 Addis Ababa accident (as the 1944 and 1945 crisis confirmed), but never brilliant before (he was a good colonel, no more), but his staff performance.
Bye
EC
-----------
by JulioMoc » Tue Nov 01, 2005 5:36 am
Please, explain to me this crisis... Was it a Graziani's personal crisis or you're talking about the general RSI crisis?
-------------------
by SUPERMARINA » Wed Nov 02, 2005 10:47 am
The Graziani's nerve crisis mentioned, for example, by Cdr. Borghese during the April 1945 collapse of RSI, or his decision to disband the Rome Carabinieri in Oct. 1943 (improving the local resistance) and later, to send others Carabinieri to Zara with the plan to create there a Division, a plan which had a logic but was so bad organized with so many changes the final result was to send the men in Bohenia as a sort of not declared POWs (and there, again, many of them joined the Czech resistance).
The only sound act of his during the RSI time I can recall was the uproar (again) against Keitel on 20 July 1944 which spared the four division men to be disbanded and used as Luftwaffe Flack auxiliary in Germany, as the OKW wanted to do. I don't know, anyway, if the final result was determined by his verbal violence or by the hurry Keitel and co., had to ship the Italian home to be able to handle their post bomb plot duties.
Bye
EC
------------
by Ennio » Wed Nov 02, 2005 11:47 pm
Well, also his march on Neghelli was prompted by furious telegrams by Mussolini, as Graziani was shuffling his feet and hesitating before doing anything. On the credit side, we can concede that he had a bright idea to give mobility to all his forces by leaning heavily on the US industry, Ford, Caterpillar, and Standard Oil first and foremost. A good Colonel and a good divisional logistician, that was his level.
Who ended up, nevertheless as CinC North Africa, Governor of Lybia, remaining at the same time Chief of Staff of the Army, and getting all three salaries. Misteries of the career system of the Regio Esercito.
-----------------
by FB » Thu Nov 03, 2005 12:56 am
Who ended up, nevertheless as CinC North Africa, Governor of Lybia, remaining at the same time Chief of Staff of the Army, and getting all three salaries. Misteries of the career sytem of the Regio Esercito.
In his book about the Abyssinian campaign, of which he was responsible for the southern front (the secondary one, as the plans foresaw the main move towards Ethiopia coming from the north) Graziani writes extensively about the efforts made in order to motorize as much as possible his troops. And in order to actually use motorized forces, under his command was endured the construction and/or adaptation of a rather complex road system that joined the coastal port cities/towns (in some cases only slightly more than a beach that the steamers could more or less approach and transfer their load onto smaller boats) between themselves and then to the Ethiopian border. A hell of a work, carried on while in the meantime other tasks were being carried on such as the fortification of Mogadishu for instance. Interesting data from his book: a truck was considered out of order and to be replaced by a new one after 25.000 Kms, due to the severe condition in which it was used. Interesting also the system used to bring to the starting point and to middle way stations all the materials needed for the offensive and to feed it afterwords: road trains composed by an American tracked tractor (caterpillar dozer like) and one or two big slides. These could only be used after the roads (dirt roads) were built and a lot of bridges built.
Best regards
P.S.: afaik the cumulative pay system was introduced by that old chap of Badoglio some years before Graziani. It's always good to have a good teacher
----------------
by Gian » Thu Nov 03, 2005 3:17 am
The cronologia.it website mentions that a Piedmontese transport enterprise based in Ethiopia was commandeered (i.e. embedded into the Army) to fasten the advance of the troops. But while pushing towards Macallé some big problems started to surface: as usual, supply lines had become overstretched and the need for fuel, tires, spare parts and fitters (sand continuously paralyzed vehicles) became dire. And, in addition, no reconnaissance work had been performed on the sides of the advancing convoys, rendering them potential "sitting ducks".
Sounds like the campaign was planned like a joyride, at least in its first stage, and better arranged as it developed.