Eugen
I can't demonstrate that such manuals were never written. All I can say is I have searched for this type of information and came up empty handed.
And I find it strange to rely on the initiative of the local commands in such an important respect.
Comando Superiore A.S. ran its own training program for new units/personal arriving in A.S. This wasn't merely acclimatization or special techniques. It was basic training. Read Richard Carrier's 'Some Reflection on the Fighting Power of the Italian Army in North Africa'.
But on the company level the battle had to be entirely different from standard, prescribed in the previous manuals.
Only if you believe that the infantry in A.S. were executing the type of offensive you are thinking about. One discussion point on the forum here at CS was when did the units truly transition to the A.S. tipo 42 structure.
What does an infantry attack look like in A.S. 1942? The R.E. recognized by 1942 that the German were the offensive power in A.S. Not the Italian units. It is one reason the A.S. tipo 42 was adopted.
Gazala saw the bulk of the Italians demonstrating against UK positions, but not actually pressing the attack. The main effort against Tobruk was the German units, «Ariete» and «Trieste». How were the bersaglieri and motorizzata units organized at the time. Was it the enginneer units that really did the close in fighting to clear the way for the mechanized forces?
1st Alamein was a mobile battle where armored units gained ground and then the infantry tried to hold it. How many infantry assaults did the Italian units actually attempt during that battle?
The issue of how the Italian infantry units fought in 1942 is a great research topic. Like the divisione binaria, the tipo 42 structure has never been truly analyzed.
Pista! Jeff