Posted 08 November 2005 - 09:04 AM buy FB
Was it part of the Fleet that escorted the Italian convoy to Bengasi (near or at large escort?)?
Some sources list this Division in the Italian OoB for this battle, other not.
Those who list it (for instance Giorgerini's La guerra italiana sul mare. La Marina tra vittoria e sconfitta 1940-1943) though, go on in saying that this Division, was there but did not manage to be part of the battle because it was late in assuming its position in the RM fleet disposition, always behind (they were coming from near Bengasi where they escorted the convoy).
What really happened? Why weren't those 4 cruiser able to line up and go towards the front of RM fleet, and thus assuming a useful fire position being that they were among the fastest ships in our fleet?
Did Adm. Sansonetti ever wrote something about this?
Best regards
Posted 08 November 2005 - 11:55 AM by Supermarina
The horrible Regia Aeronautica recce service induced Adm. Campioni to divide his cruisers, before the action off Calabria, in two groups:
III and I Division (the heavy cruisers)
and VIII, IV and VII (the light ones)
with his two BBs in the middle.
In this way, wherever the British would have been sighted, at least, it would be possible to have an advanced force to engage the enemy cruisers.
When the Mediterranean Fleet was in sight, about at 15.00, Campioni' suspicion proofed to be right and the heavy cruisers were in the right place.
The Italian light ones (VIII) engaged the British scout force at first and Tovey four cruisers (Liverpool, Orion, Neptune and Sydney) run like hell facing only Garibaldi and Abruzzi asking for the 15" Warspite support and writing, still in 1948, on the London Gazette official report, they were engaged by four Zaras.
To be unable to count the right number of enemies (2 instead of four) and to appreciate the size of the 203 mm water coloumns (diuble than the 152 of the Garibaldis) is a further confirmation of the British shock of the day.
The two IV Div. cruisers (Da Barbiano and Di Giussano) were in sight later, when Warspite had yet arrived; they were shelled for a while, with no effect, by the British BB quite beyond their 152 mm (6") range.
The VII Division was the rear one of the second cruiser group and had not the chance to be engaged during the brief first time; she was still too much behind during the following general action.
It would have been impossible, anyway, to direct the fire of all the 14 cruisers in a single line during the action as it was possible to direct the fire of only two ships against a single target. The four British cruisers, so, could face, by the book, no more than 8 cruisers.
Bye
EC
PS I'll be absent for a while, but don't worry guys, I'm working at something... :twisted:
Posted 08 November 2005 - 02:34 PM by FB
Thank you very very much, Enrico.
From what you write, it seems that the VII Division was in the rear because it was meant to be there. In the mentioned book by Giorgerini it seems instead the it was there because (inexplicabily) it wasn't able to pull up to the front.
That's why I asked. As always there seem to be differing stances on battles etc. That's also why I was courious to know if Sansonetti wrote something about Punta Stilo.
Ciao
Posted 08 November 2005 - 03:21 PM by Supermarina
You may read a Sansonetti general study about the Action off Calabria in an appendix of Mattesini's La battaglia di Punta Stilo (a book I do not agree with, but rich of documents).
About Giorgerini he had always, according my opinion, some problems to appreciate what's the bow and what the aft...
EC
Was it part of the Fleet that escorted the Italian convoy to Bengasi (near or at large escort?)?
Some sources list this Division in the Italian OoB for this battle, other not.
Those who list it (for instance Giorgerini's La guerra italiana sul mare. La Marina tra vittoria e sconfitta 1940-1943) though, go on in saying that this Division, was there but did not manage to be part of the battle because it was late in assuming its position in the RM fleet disposition, always behind (they were coming from near Bengasi where they escorted the convoy).
What really happened? Why weren't those 4 cruiser able to line up and go towards the front of RM fleet, and thus assuming a useful fire position being that they were among the fastest ships in our fleet?
Did Adm. Sansonetti ever wrote something about this?
Best regards
Posted 08 November 2005 - 11:55 AM by Supermarina
The horrible Regia Aeronautica recce service induced Adm. Campioni to divide his cruisers, before the action off Calabria, in two groups:
III and I Division (the heavy cruisers)
and VIII, IV and VII (the light ones)
with his two BBs in the middle.
In this way, wherever the British would have been sighted, at least, it would be possible to have an advanced force to engage the enemy cruisers.
When the Mediterranean Fleet was in sight, about at 15.00, Campioni' suspicion proofed to be right and the heavy cruisers were in the right place.
The Italian light ones (VIII) engaged the British scout force at first and Tovey four cruisers (Liverpool, Orion, Neptune and Sydney) run like hell facing only Garibaldi and Abruzzi asking for the 15" Warspite support and writing, still in 1948, on the London Gazette official report, they were engaged by four Zaras.
To be unable to count the right number of enemies (2 instead of four) and to appreciate the size of the 203 mm water coloumns (diuble than the 152 of the Garibaldis) is a further confirmation of the British shock of the day.
The two IV Div. cruisers (Da Barbiano and Di Giussano) were in sight later, when Warspite had yet arrived; they were shelled for a while, with no effect, by the British BB quite beyond their 152 mm (6") range.
The VII Division was the rear one of the second cruiser group and had not the chance to be engaged during the brief first time; she was still too much behind during the following general action.
It would have been impossible, anyway, to direct the fire of all the 14 cruisers in a single line during the action as it was possible to direct the fire of only two ships against a single target. The four British cruisers, so, could face, by the book, no more than 8 cruisers.
Bye
EC
PS I'll be absent for a while, but don't worry guys, I'm working at something... :twisted:
Posted 08 November 2005 - 02:34 PM by FB
Thank you very very much, Enrico.
From what you write, it seems that the VII Division was in the rear because it was meant to be there. In the mentioned book by Giorgerini it seems instead the it was there because (inexplicabily) it wasn't able to pull up to the front.
That's why I asked. As always there seem to be differing stances on battles etc. That's also why I was courious to know if Sansonetti wrote something about Punta Stilo.
Ciao
Posted 08 November 2005 - 03:21 PM by Supermarina
You may read a Sansonetti general study about the Action off Calabria in an appendix of Mattesini's La battaglia di Punta Stilo (a book I do not agree with, but rich of documents).
About Giorgerini he had always, according my opinion, some problems to appreciate what's the bow and what the aft...
EC
