From the early years of the creation of the Air Force it thought to study new weapons that, in attacking warships, were more effective than the usual aerial bombs, which the experience of the 1915-18 war had already proved insufficient against those targets.
In the first experiments carried out in the years 1927 and 1928 with seaplanes M. 24 and S. 55, it was foreseen that the launch of the torpedo had to be carried out at very low altitudes. Nonetheless, it was found that the common torpedoes used by the Navy suffered more or less serious damage when impacting the water.
Some modifications were defined, intended to conveniently reinforce some parts of the weapon to be used for aeronautical use, but this did not completely remove the drawbacks. So, in 1933, an attempt was made to define a device that would allow the angled launch of the torpedo, in order to cushion the impact on the water. A special type of aerodynamic tail was made, which perfectly fulfilled the purpose.
In 1937 the Air Force General Staff arranged for an S. 79 aircraft to be equipped to continue the experience with more modern and faster aircraft, for the launch of the W torpedoes built by the Silurificio di Fiume.
The first aircraft, equipped for launching a single torpedo, entered service in November 1937. In March 1938, the S. 79 was ordered to be equipped to carry two torpedoes. In August this, equipment was completed by S.i.A.I., manufacturer of the aircraft. The first tests revealed the failure of the system and some changes had to be made.
In September 1939 the first S. 79 with double installation arrived on the field of Gorizia and, after tests and modifications, in October it was possible to start the serial production.
As can be seen from this brief chronology, the tests and experiences had been conducted very slowly, without a precise vision of the importance of the problem, and without a determined will to quickly reach a solution.
Not only that, but for years between the Air Force and the Navy there was an unedifying struggle to establish & which of the two Administrations was responsible for supplying the torpedo and on which of the two budgets, it should weigh in relative expense.
The outbreak of the conflict found the question still unsolved.
In the phase of "non-belligerence" the S.M. of the Air Force not only returned to the problem of torpedo bombers with the utmost care and energy, but tried to solve in the best way those great and small difficulties that the emergence of the new specialty inevitably put on the table, both for the Air Force and in relations between Air Force and Navy.
First of all, it established - as was unquestionably logical - that the supply of the weapons and related equipment on the ground belonged exclusively to the Air Force and requested from the Navy only the assistance of means and people that the Air Force could not do without in the initial stage.
Some difficulties inevitably arose, yes: because the Navy was not able to reduce many from its availability, its production and its staff, both for the existence of some susceptibility. For example, to the request for torpedo pistols, which the Navy had that the Air Force lacked to complete the first weapons produced on its behalf, the Navy countered with the request that the aiming and launch of the torpedo should be done by the Navy observers, who - due to the agreements between the two MS - were initially made part of the crews of torpedo aircraft.
Now this request, apparently logical in theory, was not feasible in practice. The observer officer, in fact, could not take the place of one of the pilots in the dangerous phase of the attack and, having to remain standing behind the pilot's seat, he was certainly not able to perform the aiming and to steer or to steer the aircraft with the instantaneity of maneuvers that a torpedo bombing attack requires.
Moreover, the presence of a naval officer on board was considered opportune essentially for the identification of the enemy ships; once ensured, nothing supported that the naval officer was, more than a specially instructed and trained pilot, able to perform the physical operation of aiming and launching.
The impossibility in which the Air Force found itself to accept the request of the Navy seemed to compromise the transfer of the indispensable pistols. But the superior needs and the spirit of mutual understanding ended up prevailing and this question too was resolved.
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The procurement of torpedoes for the Air Force was especially at the beginning, far from easy. The Silurificio di Fiume and that of Naples had long had their production fully committed to the Italian Navy and the Germans; at first, for the most immediate needs, it was possible to obtain a production rate of 4 torpedoes per month.
Subsequently, it was very difficult to establish an appropriate program, which made it possible to make the most of the residual production capacities of the Silurificio di Fiume and that of Naples; so that the situation slowly gradually improved.
In September 1942, the Air Force had withdrawn altogether, both for its own orders and for disposals of the Navy and the Germans, about 250 torpedoes; it had a total of 250 W orders at the Silurificio dl Fiume and 130 Si la Silurificio di Napoli and had other orders planned for 1450 weapons overall between the two companies.
But in the early days the problem of always having the torpedoes necessary for the use of torpedo bombers available on the main bases of the various sectors was extremely serious and, in some cases, was nevertheless solved with a speed that was prodigious.
Some S. 82 aircraft were equipped for the rapid transport of torpedoes, in whose belly it was possible to stow, in addition to the heavy parts making up the weapon, slings, tripods, cranes, test benches, spare parts, disassembly tools and assembly, compressor, reserve compressed air tank, etc. Sometimes it was possible to ship from Italy to Rhodes or Tobruch on a single S. 82: 3 torpedoes, 3 loaded warheads, 3 torpedo guides, 3 tail ends, 3 loaded pistols, 3 gyroscopes, and relative packaging; all for a total weight of about 4000kg.
Until the production ensured a convenient distribution and allowed establishment of fixed deposits in the various sectors, it was not possible to have torpedoes, or to have a sufficient number of them, on all the air bases in the Mediterranean where the torpedo bombers could, depending on the circumstances, be called to work. So that, at each detection of the movements of the English Gibraltar and Alexandria squadrons, first of all, the few torpedoes that were eventually ready for shipment and for testing at the Schools were immediately sent in flight where they were most needed. Then as the air and naval actions moved following the movement of the convoys, the residual torpedoes were transported by means of the S. 82, for example, from Sardinia to Sicily, from here to Libya and finally, possibly, to the Aegean; and viceversa.
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The use of torpedo bombers was linked to the rather complex preparation of the torpedoes on the ground, immediately before the action: preparation that required excellent specialized personnel and appropriate equipment.
In the early days of employment, the Air Force had to rely on the Navy, perfectly expert in the various construction sectors, the preparation and use of the torpedoes. But the Navy could not assign many forces and means to its needs and the Air Force had to partially make up for it with personnel from the torpedo industry to keep its stations active, especially in Libya and the Aegean.
Training courses for aeronautical torpedo specialists were immediately instituted at the manufacturing companies, so that it was possible to gradually free itself from the Navy and industry.
Until, however, in the various Mediterranean fronts had suitably equipped stations established on the main bases, serious difficulties always persisted in completing the delicate operations of storage, preparation and servicing of the weapons, due to the environmental characteristics at the air bases, especially those of Libya, which did not allow the most suitable installation of the various equipment and their appropriate protection against atmospheric conditions. The high temperature, the sand, the poor quality of the oils, the lack of electricity or the non-correspondence of the characteristics of these to the types of compressors very often determined very difficult situations, in which all the initiatives and resolution skills of the staff responsible for preparing these very delicate weapons were involved.
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The first school for torpedo bomber personnel arose out of natural necessity in Gorizia, as its [air]field was the closest to the torpedo preparation, mounting and testing source, the Bienne Torpedo Factory.
In November 1940, when it was also possible to obtain a share of the production of the Italian Silurificio in Naples, a second school was established at the Capodichino airport.
At these schools - in each of which the Navy posted an officer observer, with the task of cooperating in the instruction - not only was all the torpedo bomber crews and the specialized torpedo men trained, but all the experiments relating to torpedoes, installation, and aiming instruments were carried out, as well as all the numerous tests to which, since its delivery from the workshop, the torpedo was subjected: tests of the torpedo with exercise heads, launched with an inert warhead, weighted warhead launch, etc.
In the most bitter air and naval battles that took place in the Mediterranean, often the instructor staff and any adequately students, would assist the action of their not so numerous comrades from the operational units using the school’s aircraft.
Besides the S. 79 aircraft, the S. 84 were later equipped for the launch of the torpedo; but, due to the reduced visibility for the pilots and the reduced handling, they did not give good results.
Due to the increase the use of the new weapon, the Torpedo Bomber Office was established in February 1941 at the Air Force Staff, which internally grouped all the technical, logistical, operational and internal activities, previously headed by different Offices. A technical regulation and a regulation for the use of the torpedo were also prepared by this Office.
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The aerial torpedo used by the Air Force was a naval torpedo, type M A S, of the caliber of 450 mm, with the appropriate variants imposed by the need for stability during its travel in the air, by the high launch speeds, from the strong impact in water, from the need to avoid the operation of the pistol due to the impact in the water. etc.
The weapon allowed a launch from a maximum 100 m of altitude at 300 km / h of speed. The constant intent of the technicians was of course to improve the weapon, both to increase its intrinsic effectiveness and to put the torpedo bomber crew in the safest position possible; therefore, for the first purpose, there was a tendency to strive to increase the explosive charge and a greater initial running stability; for the second purpose, the possibility of higher altitudes and launch speeds and a longer travel in the air.
At the end of 1941 the construction of a head capable of about 200 kg of explosive, in place of the 170 [kg] of the type W torpedo and 160 [kg] of the type SI torpedo was in progress.
But they also studied at some torpedo manufacturers (which were called «silurotti») specially designed for aerial use, the main characteristics of which had to be: possibility of launching at much higher altitudes than 100 m and at speeds greater than 500 km / h, large charge, small weight, long air travel, great underwater speed.
The armistice found, however, these weapons are still in the design stage.
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The above shows how inaccurate Admiral Inchino is with his statement in his book "Gaudo and Matapan" which states
«After the experience of Punta Stilo everyone naturally agreed on the need for us to develop torpedo aircraft and this was accordingly done, but unfortunately precious months had been lost in the meantime ».
It was not, in fact, after the experience of Punta Stilo on 9 July 1940 (which, moreover, as will be seen below, does not prove anything new and spectacular), that the Air Force perceived the importance of torpedo bombers and consequently provided them. If the new Chief of SM. of the Air Force had not placed all its care and concern in the prompt preparation of torpedo aircraft units since November 1939, these [units] could not have acted for the first time in Alexandria on August 16, 1940, this being about a month after the experience of Punta Stilo.
Indeed, it would have been impossible in such a short time to create an
ex-novo specialty for which there was a lack of equipment, weapons, crews, training, regulations, etc.
