This is one of a series of reports either written by col. BIZZI or collected by him. Colonello BIZZI was sent to A.S. in March 1942 to collect technical information on the functionality of Italian systems, especially armored vehicles and weapons. I am translating and posting them here. Once all the translations are completed, I will assemble them and post on the Comando Supremo main page.
The original copy of this particular report is from La meccanizzazione dell'Esercito fino al 1943 tomo II Documento 52 allegato 8. It appears to be an annex to capitano TRANIELLI report, but that is not clear. As always, any errors of translation are mine and all words/comments in [ ] are additional to clarify understanding and enhance readability.
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GOVERNO DELLA LIBIA
3ª Compagnia P.A.I. «R. Gessi» Motorizzate
SUBJECT: armored car Spa 40
From the experience gained from the battle of the Marmarica, it can be said that the armored car Spa 40 proved to be, in general, a good quality machine when used in war.
The installation of weapons onboard is perfect as regards shooting accuracy and performance.
However, these positive characteristics are contrasted by some deficiencies that have manifested themselves with prolonged use, deficiencies which, however, are believed to be easily eliminated:
STEERING ‐- One of the most popular features of the Spa 40 armored car is that all four wheels are steerable. The machine acquires all the mobility allowed to a vehicle, being able to easily perform evolutions that at first sight seem very daring and which are obtained with the sole ability to know how to use the steering wheel. Mobility has great value in combat: for the armored car it is an absolutely indispensable quality given its particular use of assault and wide-ranging reconnaissance.
Unfortunately, however, the Spa 40 armored car does not maintain this characteristic for a long time; as, after roughly the first 500 km. [the system] becomes strained with the rear [drive] train wobbling due to the steering pin. This wobble even caused the helical sector to break by shearing the pin and bolt. In these conditions the driver cannot control the machine and must stop. When the problem occurs in combat then the consequences are much more serious.
The remedy that was adopted was to block the rear steering [mechanism], a remedy which however reduced the characteristic maneuverability as with the reverse driving position mechanism disabled, it reduced the driving of the armored car to a single position like that of any car. Another consequence of the abolition of the rear steering [position] is that it is no longer possible to carry out curves with a narrow radius as, while with the four [steerable wheels] there is the immediate lure of the whole machine that can turn almost on itself, with the front steering only, even with maximum turns of the wheel, the machine turns over a large radius, frequently requiring maneuvering using reverse when you have to follow roads or tracks with tight hairpin bends.
It is therefore necessary to eliminate the causes of the breakage of the rear steering pin and this is believed can be achieved by making appropriate changes to the current transmission mechanism. The technicians need to find the remedy.
VULNERABILITY OF THE WHEELS - Our armored car were preoccupied during operations in Marmarica due to the easy vulnerability of the wheels, one of them was struck causing the immediate stopping of the machine. When engaged in combat, this represents a very serious inconvenience because the alternative is to either abandon the machine itself or replace the wheel. A daring attempt that the circumstances of combat doesn’t always allow. We did it and fortunately we succeeded without sacrificing lives and means. It would be ideal to either add addition wheels (German armored cars have eight) which of course would imply a too radical transformation of the current type of car, or the application of protective armor to protect the tires.
TIRES - The application of "Libya" type tires did not give the expected results. There was a consumption of tires much higher than the assumed average. This partly depends on the weight of the machine (7 tons) which subjected the tires to strong friction; in fact, the greatest consumption occurred on hard ground soil, especially on asphalt.
Brand new tires have worn the entire tread [down] in 1200 km. of paved road. Some tires gave even worse tests, within 500 km. of work. Inexplicable gashes in some and in others there was the surprise of having detached the rubber part from the canvas part. While the aforementioned drawbacks have all occurred in the "Libya" type tires, on the contrary, it was possible to see the excellent evidence [service] provided by the "Artiglio" tires mounted on the command armored car.
[FUEL] TANKS - The Spa 40 armored car has three [fuel] tanks (front - rear - central) so, it can be said, the whole machine is a fuel tank. Four armored cars caught fire in a flash from a blow that pierced the hull.
Reducing the [number of] tanks means reducing the range of the vehicle, increasing the thickness of the armor means increasing the weight of the machine which is already too heavy. It would be ideal to be able to arrange the tanks so that at least the front part, which is normally the one most exposed to combat, is freed of fuel.
ARMAMENT AND EMPLOYMENT - If the armored car were to have only a reconnaissance or mopping-up tasks, then the current armament (20 mm. Machine gun, two 8 cal. Machine guns) is more than sufficient; but since in war it is not possible to establish at a certain point what is required to be done, it is certain that a heavier armament would be more accepted in order to be able to sustain, where necessary, possible combat with tanks. Experience has confirmed that the use of armored cars against armored tank formations causes sacrifices.
The installation of the weapons, as it is, it is guessed that a way should be found to make it easier to swing the turret and aim the weapon. The quicker that this operation is, the more it increases the aggressiveness of the vehicle, hence the need to place the gunner in the best conditions to act effectively. The movement of the turret by means of a crank is somewhat delayed, a faster device could be sought.
R.T. STATIONS - During the battle of Marmarica no use was made of the radio stations installed on our armored cars due to the prohibition of our tactical command in order to avoid disturbances with the authorized stations of the various commands.
However, the radio on the armored car may also be useful in certain conditions of time, place and use. What needs to be reviewed is the installation of the stations so that they do not steal precious hull spaces. The advantage that can be had with having a radio would be nullified by the difficulty in its use by the crew if the equipment does not have a convenient location [in the vehicle].
The intercom system has proved to be useful: it is also used during combat.
This report concludes by highlighting the poor acceleration of the SPA 40 armored car engine.
The accelerating machine develops the maximum speed of 75km. times (on a paved road), but to reach this requires a minimum burst of about 2 km. and beyond. This is detrimental especially in combat where, to fire effectively it is necessary to fire from the halt but at the same time also have the possibility of resuming mobility promptly and quickly, something to which our armored car has not responded. In this regard, it should be noted that while the sample armored car was originally fitted with a 100 hp engine, it is not known why 75 hp engines were later installed.
The original copy of this particular report is from La meccanizzazione dell'Esercito fino al 1943 tomo II Documento 52 allegato 8. It appears to be an annex to capitano TRANIELLI report, but that is not clear. As always, any errors of translation are mine and all words/comments in [ ] are additional to clarify understanding and enhance readability.
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GOVERNO DELLA LIBIA
3ª Compagnia P.A.I. «R. Gessi» Motorizzate
SUBJECT: armored car Spa 40
From the experience gained from the battle of the Marmarica, it can be said that the armored car Spa 40 proved to be, in general, a good quality machine when used in war.
The installation of weapons onboard is perfect as regards shooting accuracy and performance.
However, these positive characteristics are contrasted by some deficiencies that have manifested themselves with prolonged use, deficiencies which, however, are believed to be easily eliminated:
STEERING ‐- One of the most popular features of the Spa 40 armored car is that all four wheels are steerable. The machine acquires all the mobility allowed to a vehicle, being able to easily perform evolutions that at first sight seem very daring and which are obtained with the sole ability to know how to use the steering wheel. Mobility has great value in combat: for the armored car it is an absolutely indispensable quality given its particular use of assault and wide-ranging reconnaissance.
Unfortunately, however, the Spa 40 armored car does not maintain this characteristic for a long time; as, after roughly the first 500 km. [the system] becomes strained with the rear [drive] train wobbling due to the steering pin. This wobble even caused the helical sector to break by shearing the pin and bolt. In these conditions the driver cannot control the machine and must stop. When the problem occurs in combat then the consequences are much more serious.
The remedy that was adopted was to block the rear steering [mechanism], a remedy which however reduced the characteristic maneuverability as with the reverse driving position mechanism disabled, it reduced the driving of the armored car to a single position like that of any car. Another consequence of the abolition of the rear steering [position] is that it is no longer possible to carry out curves with a narrow radius as, while with the four [steerable wheels] there is the immediate lure of the whole machine that can turn almost on itself, with the front steering only, even with maximum turns of the wheel, the machine turns over a large radius, frequently requiring maneuvering using reverse when you have to follow roads or tracks with tight hairpin bends.
It is therefore necessary to eliminate the causes of the breakage of the rear steering pin and this is believed can be achieved by making appropriate changes to the current transmission mechanism. The technicians need to find the remedy.
VULNERABILITY OF THE WHEELS - Our armored car were preoccupied during operations in Marmarica due to the easy vulnerability of the wheels, one of them was struck causing the immediate stopping of the machine. When engaged in combat, this represents a very serious inconvenience because the alternative is to either abandon the machine itself or replace the wheel. A daring attempt that the circumstances of combat doesn’t always allow. We did it and fortunately we succeeded without sacrificing lives and means. It would be ideal to either add addition wheels (German armored cars have eight) which of course would imply a too radical transformation of the current type of car, or the application of protective armor to protect the tires.
TIRES - The application of "Libya" type tires did not give the expected results. There was a consumption of tires much higher than the assumed average. This partly depends on the weight of the machine (7 tons) which subjected the tires to strong friction; in fact, the greatest consumption occurred on hard ground soil, especially on asphalt.
Brand new tires have worn the entire tread [down] in 1200 km. of paved road. Some tires gave even worse tests, within 500 km. of work. Inexplicable gashes in some and in others there was the surprise of having detached the rubber part from the canvas part. While the aforementioned drawbacks have all occurred in the "Libya" type tires, on the contrary, it was possible to see the excellent evidence [service] provided by the "Artiglio" tires mounted on the command armored car.
[FUEL] TANKS - The Spa 40 armored car has three [fuel] tanks (front - rear - central) so, it can be said, the whole machine is a fuel tank. Four armored cars caught fire in a flash from a blow that pierced the hull.
Reducing the [number of] tanks means reducing the range of the vehicle, increasing the thickness of the armor means increasing the weight of the machine which is already too heavy. It would be ideal to be able to arrange the tanks so that at least the front part, which is normally the one most exposed to combat, is freed of fuel.
ARMAMENT AND EMPLOYMENT - If the armored car were to have only a reconnaissance or mopping-up tasks, then the current armament (20 mm. Machine gun, two 8 cal. Machine guns) is more than sufficient; but since in war it is not possible to establish at a certain point what is required to be done, it is certain that a heavier armament would be more accepted in order to be able to sustain, where necessary, possible combat with tanks. Experience has confirmed that the use of armored cars against armored tank formations causes sacrifices.
The installation of the weapons, as it is, it is guessed that a way should be found to make it easier to swing the turret and aim the weapon. The quicker that this operation is, the more it increases the aggressiveness of the vehicle, hence the need to place the gunner in the best conditions to act effectively. The movement of the turret by means of a crank is somewhat delayed, a faster device could be sought.
R.T. STATIONS - During the battle of Marmarica no use was made of the radio stations installed on our armored cars due to the prohibition of our tactical command in order to avoid disturbances with the authorized stations of the various commands.
However, the radio on the armored car may also be useful in certain conditions of time, place and use. What needs to be reviewed is the installation of the stations so that they do not steal precious hull spaces. The advantage that can be had with having a radio would be nullified by the difficulty in its use by the crew if the equipment does not have a convenient location [in the vehicle].
The intercom system has proved to be useful: it is also used during combat.
This report concludes by highlighting the poor acceleration of the SPA 40 armored car engine.
The accelerating machine develops the maximum speed of 75km. times (on a paved road), but to reach this requires a minimum burst of about 2 km. and beyond. This is detrimental especially in combat where, to fire effectively it is necessary to fire from the halt but at the same time also have the possibility of resuming mobility promptly and quickly, something to which our armored car has not responded. In this regard, it should be noted that while the sample armored car was originally fitted with a 100 hp engine, it is not known why 75 hp engines were later installed.
IL COMANDANTE DELLA COMPAGNIA
Capitano P.A.I. ONORIO AGNESA
Capitano P.A.I. ONORIO AGNESA
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