Both the Libyan divisions and the Blackshirt divisions were raised by the conscription of local men, i.e. Libyan natives and Italian colonists. They were dispatched in the first line because they were regarded as more suited to bear the weather of the desert, given that their men had been living there for years.
I can’t comment on your theory that officers were scared and requested safer postings until you can provide evidence that those requests were happening.
I have use the detailed maps found in La prima offensive britannica in Africa settentrionale schizzo 13 and 14 to examine the Italian position at Sidi el Barrani.
Catanzaro» was in a central reserve position.
My overarching consideration when discussing this battle is that the events don’t unfold in the historical manner without the use the MK II Matilda.
The Libyan and CC.NN. units were generally smaller and had less equipment/weapons. They were placed in forward, fixed locations where these issues could be minimized. The two metropolitan divisions were placed in key locations; «Cirene» was securing the open southern flank,
The layout reflects the lack of mobility of the 10ª Armata and the problem of defending in the desert with an open southern flank.
Catanzano» should have been at Nibeiwa and «Maletti» in the central location.
I never used the word "scared". Do not confuse me with those who have called the Italians "cowards"
Second, General Maletti complained of his Italian officers asking to be transferred out of his command to "safer" positions.
I find it interesting that you equate ‘exercising good judgement and leaving their men behind’ to those thousands of Italian officers whom, understanding that success was unlikely, chose to remain with their soldiers and lead them during desperate battles. These officers often gave their lives trying to give their soldiers a fighting chance by motivating them and guiding them in their fights.
You might wish to rethink that line of argument if I were you if you truly believe Italian officers aren’t cowards.