Posted by Supermarina: Mon Oct 04, 2004
You are too much kind, Jeffrey, I'm an amateur, not an expert.
Anyway, Scipione sunk that night the British MTB 316 and damaged MTBs 260 and 313.
The British, as always, had some racial problems to admit that a man-of-war of theirs, even a small one, was lost by Italian gunfire so wrote, in their HMSO Ships of the Royal Navy: Statement of Losses during the Second World War, ed. 1947, pg. 26, that MTB 316 had been sunk "...by a torpedo from Italian cruisers off Reggio, S. Italy". This was the beginning of the usual smokescreen.
The fact the Italian had recovered, after that night encounter, not only the debris of 316 but a table with the number 305 induced them to believe that another MTB had been lost. It's, however, a good habit among the small coastal forces of all the world to exchange everything which could be useful (weapons, instruments etc.) for the boats ready to sail, so this hypothesis was not a correct one.
OK, Guys, this is it.
The theme was: an intruder who tried, within a closed basin, to affirm his sea control against the insiders.
The Allied (mainly British) fleets suffered the following losses in the Med--Red sea theatre (losses and damages which imposed to retire the men-of-war for repairs outside the a.m. basin stopping so their mission there; on the other side losses and ships damaged and not yet ready at the day of the armistice; only BBs, carriers and cruisers considered, Monitors, fast minelayers, old BBs and cruisers not)
Barham + S D 11/41 (name, + = sunk, S= Submarine, D= German, 11/41= Nov. 1941)
Warspite B D 5/41 (B= bomber)
Valiant AC I 12/41 (AC= attack craft, I = Italian)
Queen Elizabeth AC I 12/41
Renown B I 7/41
Nelson TB I 9/41 (TB= torpedo bomber)
Barham B D 5/41
Hood B I 7/40
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Cavour TB GB (GB=British) 11/40
we could consider too that Royal Soveraing and Ramillies (and the "R" class as a whole, with the older cruisers of the "C" and "D" classes which could, anyway, be used again in an useful way along the Italian Eastern Africa coasts and can not, so, be included in the total of the broken off missions) were considered, after the action off Calabria, July 1940, and off Sardinia, Nov. 1940, no more suitable for use in the Mediterranean theatre; the same for Repulse, which was rejected in May 1941 just before a convoy leaving from Gibraltar into the Western Med. as the air menace was too much hight for that non-modernized ship (The Regia Aeronautica only was notoriously active in that part of the Mediterranean).
Cesare too was classified as worn out in Dec. 1942 and sent to Pola for training purposes only.
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Ark Royal + S D 11/41
Eagle S D + 8/42
Illustrious B D-I 1/41
Formidable B D 5/41
Indomitable B D 8/42
Indomitable TB I 7/43
We can consider Eagle worn out at the end of Dec. 1940 after have sustained minor damages by Italian bombers in July and Oct. 1940.
She came back in the Med. only in Spring 1942.
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Calypso + S I 6/40
Capetown MTB I 4/41
Neptune + M I 12/41 (M=mine)
Liverpool TB I 10/40
Liverpool TB I 6/42
Kent TB I 9/40
York AC I 3/41
Glasgow TB I 12/40
Bonaventure S I 3/41
Phoebe TB I 8/41
Cleopatra S I 7/43
Argonaut S I 12/42
Manchester + MTB I 8/42
Manchester TB I 7/41
Kenya S I 8/42
Cairo + S I 8/42
Nigeria S I 8/42
Aurora M I 12/41
Gloucester + B D 5/41
Calcutta + B D 6/41
Coventry + B D 9/42
Ajax B D 1/43
Southampton + B D 1/41
Fiji B D 6/41
Najad S D 3/42
Dido B D 5/41
Phoebe S D 10/42
Penelope B D 4/42
Galatea + S D 12/41
Newcastele, MTB D 6/42
Hermione S D 6/42
Arethusa, TB D 11/42
Newfoundland S D 7/43
Perth B D 5/41
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Trento + S GB 6/42
Trieste + B USA 4/43
Zara + N GB 3/41 (N= surface ship)
Fiume + N GB 3/41
Pola + TB and N GB 3/41
Colleoni + N GB 7/40
Bande Nere + S GB 4/42
Da Barbiano + N GB 12/41
Di Giussano + N GB 12/41
Diaz S GB + 2/41
Attendolo + B USA 12/42
Bari + B USA 5/43
Bolzano S GB 8/42
Gorizia B USA 4/43
We can add the cruiser Taranto, disarmed at the end of 1942 in face of the new menaces.
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As you can see we have:
a total of 22 Allied BBs against 7 Italian ones (the monthly media was 4 against 4)
a total of 11 carriers against 0 (not counting the escort carriers, which were 7) with a monthly media of 2.
a total of 76 cruisers against 24 Italian ones (the monthly media was 16 against 12).
In front of a (total) strength of 3 against one the Allies suffered:
8 BBs which had to break off their mission in front of 1
(11 at 2 with the worn-out or no more suitable ships included)
6 Carriers which had to do the same (7 counting the conditions of Eagle at the end of 1940)
34 cruisers in the same condiction against 15 Italian ones.
The division of these results between the Italian and German services gives:
Germany 23,5 Italy 24,5
not counting the a.m. cases of Royal Sovereign, Ramillies, Repulse and Eagle, which were all determined by Italian causes.
In detail, the Luftwaffe achieved 14,5 "points" and the Kriegsmarine 9
the Regia Marina gained 14 "points" and the Regia Aeronautica 10,5.
The British were responsible of 10 "points" and the USA of 4, not counting the cruiser Taranto paid off.
Any suggestion gentlemen?
Bye EC
The reality of war is, anyway, not a champion league but traffic and strategical projection. The fundamental traffic within the central basin of the Med. (the Mar Jonio in Italian terms) was possible only by the far cover of the Italian main battle force since the action off Calabria, July 1940, until the invasion of Sicily, July 1943, when the Royal Navy was at least able, courtesy of the US Navy who sent two modern BBs at Scapa Flow, to pick up six BBs against the two Italian ones then available. It was only a temporary lease but, unfortunately, the nerves of the Italian Comando Supremo generals (Ambrosio and Castellano) cracked on 25 July 1943. Had the Regia Marina been able to go on with her correct fleet in being strategy things would have been different, very different. EC
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Posted by Lupo Solitario: Mon Oct 04, 2004
SUPERMARINA wrote: |
.
Any suggestion gentlemen?
Bye EC
|
At least three, Enrico:
1) How do you consider the damages at Vittorio Veneto at Matapan? and Littorio and Duilio after Taranto?
2) I don't see which could have been the "other" use of the fleet in summer 1943 with Sicily practically just in allied hands (and practically Sardinia cut off in few time I fear) OK we could sell high the hide but with which results?
3) It doesn't seem me RE lost head July 25, the coup had been prepared by time...they lost head 45 days after...
(ok you probably have just the answers but questions had to be made
)
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Posted by Supermarina: Mon Oct 04, 2004
/Good questions Lupo, I hope the answers too will be valid.
The Taranto torpedoing is not considered, except for the Cavour, as the ships were able to come back in line before the armistice.
The confront was between two logistical systems. The intruders were numerically stronger but had not the availability, in the Med., of the facilities necessary to repair serious damages, the insiders Italians had.
In July-Sept. 1943 the traffic with Sardinia suffered about a 10% percentage of losses, and was, so, maintained. The tonnage war too was, according to the British opinion expressed in Spring 1943, a failure as the appreciated, correctly, the Axis had still enough tonnage to go on with the actual strength until Autumn 1944. The Italian Navy opinion was just the same. The experience confirmed the Germans were able to maintain the sea lanes in the Balkans and along the Italian and France coasts even with half of the freighters available in Sept. 1943 before the armistice.
Had the Anglosaxon timetable been respected the two most modern British BBs (King George V and Howe) would have sailed for Britain before the end of July. As a consequence, the further, yet planned landing, would have been confined at Reggio and Crotone with the order not to go beyond the Sila mountains for lack of troops until spring 1944 when a new landing in Sardinia and Corsica was forecast as the necessary beginning of the France invasion first time. Provence. We know now, anyway, that the lack of Allied landing crafts was so great they had to postpone the Provence landings until Aug. 1944. Italy would have gained a year, so, facing the eventuality of an armistice without German troops inside her borders, except for southern Italy and the main islands.
The other problem was, according to this scenario, if Stalin would not sign a separate peace. My personal opinion is he would have made a new Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. Mussolini thought the same way.
The order to maintain the two a.m. British BBs in the Med. was accepted, at least, by the Americans, the new master of the Anglo Saxon alliance since March 1943, only after the Duce fall and in a declared way as a consequence of that sudden new fact.
Mussolini's overthrow was planned for years (I published just now a long article about the army maneuvers in this sense) but the 25 July op. was an improvised one. The program was scheduled for Aug. and was accelerated that morning after the King had said he WAS NOT, REPLAT NOT, GOING TO DO ANYTHING AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE LAST NIGHT GREAT COUNCIL OF FASCISM VOTE.
It was only a Latin America style golpe made by a group of criminals (less than 10 peoples) which had the worst consequences not only for Italy but for the world as well.
Bye EC