Supermarina's Cryptographic Service

[Saetta]

Hello all,

I've recently been reading The Italian Navy in World War II by Commander (R) Marc' Antonio Bragadin (United States Naval Institute Publication) and came across a very intriguing passage in which I would like some additional info regarding it (if available). According to Bragadin,

"As a counterpart to its own communications system, the Italian Navy had also developed to a highly efficient state an extensive service for intercepting enemy radio messages, as well as a cryptographic center for decoding the intercepts. This particular organization worked under highly secret conditions which even today cannot be described..." Bragadin p.14

This book was of course written in 1957, so while this may have all been classified information at the time the author presented it, does anyone know if there has been any information released as of this time regarding Supermarina's Cryptographic Service? Bragadin continues to describe their role:

"... The cryptographic service, headed by a small group of extremely capable officers, produced tremendous and extremely valuable results during the entire war. For instance, the immediate decoding of British reconnaissance communications especially for the deficiencies of our own Mediterranean reconnaissance, since it permitted Supermarina to turn to its own use the results of the enemy's extensive reconnaissance service. Bragadin p.14

Bragadin is very critical of the Regia Aeronautica's failure to provide accurate aerial reconnaissance, particularly in the early war period, so it is very fascinating to see that Supermarina used alternative methods to extract intelligence from enemy reconnaissance reports. I am not very far in this book so I hope to see more mention of this in practice, but in case any more information has been made available, do you know of any specific engagements or maneuvers where Supermarina may have intercepted British reconnaissance and altered the positioning/disposition of her forces as a result?

Grazie,
Chris

 

[MelaraClubPrez]

The Other Ultra by Ohara and Cernuchi might help:

https://www.jstor.org/stable/26397400?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents

 

[Dili]

RA failed accurate aerial recon of the naval bases?

 

[Turbulent98]

I was recommended to read the following- “Uomini ombra. Ricordi di un addetto al servizio segreto navale” by Mario De Monte and “La mia guerra fra i codici ed altri scritti” by Eliso Porta. Both Authors were officers in the Royal italian Navy signals intelligenge during WW2.

 

[DrG]

I was recommended to read the following- “Uomini ombra. Ricordi di un addetto al servizio segreto navale” by Mario De Monte and “La mia guerra fra i codici ed altri scritti” by Eliso Porta. Both Authors were officers in the Royal italian Navy signals intelligenge during WW2.

While both are classics, if you can read Italian I suggest you "Ultra: la fine di un mito" by Enrico Cernuschi:
https://www.amazon.it/«Ultra»-guerra-inglesi-italiane-1934-1945/dp/8842552186/
Here there is a short interview to the author: https://www.analisidifesa.it/2014/04/ultra-la-fine-di-un-mito/

 

[Turbulent98]

An Italian historian sent me the following about Cernuschi-The book is a bad attempt to sustain that the Italian intelligence effectiveness was capable to match Ultra. The reality is that the book is extremely weak on a source based perspective and even worse on a methodological point of view. For example it ignores the research done by Alberto santoni that with direct comparison between British and Italian documents claims that a good part of the Italian losses of merchant ships was caused by Ultra. Also quotations from British documents are very few, less than a dozen, and some of them are not even related to Ultra. This author is famous in Italy for his little reliability and for not having published in any respectable scientific journal, but has gained some credit in the Anglo-American world because is supported by Vincent O'Hara.

 

[Turbulent98]

There is also this official history -https://www.difesa.it/Area_Storica_...azione_Servizi_Informazione/Pagine/index.aspx Unfortunately it resists any attempts by google to translate it.

 

[DrG]

An Italian historian sent me the following about Cernuschi-The book is a bad attempt to sustain that the Italian intelligence effectiveness was capable to match Ultra. The reality is that the book is extremely weak on a source based perspective and even worse on a methodological point of view. For example it ignores the research done by Alberto santoni that with direct comparison between British and Italian documents claims that a good part of the Italian losses of merchant ships was caused by Ultra. Also quotations from British documents are very few, less than a dozen, and some of them are not even related to Ultra. This author is famous in Italy for his little reliability and for not having published in any respectable scientific journal, but has gained some credit in the Anglo-American world because is supported by Vincent O'Hara.

Your corrispondent does not know what he is talking about. Period. Cernuschi knows perfectly Santoni's outdated research, which is more than 40 years old and written by a scholar who, unlike Cernuschi himself, hadn't a clue about the actual work of the cryptographic branch of the Navy. Adm. Luigi Donini, who served in the Italian Navy's cryptologic service and was , had an extremely low opinion of Santoni's research, for example. Cernuschi has published hundreds of articles on the official review of the Italian Navy ("Rivista Marittima"), "Storia Militare", etc., and several books for the Historical Office of the Italian Navy and other reputable publishing houses. The book "Ultra: la fine di un mito" is fully based not only on British primary sources, but also on the Italian decrypts of British signals, which had never been used before, least of all by Santoni.

 

[Turbulent98]

My correspondent is a senior academic at a university.

 

[Francoquarter]

Too me have read that Cernuschi is too apologetic

 

[DrG]

My correspondent is a senior academic at a university.

Me too (in a different field, but when I meet a practitioner in my field I listen carefull and I don't brag about my titles, because being a professor does not make you a superior being), and so what? There is not a single university professor who has a tenth of Cernuschi's knowledge about the history of the Italian Navy. And, frankly, none of the most important naval historians around the world is an academic.

 

[DrG]

Too me have read that Cernuschi is too apologetic

My signature is the explanation of your feeling. Once you study a topic deeply enough, it becomes difficult to state negative judgments. Internet and bookshelves are full of armchair generals, admirals, politicians, etc., but none of them has the same professionality of the men they jugde and, at the same time, they already know how it ended but don't know exactly what those men - whom they swiftly criticize or condemn - knew at the time. Cernuschi has a good naval prepartion and, unlike many soi-disant experts, does not put himself on a pedestal passing judgments.

 

[Dili]

Cernuschi is considered a "revisionist" by the established narrative promoters. I find him useful and he brings new stuff but i don't agree with some of his conclusions and how he reach his conclusions. some seem in iffy ground like giving too much weight to what an agent said about of damage of a British warship arriving to a port.

 

[DrG]

Cernuschi is considered a "revisionist" by the established narrative promoters. I find him useful and he brings new stuff but i don't agree with some of his conclusions and how he reach his conclusions. some seem in iffy ground like giving too much weight to what an agent said about of damage of a British warship arriving to a port.

Hi Dili. As far as I can say about Cernuschi's research, I see that if he uses an Italian source about a damage to a British ship, it is always as the starting point, never as a settled matter. In other words, then he finds a document (a British report or testimony; or a photo) to corroborate the initial find, but he is not satisfied by an uncorroborated source. If you wish, may you quote the passages that leave you somewhat disappointed by his statements?

 

[Bry]

Hello all,

I've recently been reading The Italian Navy in World War II by Commander (R) Marc' Antonio Bragadin (United States Naval Institute Publication) and came across a very intriguing passage in which I would like some additional info regarding it (if available). According to Bragadin,



This book was of course written in 1957, so while this may have all been classified information at the time the author presented it, does anyone know if there has been any information released as of this time regarding Supermarina's Cryptographic Service? Bragadin continues to describe their role:


Bragadin is very critical of the Regia Aeronautica's failure to provide accurate aerial reconnaissance, particularly in the early war period, so it is very fascinating to see that Supermarina used alternative methods to extract intelligence from enemy reconnaissance reports. I am not very far in this book so I hope to see more mention of this in practice, but in case any more information has been made available, do you know of any specific engagements or maneuvers where Supermarina may have intercepted British reconnaissance and altered the positioning/disposition of her forces as a result?

Grazie,
Chris

The mission and exact positioning of the HMS Sea Lion(72S) during Operation Boatswain on May 18,1941.

 

[Turbulent98]

Royal Navy warships do not need the definite article before the name.The attack was not carried out by the submarine Sealion but a motor launch of the same name. The submarine was in UK waters at the time. I am not sure what this has to do with the original post.

 

[Bry]

No expert here.I just know that OVRA was waiting for them.Likely in a Vichy French boat.The British will deny involvement.May 1941 records are sealed for the Sea Lion.
https://www.independent co.uk/voices/commentators/fisk/robert-on-the-trail-of-a-dead-british-major-in-vichy-lebanon-2070153.html

 

[Bry]

No expert here.I just know that OVRA was waiting for them.Likely in a Vichy French boat.The British will deny involvement.May 1941 records are sealed for the Sea Lion.
https://www.independent co.uk/voices/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-on-the-trail-of-a-dead-british-major-in-vichy-lebanon-2070153.html

 

[Bry]

Royal Navy warships do not need the definite article before the name.The attack was not carried out by the submarine Sealion but a motor launch of the same name. The submarine was in UK waters at the time. I am not sure what this has to do with the original post.

There was never any motor launch by that name ever registered. The whereabouts of the sub are classified for May 41,I have checked with the National Archives about 15 years ago.

 

[Bry]

Furthermore the supposed launch had neither the speed nor range to cover the distance required.