This is the first part of a much longer report. I will be adding to it as I can.
Notes on the experience derived from the employment of the «Ariete» Division
during the Operational period "BATTLE OF MARMARICA"
(November 18, 1941 - February 20, 1942)
1º) TANKS
Tank L/3 - Once again found to be an absolutely unsuitable vehicle for armor, armament, speed and engine.
Insufficient armor, perforable even by common machine gun amor-piercing ammunition, poor visibility and not likely to be improved, even with the adoption of periscopes and mobile hyposcopes; limited firing arc, machine guns easily jammed, difficulty in starting from inside the tank, slides easily in varied terrain, rigid suspension, insufficient speed to compensate for the great vulnerabilities, all are the causes that contribute to make the personnel lose all confidence in this tank and reduce the efficiency of the tank to zero.
The L/3 tank can only be useful in cooperation with infantry units.
With some modifications to the equipment, such as the removal of the entire upper part, installation of torsion bars, the L/3 carriage could be used as a mobile, armored, tracked machine gun, and be used in an almost similar [manner] to that of the «Bren carriers »in use in the British army.
Features that a modern L tank should have
In relation to the terrain of the Libyan-Egyptian theater, this combat vehicle should be able to reach a sensible speed (50-60 km. on desert terrain) and with great range, such as to allow it to be able to properly thrust, with a certain margin of safety, as the vanguard of the large tank force.
Its effective armament against similar vehicles could consist of a 20 cannon and two paired machine guns. The hull structure should not differ from that of heavier tanks.
Briefly the characteristics should be the following:
a) - structure: a lower hull and a turret in which the main offensive weapon must be placed (20 machine gun);
b) - Armor: such as to guarantee its safety against the offense weapons ranging from 13 to 20 m/m;
c) - Speed: high (from 50-60 km. per hour on desert terrain), a characteristic that requires at the same time an engine of exuberant power compared to the vehicle's speed:
d) - Range: at least 400 km without the use of fuel trailers;
e) - Armament: a 20 m/m machine gun placed in a turret and two paired cal. 8 machine guns, Breda type, in the hull;
f) - Suspension and track: such as to allow any movement, on any terrain, without fear of incurring breaks and tormenting the crew too much;
g) - Crew: three men are more than enough;
h) - Radio: R.F. type 2C/A;
i) - Antimagnetic compass: in a convenient location; it is indispensable for movement in desert terrain.
Tank M/13-40 - Overall it responded very well when required.
There has been a difference for some time between the equipment [currently] in A.S. and that recently arrived from the Motherland which is less robust.
The main problems that have occurred are generally the following:
a) - discontinuous operation of the oil pressure gauge;
b) - insufficient cooling system, especially for the intended use in hot climates;
c) - very frequent breakage of the rubber connector sleeves for the auxiliary water tank;
d) - malfunctions of the oil filter, a drawback especially in combat and when the tank is called to travel long distances, it limits the offensive possibilities, forcing it to stop;
e) - easy calibration of the injection pump;
f) - frequent breakage of the oil and water pump shaft;
g) - failure of the starter nut;
h) - failure of the gear lever and front teeth of the direct drive;
i) - breakage of the [turret] shaft due to the traverse of the cannon.
In the recently assigned tanks (constituting the vehicles of the Xº btg. carri M. 13 of the 133º rgt. «Littorio»), to the deficiencies already reported, must be added:
a) - very frequent failure of 3rd gear;
b) - breakage of the starter motor shaft;
c) - easy puncturing of fuel tanks, both main and reserve;
d) - failure of the transmission shaft;
e) - broken links of the track and the teeth of the drive sprocket;
f) - easy breakage of the oil delivery pipes from the injection pump to the injectors;
g) - breakage of the suspension shoulder plug.
The experience gained in this combat period suggests some changes in order to make greater use of the qualities and possibilities of our M. 13-40 tank.
Engine assembly - you need to change it. The current [one] has insufficient power and this deficiency is attributable to all the aforementioned faults that are very common. For use in desert areas, the engine must have a significant excess of power, to ensure the use of the tank in any terrain (sandy, muddy, stony, flat, sloping, etc.) and at any temperature.
Oil filter - Moving the filter from outside to inside the combat compartment is essential, to allow the crew to clean it during combat.
Range - insufficient. It can be increased by using reserve cans containing oil, diesel and water: secured to the tank by means of special support railings to be affixed to the right side and rear of the tank. With 8 20-liter cans, there would be a range increase greater than eighty kilometers compared to the current one.
Turret traverse - The «Calzoni» pump is not necessary and it is bulky.
Ammunition supply - The one for the 47 cannon is not always sufficient. It must be increased to at least 110 rounds (25 more rounds than currently), placing them conveniently in the bottom of the combat compartment.
It is also necessary to realize:
- a tracked tractor with light armor and of adequate power necessary for the recovery of inoperable tanks on the battlefield;
- an armored tank for the transport of parts that are perishable and more consumable with specialized mechanics for brief and urgent repairs during combat stops and in areas under fire;
- a mobile armored workshop for battalions that, unlike the current one, can closely follow them everywhere.
The need for a command tank for battalion, regiment and division commanders is also recognized. While retaining the identical external characteristics of a common tank, the command tank should allow easy movement inside the combat compartment (radio station operation) and ensure observation of the entire horizon. The current radio center tanks, with their very small internal space, put the commander in serious difficulty when executing his command functions.
2º) ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
Cannon 47/32 - The equipment ballistically gave excellent tests and its caliber proved suitable for piercing the armor of most enemy tanks and armored vehicles.
It should be equipped, if possible, with the projectile that is simultaneously piercing, bursting and incendiary.
As armament of the M. 13-40 tank, it didn’t give rise to any noteworthy findings; as armament of the anti-tank unit, the impossibility or difficulty of using the same vehicle [to fire from] that carries it has significantly reduced its performance.
Even the mod. 39 autotrainabile has, during practical experiments, proven the absolute unsuitability for towing on varied terrain even at the most modest speeds and for short distances.
Experience has shown the need for anti-tank weapons to have the ability for immediate action, under penalty of their capture or destruction.
They must be able to open fire from the same vehicle that transports it, in all directions in order to compete with the enemy vehicles, whether they are self-propelled anti-tank vehicles, or whether they are trucks equipped with machine guns.
It is therefore essential to abandon the folding carriage and install them on a tracked or wheeled vehicle, light, fast, with great range, not very high over the ground, which allows the cannon to fire in horizontal sectors of 360º and gives the crew some protection against machine guns and splinters.
Fucilone 20 and 25 - The 20mm "Solothurn" and the captured 25mm "Hotchkiss" are carriage mounted, and do not meet the requirements of anti-tank weapons for armored divisions.