Francoquarter
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The binary division were not a news of the Ordinamento Pariani, they born in the Ordinamento Baistrocchi in 1934, see the 31a divisione Caprera
The binary division were not a news of the Ordinamento Pariani, they born in the Ordinamento Baistrocchi in 1934, see the 31a divisione Caprera
From an organizational point of view, Badoglio himself, on the basis of his personal African experience, judged the ternary division too heavy and not very manoeuvrable, at least in that operational theatre. Thus, with the tactical arrangement sponsored by Pariani, the introduction of the binary division would be reached, which would not have represented a simple organic change but a radical modification of the functions of the divisional unit, which lost its ability to maneuver to transform itself into a column of impact and penetration, thus allowing the maneuver to become a specific prerogative of the army (long-range manoeuvre) and of the army corps (small-range manoeuvre).
During the Ethiopian campaign, first two and then three divisions (Assetta, Cosseria and Metauro) had been sent to Libya, all on only two infantry regiments, in order to make them more easily transportable. These GG.UU., however not tested in combat, had proved to be leaner and more manoeuvrable and Pariani believed that the solution to the problem lay in that entirely occasional expedient. As Dorello Ferrari observes, the adoption of the ternary order of 1926 was not created so much from considerations of a tactical nature as from a problem of economy of forces, because it was calculated that the Italian defensive needs involved a minimum of thirty divisions, 19 against France and 10 against Yugoslavia, and on the other hand budgetary requirements did not allow for the formation of more than 90 infantry and grenadier regiments, i.e. three for each division. It was therefore the tactical needs that were paradoxically related to the structural limits, and not vice versa. The first binary divisions appeared in 1934, when the unit stationed in Sardinia at the 30% [manning], was split into two lighter divisions, Sabauda (later reverted to ternary when sent to A.O.) and Caprera. Between the summer and November of 1935 the needs of the mobilization for the I'A.O. and the motorisation of two divisions (Po and Trento) led to the transformation or establishment of another seven binary divisions, the number of which would be reduced to four in 1936. The definitive and generalized adoption of the binary system would take place during 1937 for the concomitant effect of several factors but not as a consequence - as has often been stated - of alleged lessons from the Ethiopian war, during which the binary-ordered divisions sent to A.O. (Cosseria and Assietta) were not actually employed. Instead, there were three decisive factors, two of a strategic and financial nature and one of a tactical nature. The first two were summed up in the opposite need to increase the number of units for reasons of image and international strategic balance, and at the same time not to increase too much the balanced force and the infantry regiments, given that at that moment the Army was busy getting the government to approve a ten-year modernization and expansion plan which would in practice have involved doubling the annual budget from 2.5 to 5 billion. The tactical factor was given by the need to make the divisions more suitable for conducting the war of movement established by the 1935 Directives. The project would have been started in July 1937, and a first G.U. of this type it was tested, even if with incomplete personnel, during the Great Maneuvers in Sicily carried out in the same year (497).