I would have assigned Marmarica to the Bir Enba gap between Maletti and Cirene. Marmarica could have been replaced by 2nd Blackshirt in defending the road to Buqbuq
Okay. One issue we haven't touched upon is the ability to supply these units. I believe part of the issue is that Italians were unable to supply more than what they already had forward in Egypt.
Correct. The Italians were limited by their number of trucks of what could be sent from Tripoli to reach Tenth Army. By my calculations, Italy could supply seven semi-motorized divisions in Tenth Army (I did not include the trucks landed in September for this calculation.). That's enough to supply Cirene, Catanzaro, and Marmarica with enough left over for at least five (maybe six) Libyan and Blackshirt divisions of which there are six. So - yes - Italian supply is maxed out. I made this calculation based on the supply line ending at Sidi Baranni (Technically, another 15 miles as well which would include two of the three Libyan camps but not Maletti.).
Including Maletti and another division southeast of it could be accomplished by early October by building a supply dump at Sidi Barrani which these camp "boxes" would draw upon. Whether or not the Italians built a supply dump at Sidi Baranni is unknown to me but I assumed one was as it was the only way to reach Mersa Matruh.
Whether the trucks landed in September effect my calculation depends upon how they were used. Likely they were added to the Sidi Barrani supply run to ease the truck shortage or to replace trucks in maintenance.
Given that some semi-mototized divisions had their trucks returned by December 1940, it would seem the supply situation was solved by then.
It wasn't even mined and Maletti ordered the patrols on it ended.
A minefield that isn't covered by fire is useless. An unprotected minefield at most would cause less than a hour delay, if that.
The Bir Enba road went up the escarpment. Mining it's narrow points would cause any vehicle hit on the road to block the way for those behind, creating delays. The British must use sappers the whole way up or accept the delays. Even just three mines on that road would cause a one hour delay.
Then there is the fact that Maletti Group could have covered the mined road closer to their south for several thousand yards with artillery against sappers. My understanding is the box was mined but not the road, allowing the British to simply go up the road until reaching the west side of the box, then use the Italians own tire tracks to attack the camp while avoiding the mines.
(I consider defending Sollom as too far for the British to go.)
At this time in the war, I agree that the British were unlikely to risk going that far.
Which, by 2nd BS in Sollom, tells us the Italians were considering a "worst case" scenario of the 10th Army being cut off in Egypt, a scenario requiring the British have a nearly unlimited fuel range.
The forces can't support each other as they lack a mobile offensive capability. If «Maletti» and Cirene» were only 10kms apart, what could «Cirene» do to help «Maletti» when the latter is attacked. Besides artillery support (which at 10kms would stretch the range of most of the Italian guns), the bulk of the metropolitan division could only watch the destruction of the group. Infantry can't attack across open ground against a mobile armored force.
Cirene would be
at least 10km from Maletti and so they would not be mutually supporting just as you say. However, Cirene would not be positioned here to create a continuous line, only to cover the Bir Enba road from its top, the same as Cirene was doing at Sofafis and Rabia and the reason the Marmarica and Cirene weren't linked as there was no road between them for the British to use to go up the escarpment. Without a road up to the top, the British can't get up there. If they can't up there, they can't get between Cirene and Maletti.
Although I may be wrong because I believe there was another road up the escarpment some miles east of Bir Enba and near where the British built their refueling station. When I look at Operation Compass maps, they don't actually show the British using the Bir Enba road but possibly this road (to attack Nibeiwa first with artillery from the southeast). It might be that 10th Indian took this first road and 7th Armored took Bir Enba.
And that would change everything.
These must be considered together. If only one, then it doesn't work. The camps need to hold out to give time for the mobile armored counterattack to succeed.
But the mobile armored counterattack does not exist in order to succeed, leaving the Libyans in a position of possible surrender but even inevitable surrender.
As I previously stated, «Maletti» should have been the mobile reserve and not in the front line.
It reasons the ideal location for Maletti's motorized force is Buq Buq as it can equally support Sidi Baranni and both Cirene and Marmarica, all at an equal distance of 25 miles (40 km). It also defends Buq Buq from direct attack via the Bir Enbi road. This position may have even been considered as Maletti comes under the corps command of Cirene, Marmarica and Catanzaro, suggesting it was originally intended for Buq Buq and Catanzaro somewhere else (most like Bir Enba in order to cover the north/south escarpment roads the same as Marmarica and Cirene.).
Now I have no evidence for the following but neither do I have evidence against it. Suppose Maletti at Buq Buq was the original plan? It could reach anywhere it was needed in one day (or less) including acting as a counter attacking force against the British in the Libyans rear. Is this not exactly as it should be?
But then suppose Cirene, Marmarica and Catanzaro objected to having Maletti's command as their mobile reserve? The arguments against Maletti Group would be numerous. Maletti's Libyans did not speak Italian, could not read maps or use a compass, got lost out in the desert and had to be found by search planes, used reserve Italian officers that were too few (no regiment or brigadier officers), incompetent (Colonel D’Avanzo) or applying for transfers to safer positions (Maletti's own complaint), lacked machineguns and mortars, and likely only knew how to fire their artillery pieces by line of sight as GAF artillery exists in their ranks. Finally, they produced only 65 British casualties in taking Sidi Baranni to 500 of their own. They already have a poor record.
Given this argument, the decision might have been made to place Catanzaro at Buq Buq instead, with the addition of a battalion of L3 tanks. As to what to do with Maletti?
Let them join the other Libyans.
Given the depth of the Italian penetration into Egypt, Italy would need several more infantry divisions to even attempt to make a solid defense without gaps. Logistics alone would like prevent that from happening.
We both agree 2nd Blackshirt at Sollom is an unnecessary "gap" to cover. So it could have been moved to Bir Enba. No division is necessary to cover between Marmarica and Cirene due to the escarpment. The gap between Cirene and Maletti would now no longer exist, the very existence of which was the basis for the British attack.
Where I see the problem is any division on the Sidi Barani to Bir Enba line (including my just moved 2nd Libyan) has no chance of getting back to Libya given a successful British attack. The chances of the Libyans not surrendering are exactly equal to the chances of the 4th Blackshirt driving the British back to Mersa Matruh.
I see where no Italian troops are on that line with the Libyans. Yet I also see it as "good judgment". Grazziani can tell Mussolini he defended Sidi Baranni while defending Bardia with Italian troops. If one wanted to develop a plan of defense for Bardia using four Italian divisions, the defense of Sidi Baranni accomplished it. Any attempt at plugging that gap will result in at least one less division defending Bardia.
