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Myths concerning Italian leadership, morale and combat performance

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Annales

New Member
There are several enduring myths about the Italians in the Second World War that have been largely created by the Anglo-American-German fraternity. In my research it appears that many Anglo-American historians have simply taken disparaging German accounts of their Axis partner – the Italians – on face value. One example, are the Rommel Papers as well as reports and memoirs from an array of German generals such as Keitel, Kesselring (who made the snide remark that the Italians were “trained more for display than for action”), General von Thoma (who wrote to Hitler that Italian troops were useless, that “one British soldier was better than 12 Italian”), to Admiral Raeder and others. Such remarks were eagerly accepted by Anglo-American historians as the gospel truth. Indeed, many (but not all) Germans at the time, held such prejudiced beliefs about the Italians due to their heightened sense of racial superiority drummed into them by the Nazis. It is worth mentioning that such erroneous beliefs were also held about other races as well, such as the Romanians, the Hungarians, the Bulgarians, not to mention, Poles and Jews. Rommel himself brought such beliefs with him to North Africa. As one Italian liaison officer observed, “the Italians were widely believed by the Germans to be weak, lazy, cowardly, and militarily incompetent.” I think this last statement pretty much sums it up. With an ally like this, who needs enemies?

Of course, as we on Commando Supremo, and anyone with a scrap of intelligence knows this is all hogwash and nonsense. But back in the 1930’s and 40’s, political correctness and multicultural tolerance hardly existed, and certainly not in the German high command, where they were nearly all good Prussian soldiers: efficient, direct, strait-laced, opinionated bigots to the core.

And since many Anglo historians share or have shared such racist sentiments, who were they to argue with the Germans, their “racial cousins”?

It is sad, but it is what it is. Fortunately, there is some light at the end of the tunnel from certain quarters: Prof. Richard Carrier of the Department of History, Royal Military College of Canada, being one.

In his relatively recent article, ‘Some Reflections on the Fighting Power of the Italian Army in North Africa, 1940–1943’ (War in History, 2015, Vol. 22:4 503–528), he makes a convincing case that after the disaster of Operation Compass, Italian leadership and training dramatically improved. It was a steep learning curve, but one that, by and large, the Italians succeeded in. Certainly the Italians improved their performance whilst learning from their mistakes faster than the Russians who in contrast, required several disasters and nearly a million prisoners before they started to learn from theirs. The Italians did not have the luxury of time and space – but improve, they did.

The myth of Italian military ineffectiveness

Carrier has also exposed another myth for us: that of Italian military ineffectiveness, which he blames on two factors: the lack of familiarity of Italian military archives and official histories and the Rommel legend. Surprise, surprise! But hang on? His article was written in 2015 and still, even today, Anglo and German historians are unfamiliar with Italian archives!! Hard to believe, isn’t it? And yet, this is what Carrier maintains.

But let’s get back to Carrier, an academic who has actually researched Italian WW2 archives. He goes on to write that “unfortunately, few of them [historians] have taken into consideration Italian sources at all, and many still trust the Rommel Papers [edited by Liddell Hart in 1953] as the most reliable source on Italian military performance.” Fortunately, we now know that Liddell Hart had a personal and professional interest in presenting Rommel in the best possible light. This controversy was described by the political scientist Dr John Mersheimer in his work The Weight of History, who concluded that, by "putting words in the mouths of German Generals and manipulating history", Liddell Hart was in a position to show that he had been at the root of the dramatic German successes in 1940" (Wikipedia: The Rommel Papers).

The myth of low morale
Another myth that Carrier exposes is the myth that the Italian soldier was plagued by consistently low morale and a distinct lack of will to fight. “During the campaign, and contrary to common belief, Italian morale was not always low, even in the case of the infantry divisions.” This does not mean that after the disaster of Operation Compass, Italian morale did not reach rock bottom. Of course it did and it would be very odd if it didn’t. But what it does mean is that morale wasn’t always going to remain low. Morale soon recovered with the appearance of the Ariete and Trento armored divisions, more infantry and motorized divisions, as well as the arrival of the Germans. Any help was going to be appreciated from any quarter. (However, the assistance the Italians received from the Germans was not free of nuances and complications, as we will see later.) More importantly, the Italian soldier received better training. It is true that for the average rank and file, the training they received on the Italian mainland was not always of the highest quality nor sufficient. But after the mauling of Graziani’s 10th Army by the British, training improved markedly, training which occurred behind the lines in North Africa at Centri di Istruzione or instruction centers in order to increase their fighting performance for the fighting to come. With on the spot training, practical instruction, real field experience, armored reinforcements, the support provided by the Germans coupled with better tactics and equipment, the performance of the Italians improved significantly. According to Carrier, training requirements and methods were reviewed and implemented, and the result was impressive. In addition, infantry units and divisions were upgraded and better trained, with good results. For example, men were trained on how to use the 47mm anti-tank gun more effectively at close range against vulnerable parts of an enemy vehicle and how to use improvised explosive devices such as incendiary bombs to maximum effect. Even reputedly weak infantry units improved dramatically and gave a good account of themselves against the Australians at Tel el Makh Khad ridge. Dr Carrier, having studied the primary sources from Italian military archives closely, confirms that Italian generals and officers took the matter of training very seriously. The newly restructured Italian army in Libya by the winter of 1941 was very different to the Italian army of June 1940.


Italian - German collaboration

The presence of the Germans was initially welcomed by the Italians. As stated previously, any help from any quarter was always going to be welcomed. It was often assumed by the British that the new, improved performance of the Italians and higher morale was “due almost certainly to increasing German influence both in organization and tactics” (British General Staff Intelligence, Brief Notes, p. 5 cited in Carrier, p.524). However, it wasn’t as simple as that. Carrier argues that this assumption, while seemingly correct, is difficult to prove “as primary and secondary sources have little to offer.” Notwithstanding the German factor, the arrival of reinforcements of infantry and amour like the Ariete and Trento divisions, plus improved training, allowed Italian morale and performance to recover from the shock of their mauling in early 1941. It is my view that the presence of the German divisions and Rommel augmented an increase in morale and performance, but were not the originator of them. Italian officers were not clueless ninnies and stuffed shirts that Anglo and German popular historians like to portray, preferring to eat pasta and play the mandolin than fight. The Italian officer class already had the leadership and skills to train their men up – they didn’t need the Germans for that. But certainly, having the Germans on the ground was the icing on the cake in that it enhanced an increase in leadership, morale and combat performance for the Italians. Carrier notes that their proximity to the Germans, literally eating, fighting and dying shoulder to shoulder, allowed the Italians to learn new tactical and operational techniques, which contributed to an improved performance against their British and Commonwealth opponents.

Carrier’s conclusion: that the Italian army moved on from the disaster of 1940 to become in his words, “an effective fighting force”, even though its successes were often overlooked by the Germans and the British. For all that, the real tragedy or irony of the North African campaign for the Italians was this: notwithstanding the much improved performance of the Italians and their ability to improvise with inferior weaponry to maximum effect, as the war continued their weapons became more and more outdated and less effective, thus losing the technological race that would end in their defeat.
 
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Dili

Member
I mostly disagree. What would have happened without Germans in Sicily in January and in Feb-March in Africa and in Greece by April.

I think Italy would have folded there is no way they could have sustained the war.
What successful offensives Italian Army made in WW2: East Africa is the only one that i remember.

Italy was not a great power, they didn't even had proper engine development and that is enough to make incapable of fighting a war in 1940's.
 

Annales

New Member
Dili, I only posted this a few minutes ago!!! Please take the time to read it more carefully and diligently and then reply to it again.
 

sultanbev

New Member
In Carrier's article, are there more details of the extra training for the Italian units in North Africa implemented in 1941?
Was there, for example, an increase in the allocation of radios, and more effective command decision training at the regiment-battalion-company level?
I'm no fan of the "Italians were crap" mythos, morale means different things to different people at different times. Morale quality I treat as a separate entity from the ability to engage in effective mechanised warfare. In my case I take morale as the ability of a unit to absorb casualties and carry on functioning as an effective combat unit. Or perhaps the probability that a unit will carry on that fight. But then I'm biased to a wargaming aspect. Other readers' views may be different, and that's perhaps a whole new topic.

I have a pdf called
FALLEN EAGLES: THE ITALIAN 10TH ARMY IN THE OPENING CAMPAIGN IN THE WESTERN DESERT, JUNE 1940 - DECEMBER 1940 by HOWARD R. CHRISTIE, Bloomsburg University, 1986 (sorry, don't know how to link to a pdf, but I'm sure if you google it you'll find it)
which clearly shows the Italians understood the doctrine of modern mobile warfare, but strategically failed to implement it, partly because of lack of resources, such as insufficient trucks, low serviceability rates of what trucks they had, tankettes instead of tanks., lack of radios. insufficient industrial capacity. I suspect they were unable to implement at the lower tactical level too.
This in no way means they had poor morale. Morale is subjective anyway, and can fluctuate by battalion over time. In any army you get units that lack resilience, and some that sustain it. And that over time, that resilience can change.
 

Dili

Member
The British say that by Crusader the Italians M13/40 tanks were employed effectively while they were dismal in Compass.
So they certainly improved and improved well - how much was this own knowledge extracted from defeat and intellectual warfare thought and how much was German input is difficult to know, but they never had the capability to make offensives, they could only play defense better or with good special forces make raids.
 

jwsleser

Administrator
Staff member
Did the R.E. perform better than is usually acknowledged? Yes.

Did the R.E. win battles? Yes.

Has the R.E. been misrepresented in English histories? To a point, yes.

One must recognize that in terms of fulfilling its role at the national level, the R.E. ultimately failed. This failure was not at the strategic level as one can argue in the German and Japanese cases, but at the operational and tactical level. No matter what one argues, the R.E. was unprepared for war, took a significantly longer time to adjust to the 'current' style of warfare, and in the end, it never did completely reinvent itself to master the realities of the current war.

The R.E. in 1943 was basically the same army as it was in 1940. As Carrier states in his closing sentence:

While the enemy counted on vast amounts of weapons and gradual technological superiority, Italian combatants' only hope was to learn, adapt, and improvise.

Hope is not a method to win wars.

Let us not whitewash the significant problems/shortcomings of the R.E. The Italian soldier proved worthy when given the opportunity. Too often during the war he wasn't given that opportunity. That lack of opportunity was mainly due to the Italians themselves.
 
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Annales

New Member
I think the Germans were the hammer and the Italians were the anvil. The Germans definitely had superior firepower and were more mobile, which meant that the Italians were often relegated to protecting Rommel's flanks. However, I am pretty sure that the Italian armored and infantry divisions did attack the enemy on a number of occasions and did quite well. Dr Carrier mentions the Tel el Makh Khad ridge where the Italians gave a good account of themselves.

One only has to ask the simple question: How far would Rommel have gotten without Italian support in terms of manpower, resources and logistics. The answer: not very far!

War is a team effort and the glory tends to go to the attackers. But without the defenders, the attackers would falter and fall flat on their backs. Think of a footfall team. Think how far star players like Ronaldo or Messi would get on the pitch alone?

Rommel was a "star" because of the huge support he got from the Italians.
 

Annales

New Member
Did the R.E. perform better than is usually acknowledged? Yes.

Did the R.E. win battles? Yes.

Has the R.E. been misrepresented in English histories? To a point, yes.

One must recognize that in terms of fulfilling its role at the national level, the R.E. ultimately failed. This failure was not at the strategic level as one can argue in the German and Japanese cases, but at the operational and tactical level. No matter what one argues, the R.E. was unprepared for war, took a significantly longer time to adjust to the 'current' style of warfare, and in the end, it never did completely reinvent itself to master the realities of the current war.

The R.E. in 1943 was basically the same army as it was in 1940. As Carrier states in his closing sentence:



Hope is not a method to win wars.

Let us not whitewash the significant problems/shortcomings of the R.E. The Italian soldier proved worthy when given the opportunity. Too often during the war he wasn't given that opportunity. That lack of opportunity was mainly due to the Italians themselves.


The R.E was unprepared for war because Hitler double-crossed Mussolini and started a major war in 1939 instead of, what Mussolini wanted, 1943. This delay of 3 years would have put the RE into better shape. Italy had been fighting wars since the 1920s and the last one, the Spanish Civil War, only ended in 1938. Hitler miscalculated that by invading Poland, Britain and France would do nothing, which was understandable considering their track record. Mussolini warned Hitler not to and as it turned out, Mussolini was right. So already the Axis Alliance was off to a bad start, and it just got worse, especially after the next serious blunder by Hitler - the invasion of Russia without finishing off Britain first, which again Mussolini strongly implored Hitler not to do. Again, Mussolini was right and Hitler proved to be wrong.

My view is a simple one Jeff. The R.E, R.A and R.M did not have any so-called "deficiencies" at the start of the war because in 1939 they were what they were, ready or not. Were the British ready to fight a World War in 1939? No. Were the French? No. Were the Russians? No. Were the Americans? No. Were the Hungarians, Bulgarians and Poles? NO! The only nation that was ready were the GERMANS! and they should be, because they bloody well started it in 1939!

But in reality, even the Germans, with all their industrial might, were not ready in 1939 or 40 or 41 to take on the Russians as it became clear during Operation Barbarossa, that they had bitten off more than they could chew and ultimately lacked the resources to defeat the Soviet Empire.

In 1939, the British were caught with their pants down; and the Americans in 1941, were caught with their pants down!

The difference, and the ONLY difference is that the UK and US economies and industries were 10 times bigger (and probably a lot more in certain sectors) than the Italian economy and industrial base.

Nothing to do with the Italian soldier, their generals, their strategy, tactics, or supposedly "inherent weaknesses" in the Italian Military structures and organization. Italy's problems in the war can be summed as:

a) an alliance with the criminal Nazi regime and its maniacs
b) simply unable, through no fault of its own, of producing enough tanks, artillery, ships, etc, and all the instruments of war, to kill as many of the enemy as was necessary to win the war.

This was Italy's only "inherent weakness".

Basta!
 
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jwsleser

Administrator
Staff member
Dr Carrier mentions the Tel el Makh Khad ridge where the Italians gave a good account of themselves.

Yes, they did do well as I indicated above. But Dr. Carrier missed one important point: The Italians successes mentioned in his article were all defensive successes. The defense was the one area of operations that the Italian doctrine and training was the most adaptable to the current situation.

The Italians never created an offensive or exploitation capability. Your own comment recognizes that fact:

I think the Germans were the hammer and the Italians were the anvil.

There is nothing inherently wrong with this symbolic relationship, except that the Germans could function without the Italians (offense, defense and exploitation), but the reverse is not true. Yes, the Germans needed Italian numbers in A.S. because the Germans saw A.S. as a holding action at the strategic level. Due to that, they wished to limit what they committed to that theater. Take the Italians away and replace with Germans, and you have a competitive fight. Take the Germans away and replace with Italians, you have problems.

The RE was unprepared for war because Hitler double-crossed Mussolini and started a major war in 1939 instead of, what Mussolini wanted, 1943. This delay of 3 years would have put the RE into better shape. Italy had been fighting wars since the 1920s and the last one, the Spanish Civil War, only ended in 1938.

That is rationalization. An army must be able to fight at any time. In Italy's case, the Italians picked the time and the place for its first fights (France, A.S., and Greece). France was a draw, A.S. and Greece were basically disasters. Nothing forced the Italians to fight in 1940 except the Italians themselves (yes, I know it was Mussolini's decision, but Hitler didn't force the Italians to fight). There was a choice.
 

jwsleser

Administrator
Staff member
Nothing to do with the Italian soldier, their generals, their strategy, tactics, or supposedly "inherent weaknesses" in the Italian Military structures and organization. Italy's problems in the war can be summed in two:

a) an alliance with the criminal Nazi regime and its maniacs
b) simply unable, through no fault of its own, of producing enough tanks, artillery, ships, etc, and all the instruments of war, to kill as many of the enemy as was necessary to win the war.

This was Italy's only "inherent weakness".

Couldn't disagree more.

a) There choice to in an alliance.

b) you need to read more about the fascist regime and how it operated. The problems in production were inherently Italian. Raw resource was a limitation, but Italian historians have show time over time that Italy did a poor job in managing what they had.

I have always believed that the leadership before and during the war was the greatest problem. Their decisions led the R.E. down the traditional paths of WW1 redux. The promising starts made in the late 20s and early 30s were actively challenged and suppressed by the leadership. The poor training programs weren't created and implement by either of your two reasons. The lack of powerful areo engines wasn't caused by your two reasons. Not continuing the promising work on radar wasn't caused by your two reasons. The fascist state created many of their own problems, and the inherent conservative foundation of the R.E. remained unchanged.
 

jwsleser

Administrator
Staff member
How far would Rommel have got without the Italians? Zip!

If the Italians had successfully defended the A.S. in 1940, Rommel wouldn't have been in Africa. ;)

It appears your main issue is that Rommel get all the credit. Note that Dr. Carrier acknowledges Rommel's role in improving the R.E. in A.S. The problem is not that Rommel gets the credit, but the efforts of the Italian go unrecognized.

No one here has disagreed with you. :)
 
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Annales

New Member
Yes, they did do well as I indicated above. But Dr. Carrier missed one important point: The Italians successes mentioned in his article were all defensive successes. The defense was the one area of operations that the Italian doctrine and training was the most adaptable to the current situation.

The Italians never created an offensive or exploitation capability. Your own comment recognizes that fact:



There is nothing inherently wrong with this symbolic relationship, except that the Germans could function without the Italians (offense, defense and exploitation), but the reverse is not true. Yes, the Germans needed Italian numbers in A.S. because the Germans saw A.S. as a holding action at the strategic level. Due to that, they wished to limit what they committed to that theater. Take the Italians away and replace with Germans, and you have a competitive fight. Take the Germans away and replace with Italians, you have problems.



That is rationalization. An army must be able to fight at any time. In Italy's case, the Italians picked the time and the place for its first fights (France, A.S., and Greece). France was a draw, A.S. and Greece were basically disasters. Nothing forced the Italians to fight in 1940 except the Italians themselves (yes, I know it was Mussolini's decision, but Hitler didn't force the Italians to fight). There was a choice.


Jeff, once Hitler invaded Poland, against the strong objections of the Italians, the dice was set. Then to make matters worse, Hitler unilaterally without consulting his Axis partners, invaded the Soviet Union. He forced Mussolini's hand, especially as he was a predatory ally who simply disregarded his allies and intruded upon Italy's sphere of influence, such as Romania and Yugoslavia.

When you analyse the geo-political ramifications of Hitler's actions, one must conclude that Mussolini did not have a choice.

Hitler and the Nazi regime set in motion a major conflagration without any sense of proportion or long term political strategies. They were an elephant smashing about in a china shop.

Hitler and his generals knew that the Italians were not ready for a major European war. They ignored that to their own peril and paid dearly for it.

The ultimate responsibility for the disasters the Italians had to endure, are squarely at the feet of Adolf Hitler and his gang of ideological nincompoops.
 

jwsleser

Administrator
Staff member
I don't see how Hitler can be blamed for Mussolini's mistakes. Hitler wanted Italy to remain neutral. Why are you trying to absolve Italy for its own errors?

if you have issues with Hitler, please discuss them on a different forum.
 

Annales

New Member
If the Italians had successfully defended the A.S. in 1940, Rommel wouldn't have been in Africa. ;)

It appears your main issue is that Rommel get all the credit. Note that Dr. Carrier acknowledges Rommel's role in improving the R.E. in A.S. The problem is not that Rommel gets the credit, but the efforts of the Italian go unrecognized.

No one here has disagreed with you. :)


Jeff you miss the point I was trying to make: in 1940 they were not ready to defend A.S due to the actions of their supposedly German "partners". They could have easily supplied the Italians with the equipment and resources (ie. tanks) that the Italian generals requested time and again from them; and time and again the Germans said: NEIN!
 

Annales

New Member
I don't see how Hitler can be blamed for Mussolini's mistakes. Hitler wanted Italy to remain neutral. Why are you trying to absolve Italy for its own errors?

if you have issues with Hitler, please discuss them on a different forum.

Jeff, while you are very good with logistics, military armaments and organisation, structures, divisions and all that technical stuff, you appear very naive when it comes to the geo-political ramifications of the actions Hitler initiated that led to the disaster that befell the Italians and not just the Italians, the Hungarians and Romanians, as well. Think of snooker: you set a ball in motion, that then sets other balls in motion, with unintentional results!

The Italians did what they did, to the best of their ability, in a situation NOT of their making, but actually against their interests. The final responsibility rests with the Nazis.
 

jwsleser

Administrator
Staff member
No, I fully understand your point, but it has nothing to do with whether the R.E. was prepared for war. Training infantry in modern battlefield tactics doesn't require modern equipment (but it is certainly nice to have).

The problem wasn't merely the outdated methods taught, but the fact that training wasn't done. The poor level/lack of training has nothing to do with when Italy planned to enter the war, but was part of the underlying culture of the R.E. The fact that better training happened in A.S. and not on the mainland highlights this issue. That is one of several issues affecting the R.E.'s performance.
 

jwsleser

Administrator
Staff member
Jeff, while you are very good with logistics, military armaments and organisation, structures, divisions and all that technical stuff, you appear very naive when it comes to the geo-political ramifications of the actions Hitler initiated that led to the disaster that befell the Italians and not just the Italians, the Hungarians and Romanians, as well. Think of snooker: you set a ball in motion, that then sets other balls in motion, with unintentional results!

We are done.
 
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