The Italian Army in North Africa, 1940-43: Luck Was Lacking, But Valor Was Not

[DrG]

Thank you for your review. If you could make a comparison, would you prefer this book or Green, Massignani, "Rommel's North Africa Campaign"?

With regards to the Italian trucks used by the Germans, you can find a confirmation of this matter in Cavallero's diary (p. 560) and in the similar Diary of the Comando Supremo (volume 8, p. 695), where Cavallero complained with Rommel about the fact that, on 10 November 1942, he was still using the Italian autogruppo leased to him previously (no date is specified, but Messe, "Come finì la guerra in Africa", p. 23, states in his memoirs that it happened already in 1941), despite the several previous requests from the Comando Supremo to give it back, and that 25% of his 10,000 vehicles were Italian. The matter is evaluated also in Ceva, "Guerra mondiale", pp. 280-282.

 

[jwsleser]

Like everything in life, it depends.

For a straight forward account of the campaign itself, Rommel's North African Campaign is better. The narrative is truly chronological and it has better maps to support the action. The limitations of the book include less focus on the Italians (Compass is very briefly mention) and overall less detail.

Luck was Lacking has more detail, but the flow of information isn't direct. The use of an overview followed by a more detailed account of the battles is awkward as an event stated in the overview isn't addressed in the detail account and vice versa. For example in the overview of the First Italo-German Offensive, the authors write about the actions of the 6 RTR against the «Pavia» on 19 December but don't mention Bir el Gobi on the same date (p.122). In the detailed account of Crusader, Bir el Gobi is presented in great detail (pp.126–130 but not a single map) but the other events of 19 December aren't mentioned. The reader needs to read two different parts of the book to understand what happened on 19 December.

The danger (IMHO) is the Luck was Lacking makes the reader aware of the problems of the historiography of the Italians in AS but doesn't present the discussion necessary to understand it. From reading Luck, one could argue that the Italian soldiers were just as well fed as his Allied counterparts (pp.33–35). The argument is poorly present using false equivalences. I have done a lot of research on Italians rations (a subject which truly needs more research) and what they say isn't supported by the record. I can see someone arguing that the Italian soldier was as well fed as his enemies and citing this book as evidence.

I need to do some work, but will come back to your second comment.

Pista! Jeff

 

[jwsleser]

DrG

Thanks for the cites. There is no doubt that the Germans used/kept Italians trucks. The issue is that the authors present their position as a simple fact and ignore the complexities of the problem.

When reading about an issue such as trucks, one must remember one basic fact: The RE was incapable of successfully executing an offensive operation in AS. The German force was the offensive power and maintaining its effectiveness was a critical factor of any Axis success or failure.

Part of the complexity includes:

-When and why were the trucks given to the Germans?
-What would the Italians had done differently if they had the trucks?
-What would have been the impact on the German force without the trucks?
-Would Germany have replaced the trucks in the DAK that were returned to the Italians?

So the simple statement “The Germans also managed to ‘requisition’ at least a thousand trucks from the Italian high command in North Africa, which meekly submitted to the German request, thus depriving the Italian front-line troops of already scarce transportation assets.” doesn't informed the reader of the complexities of the issue.

This is the same issue for many of the other points the authors make in the book. It paints a picture that the Italian failures were different from what they actually were. If only the Germans hadn't..... [pick your favorite Germans treating Italians badly story].

 

[DrG]

Thank you Jeff. Maybe the relative lack of internal consistency of the book has been caused by the presence of two authors, who wrote the chapters in relative autonomy?

 

[jwsleser]

DrG

That is certainly a possibility, but I feel it is more a style choice that wasn't properly executed. The overview contained too many small details that should have been part of the detailed accounts. The detailed accounts didn't weave all the information provided in the overview into a cohesive narrative.

Overall I felt overwhelmed with information. There is a lot of good material in the book, but one will need other sources to make full use of it. The chapter 'The First Italo-German Counteroffensive in North Africa' (pp.108–125) doesn't include a single map. In this chapter Tobruk, Brevity, Battleaxe and Crusader (Crusader actually should be in the next chapter). The next chapter is The Second British Offensive in North Africa where Crusader is discussed Only one maps that covers the entire Cirenaica and the major moves from the Egyptian border to El Aghelia is provided.

I will likely pull it out from time to time, but it is not a book that will be my first go-to.

 

[1089maul]

Agreed. A. Dry good review! I have been on vacation for the last three weeks and have not yet got round to read the book yet.
Will put my thoughts of the book on this thread if I have anything to add to Jeff’s.
Regards to all,
Bob